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In recent decades, intellectual property law (in particular patent law) has had to face new 
challenges due to the accelerating development of technology. Patents can have a negative effect on a 
country‘s economy if too many invalid or overly broad patents are granted. Such patents have the 
potential to impose high costs on society without providing substantial benefits. If a patent regime cannot 
avoid the grant of such patents, or does not provide instruments to remove them from the register, the 
negative effect may stifle innovation instead of encouraging it. In 2008, in consideration of these 
problems, the government of New Zealand introduced a Patents Bill. This Bill is the culmination of the 
government‘s review process, which started in the late 1980s. The aim of the Bill is to update New 
Zealand‘s patent law in order to bring it in line with international practise and to reduce the costs to 
society arising from invalid and overly broad patents. The provisions of the Bill cover all principal 
aspects of the patent regime: standards of examination and procedures, challenges on the grant of a 
patent, and provisions for updating the regulatory regime for patent attorneys. This dissertation focuses on 
analysing how the quality of New Zealand‘s patents could be enhanced using the knowledge and 
experience of third parties. Because the current examination standards may allow the grant of overly 
broad patents, this dissertation analyses specifically which changes in the examination procedure could 
help prevent the grant of ―bad‖ patents without overburdening the resources of the IPONZ. In the next 
step, the dissertation analyses third-party instruments under the current patent system and under the 
Patents Bill 2008, proving that neither approach by itself would be sufficient to bring about an effective 
patent reviewing system for New Zealand. The approach under the current system is too expensive and 
has the potential to delay the granting procedure, whereas the approach proposed by the Patents Bill 2008 
limits the influence of third parties before the grant of a patent to such an extent that most patents may 
remain in the register. The overall aim of this dissertation is to suggest a new approach that includes 
aspects of both of the others in order to find a balanced solution and an optimal fit for the specific needs 
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Over recent decades, the importance of intellectual property rights in 
general and patents in particular has steadily increased. After a long 
dormancy, patent law has of late attracted remarkable attention from the 
judiciary, the legislature, and the executive branch of government. In the 
past few years in particular, the development of new technologies has 
placed great pressure on patent law to provide effective protection, since 
increasing numbers of patents have been granted outside the traditional 
fields.1 As a result, traditional intellectual property protection has undergone 
wide-reaching changes worldwide. Most countries in the world have 
confronted these new challenges and adapted their laws accordingly, 
reasoning that, as Mark Twain once famously said, ―a country without a 
patent office and good patent laws was just a crab and couldn‘t travel 
anyway but sideways and backwards‖2.3 
What is the situation in New Zealand? The current New Zealand 
patent regime is exceptionally in comparison to other national patent 
systems in several ways. The patent law of New Zealand is governed by the 
New Zealand Patents Act 1953, which, although it has been amended on 
several occasions,4 has remained unchanged in most of its fundamental 
                                               
1 For example, John R Thomas stated: ―With industry routinely seeking patent protection for 
gene sequences, software, business methods, and other postindustrial inventions, numbers 
of stakeholders have freely expanded in recent years.‖, see Thomas ―Collusion and 
Collective Action in the Patent System: A proposal for Patent Bounties‖ (2001) U Ill L Rev 
305, 316. 
2 USPTO ―Mark Twain Granted His First Patent on December 19, 1871 Famous author and 
humorist was also an inventor‖ (18 December 2001) Press Release. 
3 For example, with regard to the most important patent regimes, the last significant review 
of the European patent regime was in 2000, see Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents (European Patent Convention), (5 October 1973) 1065 UNTS 199 (as revised by the 
Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000) [EPC]; the last review of the Japanese patent 
regime was in 2008, see Japanese Patent Act (Act No. 121 of 1959) (through the revision of 
Act No 16 of 2008) [Japanese Patent Act] and the last significant review of the United State 
patent regime was in 2007, see United States Patents Act 35 USC (Part I - Patent and 
Trademark Office, Part II - Patentability of Inventions and Grant of Patents, Part III - 
Patents and Protection of Patent Rights, Part IV - Patent Cooperation Treaty; as amended in 
September 2007) [35 USC]. 
4 Patents Amendment Act (No 91) 1972; Patents Amendment Act (No 112) 1976; Patents 
Amendment Act (No 81) 1992; Patents Amendment Act (No 122) 1994; Patents 
Amendment Act (No 139) 1996; Patents Amendment Act (No 119) 1999 and Patents 
Amendment Act (No 72) 2002. Furthermore, there has been other legislation repealing and 
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principles since its original enforcement in 1955.5 As a result, New Zealand 
patent law still includes some regulations that were updated long ago in 
other patent regimes.6 For example, in most jurisdictions worldwide, prior 
art (the base for novelty) is geographically unlimited, but New Zealand 
patent law still has a local novelty concept.7 New Zealand is one of the last 
countries in the world where foreign prior art cannot be used in determining 
the novelty of an invention.8 This means that it would be theoretically 
possible to obtain a patent in New Zealand for an invention already known 
in other countries. A further characteristic of New Zealand‘s patent regime 
is that the patent office will not examine applications for obviousness unless 
a third party challenges the patent application in an opposition or revocation 
procedure.9 Thus, an applicant may obtain a monopoly for an invention that 
lacks the inventive step. These are only a few of the particularities of the 
New Zealand patent system that distinguish it from other national patent 
systems.10  
Consequently, it has been said that ―New Zealand does not have an 
up-to-date Patent Act which is thought to be peculiarly appropriate to New 
                                                                                                                       
implementing sections of the Patents Act 1953, including the Lawyers and Conveyancers 
Act (No 1) 2006.  
5  The only significant amendments of New Zealand‘s intellectual property legislation have 
been made in order to fulfil international treaty obligations. For example, with regard to the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (9 June 1970) 1160 UNTS 231 [PCT], see Patents Amendments 
Act 1992 No 81; regarding the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement of the 
Uruguay Round (15 April 1994) 1869 UNTS 299; (1994) 33 ILM 81 [TRIPS], see Patents 
Amendment Act (No 122) 1994; see generally Ministry of Economic Development 
―Reform of the Patents Act 1953‖ www.med.govt.nz (last accessed 10 November 2009). 
6 For example, the New Zealand Patents Act 1953 is a substantial re-enactment of the 1949 
United Kingdom Patents Act, which the United Kingdom completely reviewed in 1977 to 
comply with European obligations and international conventions, see W R Cornish 
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (3rd ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1996) para 3-01. 
7  Patents Act 1953, s 2(1). 
8 Graham Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen Global Intellectual Property Law (Edgar Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, 2008) 120. 
9 The Examiner only searches for prior publication and prior claiming in order to examine 
the application for novelty, Patents Act 1953, ss 13, 14. 
10 A good overview of patent law in New Zealand is provided by Ian Finch (ed) James & 
Wells Intellectual Property Law in New Zealand (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 2007); 
Susy Frankel and Geoff McLay Intellectual Property in New Zealand (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) and Andrew Brown and Anthony Grant The Law of 
Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Butterworth, Wellington, 1989). 
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Zealand‘s particular needs and expectations.‖11 Its standard of examination 
of patents is less strict than in other countries, with the result that patents are 
far too easily obtained in New Zealand.12 Furthermore, New Zealand‘s 
patent law is outdated and differs too much from the laws of most other 
industrialised countries, counter to the international ambitions of patent law 
harmonisation. The government, legal scholars, and the representatives of 
commerce and business are in almost unanimous agreement that the New 
Zealand Patent Act 1953 is overdue for reform. 
There is a broad consensus that an update of New Zealand patent law 
should aim to bring it into line with the laws of its important trading 
partners. In addition, it should seek to promote local inventions as well as to 
encourage international companies to import technology and to invest in 
New Zealand.13 The reform should help ensure that New Zealand gains the 
greatest value for its innovations, particularly considering that over 90 per 
cent of New Zealand's patents are granted to non-residents.14  
Nevertheless, the question as to how the patent law should be revised 
in order to meet New Zealand‘s needs is still subject to long debates.15 The 
beginning of the reform process in New Zealand dates back to the mid-
1980s. Since then, several different official institutions have issued reports 
on the reform of New Zealand‘s intellectual property system.16 In 2004, the 
                                               
11  See quote of Hammond J in Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2005] 1 NZLR 362, para 
102, (CA) Hammond J [Pfizer]. 
12 See speeches in the first reading of the Patents Bill 2008, (5 May 2009) 654 NZPD 2883 
[first reading]. 
13 Ministry of Commerce Reform to the Patents Act 1953: Proposed Recommendations 
(Wellington, 1992) 3 [Proposed Recommendations]. 
14 In 2001, for example, 4727 patents were granted in total: 376 to residents and 4351 to non-
residents, see Ministry of Economic Development Review of the Patents Act 1953: 
Boundaries to Patentability – A Discussion Paper (Wellington, 2002) 6 [Boundaries to 
Patentability]. 
15 See first reading, above n 12. 
16 For example, Industrial Property Advisory Committee The Patent Monopoly Term and 
Extensions Thereof (IPAC, Wellington, 1985); Industrial Property Advisory Committee 
The Adequacy of Definition and Disclosure in Patent Specifications Relating to Micro-
Organism Inventions (IPAC, Wellington, 1987), New Zealand Law Commission 
Intellectual Property: The Context for Reform (NZLC R13, Wellington, 1990) 13 [The 
Context for Reform]; Competition Policy and Business Law Division Review of Industrial 
Property Rights Patents, Trade Marks and Design: Possible Options for Reform (Ministry 
of Commerce, Wellington, 1990) Vol 1 and 2 [Possible Options for Reform]; Proposed 
Recommendations, above n 13; Ministry of Commerce Maori and the Patenting of Lifeform 
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Ministry of Economic Development released a first draft of a Patents Bill 
for consultation by professionals.17 It took another four years before the Bill 
was introduced in the Parliament.18 The Patents Bill 2008 is an important 
step in the revision process of New Zealand‘s patent law. The most 
important changes include a higher proposed standard of examination  by 
introducing the absolute novelty standard, the examination for obviousness 
and usefulness, and a revised definition of a patentable innovation that 
includes explicit exclusions from patentability. It changes the instruments 
for third parties to challenge the grant of a patent by abolition of the pre-
grant opposition and its replacement by re-examination.19  Furthermore, the 
Bill proposes the establishment of a Maori Advisory Committee to provide 
advice to the Commissioner of Patents on applications for inventions 
involving indigenous plants and animals.20 At present, the Bill is still in the 
parliamentary process: its first reading was in the beginning of 2009 and, 
with the submission term now ended, the Bill is currently pending before the 
Commerce Committee.  
While the introduction of the Patents Bill 2008 was welcomed as a 
first step in the right direction, most of the proposed changes are still 
controversial. The government has acknowledged the implications of some 
critical policy issues of the Bill and has tasked the Commerce Committee 
with clarification of these matters.21 A report of the Commerce Committee 
was due in March 2010. 
However, as addressing every critical question regarding the New 
Zealand patent system is beyond the possible scope of a dissertation, this 
dissertation is limited to one of these issues: the changes regarding the 
influence of a third party in the patent granting procedure in New Zealand 
patent law.  
                                                                                                                       
Inventions An Information Paper Produced by the Patenting Lifeforms Focus Group for the 
Ministry of Commerce (Wellington, 1999); Boundaries to Patentability, above n 14. 
17 Ministry of Economic Development Draft for Consultation Patents Bill 2004 (Wellington, 
2004) [Draft Bill]. 
18 Patents Bill 2008, no 235-1. [Patents Bill 2008]. 
19 Ibid, cls 88-90. 
20 Ibid, cl 276. 




While the Patents Act 1953 provides third parties with the instrument 
of pre-grant opposition and allows an early and strong influence on the 
granting procedure22, the Patents Bill 2008 significantly shifts this system, 
replacing pre-grant opposition with a re-examination procedure.23 This 
development towards a system that gives third parties weaker and later 
influence in the granting process has been highly controversial and has been 
criticised on several grounds. In particular, emphasis has been placed upon 
the fact that an opponent to a grant is vulnerable to infringement actions 
after the grant of a patent, because a patent can be already enforced during 
the opposition procedures.24 On the other hand, one of the main reasons to 
replace the current pre-grant opposition with a re-examination procedure is 
that this will provide a simpler and cheaper way of challenging the grant of 
a patent.25  
The goal of this dissertation is to show that, for New Zealand, a new 
approach with stronger and earlier third party influence could be more 
efficient and therefore may better fulfil the particular needs of this country. 
In order to prove this thesis, the dissertation will start with a theoretical 
analysis of why third parties should have an influence on the granting 
process at all, with reference to the purpose of patents. It will explain how 
the influence of third parties can help strengthen patents, insuring that 
patents will be granted only to true inventions. The different instruments for 
third parties provided by patent regimes worldwide will be analysed, 
identifying their respective benefits. Thereafter, the dissertation will 
examine the current situation in New Zealand, demonstrating that under the 
existing intellectual property system, patents are too easily obtained and that 
invalid patents may survive in the market. In addition, this dissertation will 
analyse the current system and the proposed Patents Bill with regard to 
particular issues, such as New Zealand‘s role as a small economy and net 
                                               
22 Patents Act 1953, s 21. 
23 Patents Bill 2008, cls 88-90. 
24 Opinion from Patent Law Firm A J Parks, see first reading, above n 12, 2902. 
25
 Patents Bill 2008 (Explanatory Note), 54. 
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importer of technology,26 the harmonisation with important trading 
partners27, and the concerns of the Māori. In its conclusion, this dissertation 
will reveal that even though most of the changes provided by the Patents 
Bill 2008 will improve the quality of patents, the changes regarding the 
influence of third parties have the potential to impede this progress. 
Moreover, it will show that with respect to issues specific to New Zealand, a 
different approach regarding third party influence might be more beneficial. 
Finally, this dissertation will aim to develop an alternative approach to the 
structure of patent law in New Zealand with respect to the instruments for a 
third party, in order to better fulfil the needs of the country and to support 
the reforms that a modern patent system requires. 
It is clear that changing third-party instruments will affect 
developments in other areas of the New Zealand patent system. However, 
addressing these or subsequent questions cannot be part of the framework 
for this particular dissertation.28 Nevertheless, a discussion about the 
influences arising from third parties in the granting procedure is a good 
starting point to encourage debate over which patent system would be the 
best fit for New Zealand. 
After a brief introduction on patent theory in Part II, this dissertation 
will give a background on patents and reasons for granting them. Part III 
will briefly summarise why the quality of patents is so important and how 
the influence of third parties could help to improve it.  Part IV will then give 
an overview on how the influence of third parties can be structured and 
which instruments already exist in patent systems worldwide. Part V will 
summarize the theoretical elements of this dissertation. Part VI will present 
an overview of the objections to the current examination standards and the 
                                               
26 The term ―net importer for technology‖ expresses that New Zealand imports more 
technology than it exports. This term is widely used by the New Zealand Government; see 
Boundaries to Patentability , above n 14. 
27 For example, international agreements such as TRIPS, see above n 5; or bilateral 
agreements with important trade partners such as Australia (ANCERTA, TTMRA or 
Memorandum of Understanding on Business Law Harmonisation), see in detail below Part 
VIII B. 2(a). 
28 For example, this dissertation cannot include subsequent debates on topics such as what 
would be the best equipment for the Patent Office. These questions will need to be 
answered in future analyses. 
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current third-party instruments in New Zealand‘s patent law. Part VII will 
examine the proposed amendments of Patents Bill 2008 with respect to the 
particular needs of New Zealand. This section will also consider the 
proposed shifting of third-party influence by critically analysing the impacts 
of the changes as planned. The conclusion will demonstrate that both the 
current system and the proposed reforms have advantages and 
disadvantages. However, some of the proposed changes, particularly the 
abolition of pre-grant opposition in favour of a re-examination scheme, may 
not provide the desired benefits. Therefore, Part VIII will provide an 
alternative approach designed with the particular needs of this country in 
mind. Finally, Part IX will conclude whether this new approach is the best 
solution for the country‘s needs and explain why it would be appropriate to 
rethink the design of third-party instruments in the New Zealand patent 
regime. 
 
II  A PATENT SYSTEM - HOW DOES IT WORK? 
In order to assess the approaches for the New Zealand patent system 
regarding the influence of third parties, it is first necessary to understand 
how a patent system encourages inventions valuable to society. The 
questions of whether and how third parties should influence the patent-
granting process cannot be answered without having the general purpose of 
a patent system in mind. Possible designs for patent regimes should be 
orientated to maximise the net benefits to society.29 
 
A What is a Patent? 
A patent is a monopoly granted by the state (or Crown) to provide a 
registered proprietor with the exclusive rights to exploit an invention and to 
exclude others from doing the same, for a limited time period.30 The New 
Zealand Patents Act 1953 defines the term ―Patent‖ as ―a letter patent for an 
                                               
29 Boundaries to Patentability, above n 14, 5; Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Committee ―Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles 
Agreement‖ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000) 143. 
30 Peter D Rosenberg Patent Law Fundamentals (loose-leaf, 2 ed, Clark Boardman Co, New 
York, 1980) Vol 1, para 1.02. (last updated 6/2000).  
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invention‖.31 By virtue of the ―Deed of Letters Patent‖ issued by the 
Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ), a patentee has the 
right to make, use, sell, and exercise an invention and to exclude others 
from doing so within New Zealand. Since a patent gives an inventor the 
right to exclude others from using his or her invention, the patent system is a 
form of reward for the inventor who has applied knowledge and skills to 
create something new.32 In particular, a patent protects the patentee from 
competition within its scope throughout its entire lifetime. In return for 
these benefits given by the society, the inventor must fully disclose the 
invention to the public and must enable the public to put the invention into 
practice, so that the invention can be used after the expiration of the patent 
term.33 Although monopolies are not desirable in principle, patents are 
literally monopolies founded upon the concept of a ―social contract‖34 
between the patentee and the society.35 
 
B Justification of a Monopoly 
As patents temporarily create a distortion by preventing others from 
using an innovation, and because a society will have to bear the costs 
incurred by such anticompetitive practises, the granting of patents must be 
justified. Because a monopoly is a ―derogation from the common right of 
freedom of trade‖36, the right to grant monopolies has always been strictly 
limited in common law.37 Therefore, with respect to intellectual property, 
only the granting of monopolies for inventions has been recognised as 
justifiable by the courts and by law.38 The reason for this exception was that, 
                                               
31  Patents Act 1953, s 2(1). 
32  Craig Allen Nard and R Polk Wagner Patent Law (Foundation Press/ Thomson West, New 
York, 2008) 7. 
33 See Andrew Brown and Anthony Grant, above n 10, 487.  
34 William van Caenegem Intellectual Property Law and Innovation (Cambridge University 
Press, Port Melbourne, 2007) 63. 
35  Doug Calhoun ―‘International Developments: Patents and Biotechnology‘ Appendix B 
‗Comments on WIPO/UPOV Paper CAJ/XXIV/4 The Interface between Patent Protection 
and Plant Breeders‘ Rights‘‖ in The Context for Reform, above n 16, 73, 74. 
36 Attorney General (Cth) v Adelaide Steamship Co [1913] AC 781, 793. 
37 See Liardet v Johnson (1778) 1 WPC 53; 62 ER 1000. 
38 See Dracy v Allen (1602) 11 Co Rep 84, 74 ER 1131 (also known as Case of Monopolies) 
and Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac I, c 3. 
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from the beginning, patents have been considered necessary to provide an 
incentive for innovation and to reward inventors of important technologies.39 
The modern rationale for protecting patents is still based on this concept. 
According to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), the objective of patent rights is to promote 
technological innovation and the dissemination of technology to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare.40 Furthermore, patents seek to encourage innovation by 
providing incentives to invest in research, to create new inventions, and to 
increase public knowledge by disclosing new inventions that may be 
beneficial for society.41 
 
C Economic Impact of a Patent System 
The economic effect of patents on the welfare of a society has been 
the subject of much research over the last two centuries. As the topic of this 
dissertation is the influence of third parties within an existing patent system, 
it is sufficient only to mention that, based on the economic aspect of patents, 
scholarly opinion ranges from calls to abandon patent systems to support for 
increasing their strength.42 However, in order to discuss how the parts of a 
patent system should be designed in order to maximise the benefits to 
society, it is helpful to consider the main arguments in favour of and in 
                                               
39 The first modern patent system was established by the Venetian Patent Decree of 1474, 
providing an inventor of any novel and ingenious device with a privilege for 10 years in 
order to promote innovation, see Giulio Mandich ―Venetian Patents (1450-1550)‖ (1948) 
30 JPOS 3. 
40  See TRIPS, above n 5, art 7. 
41 See J M Aubrey ―A Justification of the Patent System‖ in Jeremy Phillips (ed) Patents in 
Perspective (ESC Publishing Limited, Oxford, 1985) 1; David Vaver ―Invention in Patent 
Law: A review and a modest proposal‖ in David Vaver (ed) Intellectual Property Rights: 
Critical Concepts in Law Vol. III (Routledge, London and New York, 2006) 63. See also 
United States Supreme Court Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron (1974) 416 US 470, 480-481. 
 However, whether a patent system could really reach this goal, or whether the 
restriction of competition may instead stifle innovations is the subject of long debates, see 
generally Wolfgang E Siebeck (ed) Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property Law 
in Developing Countries: A Survey of the Literature (The World Bank, Washington DC, 
1990). This paper does not enter into this debate. However, most countries worldwide have 
a patent regime in order to promote innovation. 
42 A selection of articles on economics of patents from the literature of economics is provided 
by Robert P Merges Economic of Intellectual Property Law Vol I (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2007). 
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opposition to patent systems in general. Furthermore, it is also useful to 
reflect on the economic impact of a patent system by reviewing New 
Zealand‘s patent system. 
 
1  Incentive for innovation 
The primary argument in favour of a patent system is that patents 
provide an incentive for innovation and that without a patent system, fewer 
inventions would be developed.43 In the absence of legal frameworks for 
patents, anybody could use an innovation and profit from it without 
incurring the costs of research and development (R&D).44 Without adequate 
protection, competitors would rapidly imitate successful inventions and 
prices would drop to the point where inventors, having to bear the costs of 
research and development, would no longer earn significant profits.45 As a 
result, companies would avoid costs for research and development because 
inventions would not be profitable enough.46 In the end, inventions with 
high social benefits might be delayed or not be created at all.47 Moreover, it 
has been stated that without some forms of incentive the level of invention 
―would be too low (sub-optimal)‖.48 
The most fundamental criticism of this theory is that patents restrict 
access to innovation. New inventions with patent protection cannot be freely 
used by society which results in decrease of social benefits.49. As a result, 
further research and development that could infringe an existing patent is 
rendered impossible. Therefore, patents may discourage innovation instead 
                                               
43 Incentive to invent theory, see Frederic M Scherer and David Ross Industrial Market 
Structure and Economic Performance (3rd ed, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1990); John S 
McGee ―Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems‖ (1966) 9 JL&Econ 
135; Fritz Machlup An Economic Review of the Patent System – Study of the Subcommittee 
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary (United States 
Government Printing Office, 1958).  
44 See Andrew Duncan ―Economics of Intellectual Property‖ in Possible Options for Reform, 
Vol. 2, above n 16, 8-9. 
45 Rebecca S Eisenberg ―Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use‖ (1989) 56 U Chi L Rev 1017, 1025. 
46 See Machlup, above n 43. 
47 Rebecca S Eisenberg, above n 45, 1025. 
48 Matthew Fisher Fundamentals of Patent Law Interpretation and Scope of Protection (Hart 
Publishing, Portland, 2007) 136. 
49
  See Machlup, above n 43, 55 and 63; Frederic M Scherer and David Ross, above n 43, 382.  
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of encouraging it.50 In addition, it has been argued that innovations can also 
be made without societal incentives, promoted only by competition.51 
Another objection is that patents could distort economic activities, as 
researchers would only concentrate on areas in which patent monopolies are 
profitable.52 As a result, research might concentrate on what can be 
protected, not what would be most useful.53 Furthermore, as patent 
monopolies restrict competition, they can result in higher prices, increasing 
the cost of technology available to the society.54 However, if patented 
products were not more expensive, the profit from selling them would not 
justify the high costs of research and development, and nobody would invest 
in the development of new products. In the end, the higher costs for society 
for patented products also finance the development of new products and 
processes.55 Therefore, ―[p]atents protect an individual‘s or firm‘s 
investment in the development of an idea, as much as they protect the 
invention itself.‖56 
 
2  Incentive for disclosure 
The other main argument in favour of a patent system is the disclosure 
of the invention in the patent specification, a description that would 
otherwise be kept secret in order to prevent imitation.57 Without disclosure 
                                               
50  Boundaries to Patentability, above n 14, 6. 
51  See Jack Hirshleifer ―The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to 
Inventive Activity‖ (1971) 61 Am Econ Rev 561.  
52  Scherer and Ross, above n 43, 387; Michael A Gollin Driving Innovation – Intellectual 
Property Strategies for a Dynamic World (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) 
42. 
53  For example, according to the Global Forum for Health Research, only 10 percent of the 
worldwide expenses for global health research are used to for research into 90 percent of 
the worldwide health problems (10/90 gap); see Commission on Health Research for 
Development Health Research – Essential Link to Equity in Development (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1990). 
54  Gollin, above n 52, 41. 
55  Adam B Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and its Discontents How our Broken Patent 
System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do about It (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2004) 40-41. 
56  Ibid, 43. 
57  Incentive to disclose theory, see Universal Oil Products Co v Globe Oil & Refining Co, 
(1944) 322 US 471, 484; Grant v Raymond, (1832) 31 US 6 Pet. 218, 247; Scherer and 
Ross, above n 43, 381; Machlup, above n 43, 32 et seq, 53 and 76. 
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of the invention, society has no access to this new knowledge, with the 
result that research may be duplicated, wasting money and resources.58  
On the other hand, although a disclosure of an invention represents a 
burden for the applicant in obtaining a patent, it is often questionable 
whether this disclosure conveys enough information to put the invention to 
practical use without supplementary knowledge.59 However, trade secrets 
may also be used to protect inventions without disclosure. In this case, it is 
questionable whether it is inapplicable in case exploration requires 
demonstration of the invention. Nevertheless, as it is generally impossible to 
sell an idea without a demonstration of how it works, this disclosure may 
destroy the monopoly if no specific legal protection exists.60 
 
3  Intermediate result 
As analysed above, good arguments exist against patent systems, in 
addition to those in favour of them. It cannot be definitively stated that it 
would be better to abolish patent systems or that it would be best to protect 
patents in order to encourage research and development. However, although 
it is clear that patent systems are to some extent imperfect, it nevertheless 
seems  that providing patent protection is ―the best policy solution man can 
devise to the difficult trade-off between, on the one hand, maintaining 
incentives for investment and, on the other hand, fostering the diffusion of 
new technology‘s benefits …‖.61. As a result, even though a patent system 
can have significant negative economic effects, most countries worldwide 
(New Zealand included) provide patent protection for inventions. 
 
                                               
58  Martin J Adelman ―Property Rights Theory and Patent – Antitrust: The Role of 
Compulsory Licensing‖ (1977) 52 NYU L Rev 977, 982. 
59  It has been stated that patent applicants withhold information from patent specifications in 
order to protect inventions through trade secrecy, see Machlup, above n 43, 32-33.  
60  Kenneth J Arrow ―Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention‖ 
(1959) Economic Division of the RAND Corporation, Paper P-1856-RC, 9. 
61  Frederic M Scherer New Perspectives on Economic Growth and Technological Innovation 
(Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 1999) 58. 
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4 How does the economic impact of patents influence the review process 
in New Zealand? 
Considering the negative aspect of the economic impact of patent 
systems, the question could arise in the course of the reform process of 
whether New Zealand still needs a patent system at all, or whether it would 
be better to abolish it. 
First, abolishing the patent system in New Zealand has never seriously 
been considered. All reviews of the New Zealand patent system have been 
mostly focused on the controversial elements of patent law.62 One of the 
reasons for this is that the establishment of a legal framework for the 
protection of inventions by patents is a principal part of New Zealand‘s 
governmental policy promoting innovation and fostering the national 
economy.63 As Hon Mr Justice Gault states:64 
… to provide a climate for New Zealand‘s industrial, commercial and 
intellectual development. […] the laws must be considered as a part of 
a wider policy which extends to encouragement of research and 
development, and fiscal policies towards investment, royalties and the 
like. 
Second, an abolishment of the patent system in New Zealand is also 
unthinkable, not only because this would mean a breach of international 
obligations such as the TRIPS Agreement,65 but also because New Zealand 
would face the risk that other countries and multinational companies that 
use patents might avoid its market. This would have serious consequences 
for a small economy such as New Zealand, as it strongly depends on 
international trade and importing new technologies. As Professor Grant 
Hammond states, with respect to the specific situation in New Zealand:66 
                                               
62  See generally the reports regarding the reform process in New Zealand, citations under n 
13,14 and 16. 
63 Alan Bollard and David Harper Research and Development in New Zealand: A Public 
Policy Framework (NZIER, Wellington, 1987) Research Monograph 39, 3.  
64 Hon Gault ―Recent Experience of Intellectual Property Law Reform‖ in The Context for 
Reform, above n 16, 21, 25.  
65  TRIPS, above n 5. 
66 Prof. Grant Hammond ―Intellectual and Industrial Property Philosophy, Process and 
Problems‖ in The Context for Reform, above n 16, 29, 34. 
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It is far from clear that there is any national commitment in New 
Zealand to the development of a genuinely innovative technology-
driven society. On the other hand, it may well be that New Zealand is 
less of a net importer of technology than is commonly supposed. 
There are some clear instances (for example in the agriculture sector) 
of world leadership in technology which would require strong support 
rights. And protection may be needed as much for technology transfer 
to us, as anything else. 
As a result, it is incontrovertible that New Zealand could not easily 
abolish its existing patent system. However, the economic impact of the 
system and its negative effects should nevertheless be taken into 
consideration in the review process. These effects are particularly relevant 
for New Zealand, because a large number of New Zealand‘s patents are 
granted to non-residents.67 As a result, the majority of patents protect foreign 
inventions from imitation by local industry.68 Much of the benefits of New 
Zealand‘s patents might thus be flowing overseas.69  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the question is not whether New 
Zealand needs a patent system at all; the question that should be addressed 
by the review process is how the existing patent system can be revised to 
maximise the benefits for New Zealand‘s society. 
 
D Keeping the Balance 
As the very granting of a patent creates welfare losses, a patent system 
should above all ensure the balance between capitalising on inventions – 
realising the benefits of excludability and non-competition – and the interest 
                                               
67  Patents Bill 2008, (Explanatory note), 51. 
68  A comparable economic situation exists in Australia, where several reviews of the patent 
system have been carried out from an economic perspective. See Industrial Property 
Advisory Committee Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (IPAC, Canberra, 
1984); Thomas D Mandeville, Donald M Lamberton and E J Bishop Economic Effects of 
the Australian Patent System (Australian Government Publishing Service for Patents, Trade 
Marks and Designs Office, Canberra, 1982); Bureau of Industry Economics The Economics 
of Patents (AGPS, Canberra, 1994); Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Committee Review of intellectual property legislation under the Competition Principles 
Agreement (Commonwealth, Canberra, 2000). 
69
  Patents Bill 2008 (Explanatory note), 51. 
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of the public to obtain new technologies.70 In the end, a patent system must 
balance the interests of all concerned: the inventor and investor, their 
competitors, and society.  
The Supreme Court of the United States noted in 1833:71 
The patent law was designed for the public benefit, as well as for the 
benefit of inventors. For a valuable invention, the public on the 
inventor‘s complying with certain conditions give him, for a limited 
period of time, the profits arising from the sale of the thing invented. 
This holds out an inducement for the exercise of genius and skill, in 
making discoveries which may be useful to society and profitable to 
the discoverer. 
An ideal patent system keeps the balance by granting patents only for 
true inventions.72 From a social welfare perspective, only new and useful 
inventions that would not have been made without a patent system should 
be granted patents, because only these rights will be beneficial to society.73 
This principle of patent law is as old as the British Statute of Monopolies 
from 1623, generally precluding protection of intellectual creations unless 
good cause can be shown.74 In theory, this means that only efficiency-
enhancing rights for true inventions should be granted. 
The patent office should avoid granting patents too easily and too 
broadly, because patents can be used as weapons to harass competitors, to 
increase prices, or to limit access to goods at society‘s expense. A patent 
system as an instrument of economic policy ―is intended to foster, not to 
harass, industry …‖.75 As previously mentioned, a patent system is only 
                                               
70 See Claude Barfield and John E Calfee Biotechnology and the Patent System: Balancing 
Innovation and Property Rights (The AEI Press, Washington DC, 2007); D P O‘Brien 
―Patents: An Economist‘s View‖ in Jeremy Phillips (ed) Patents in Perspectives (ESC 
Publishing Limited, Oxford, 1985) 32, 35. 
71 Shaw v Copper (1833) 32 US 292, 318. 
72 Jaffe and Lerner, above n 55, 8.  
73 Paul H Jensen and Elizabeth Webster ―Achieving the Optimal Power of Patents Rights‖ 
(2004) Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, Working Paper 15/04, 2. 
74 Robert Merges ―As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast‖ (1999) 14 Berkeley 
Techn L J 577, 585. 
75
 Union Foundries Ltd’s Application, 18 August 1927, per Commissioner Atkinson. 
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justifiable if it rewards true invention that increases the technological 
prosperity of society.76  
If a patent is granted for an invention that is not a true invention, the 
society must bear the high social cost arising from creating a monopoly 
without obtaining a benefit. Not only must the public pay higher prices for 
products because competition is restricted, but also technologies that would 
be otherwise freely accessible cannot be used to develop new products. 
Therefore, the aim of patents to encourage invention may not be achieved, 
sending the system out of balance. 
Since true inventions are hard to identify, patent systems commonly 
prescribe legal requirements for the patentability of an invention in order to 
justify granting a monopoly and to dispel uncertainty.77 Three criteria are 
now internationally accepted to identify a true invention: an invention is 
eligible for patent protection if it is new, if it involves an inventive step, and 
if it is useful.78 An invention is new if the subject matter of the invention has 
not been known to or used by the public before the filing date of the 
application. An invention involves an inventive step if it is not obvious to a 
skilled person in the related discipline; it is useful if the inventor can 
identify a practical use for the invention.  
 
E Is the New Zealand Patent System in Balance? 
New Zealand patent law also lists legal requirements for the 
patentability of an invention. However, the pertinent question is whether or 
not the legal requirements in New Zealand are sufficient to keep the patent 
system in balance by ensuring that only true inventions are granted patents. 
First, the current approach of New Zealand patent law in determining 
whether an invention is patentable is based on provisions of the Patents Act 
                                               
76 Fisher, above n 48, 93. 
77 J M Aubrey ―A Justification of the Patent System‖ in Jeremy Phillips (ed), above n 41, 1, 4. 
78 Under Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), patents are available if ―they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.‖ The note to Article 27 states that ―the terms ‗inventive 
step‘ and ‗capable of industrial application‘ may be deemed by a Member to be 




1953 and on case law from the courts. Under the New Zealand Patents Act 
1953, a patent is only obtainable for inventions that are a ―manner of new 
manufacture‖.79 This term is not self-explanatory and has been variously 
interpreted by the courts, which have, for example, excluded specific subject 
matters from patentability – including mathematical logarithms, principles 
of discovery, mere schemes or plans, and methods of medical treatment of 
humans.80 However, the patentability of specific inventions, such as patents 
for treatment of humans or business method patents could raise questions of 
policy and practicability that are difficult for the courts to resolve.81 With 
respect to the controversial topic of the patentability of medical treatments 
and Swiss-type claims in New Zealand, his Honour Hammond J stated:82  
For myself, I think that Parliament would have to legislate in the 
clearest and most unequivocal terms before New Zealand law could be 
taken as having gone any further in the direction of unlimited 
protection of pharmaceutical patents, than the allowance of Swiss-type 
claims (which, in fairness to Parliament, are really a Court-generated 
device). And whether it should do so, strikes me as a particularly 
difficult problem of public policy which lies well beyond the 
institutional competence of this Court. 
Therefore, in some sensitive matters of the patent law, it would be 
preferable if Parliament would amend the existing legislation and implement 
provisions defining which subject matter is patentable and which should be 
excluded from patentability.83 
                                               
79 The definition of the term ―invention‖ in section 2(1) of the Patents Act 1953 includes the 
term ―manner of new manufacture‖ referring to section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 
1623, above n 38. 
80  For the definition of ―new manufacture‖, see High Court of Australia National Research 
Development Corp v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 (HCA) [NRDC]. 
81  See also for Australia, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v F H Faulding & Co. Ltd (2000) 46 
IPR 553, 596, where Finkelstein J stated: ―… that is a matter that should be resolved by the 
Parliament.‖ 
82  See Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents, above n 11, para 128, per Hammond J. 
83  According to this, it is highly controversial in New Zealand whether or not the Patents Act 
should provide a definition of invention or specific exclusion provisions, see Boundaries to 
Patentability, above n 14, 6. For criticism of the opinion held in the report, see Jeremy 
Blum ―Why ‗Inventions‘ Should Be Removed from New Zealand Patent Law‖ (2006) 64 
Intellectual Property Forum 22; see generally Doug Calhoun ―Commodity Hedging, Trusts 
and Broomstick Putting: What is an Invention?‖ (2009) 5 NZIPJ 545. 
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Second, in the process to justify the grant of a patent in New Zealand, 
it is doubtful if the existing examination standards are high enough to avoid 
granting unacceptable numbers of ―bad‖ patents.84 The Intellectual Property 
Office of New Zealand (hereafter IPONZ), according to New Zealand‘s 
relatively low examination standards, examines patent applications only for 
novelty and the adequacy of the description.85 Unlike most other patent 
regimes worldwide, there is no requirement at the examination stage for the 
examiner to determine whether the application involves an inventive step or 
is useful.86 However, lack of an inventive step and lack of utility are grounds 
to challenge the application in an opposition or revocation proceeding.87 In 
addition, although an invention needs to be new in order to be patentable in 
New Zealand, novelty is only examined on the limited prior art base of the 
local novelty standard.88 Moreover, under the current patent regime of New 
Zealand, applicants are generally given the benefit of the doubt.89 
Since the standards of examination are less strict, it seems to be easier 
to obtain patent protection in New Zealand than in other countries, and the 
scopes of the patents may be broader.90 Unfortunately, there are no statistical 
data available as to how many applications have been refused in other 
countries but granted in New Zealand due to the different levels of 
examination standards. 
Because the examiner has no right to refuse an application that is 
indeed new but does not involve an inventive step, it is possible that patents 
may be granted in New Zealand that could not have obtained patent 
protection under a patent regime that included the examination of 
                                               
84  As used in this paper, a ―bad‖ patent is one that should not have been issued because the 
claimed scope is too broad or the patent is not valid. 
85  Patents Act 1953, ss 13-14. 
86  Ibid, ss 13-14; see otherwise requirements of TRIPS as an international standard for 
patenting inventions, above n 5, art 27. 
87  Patents Act 1953, ss 21(1)(e), 41(1)(f) and 42(1). 
88  Ibid, s 2(1). 
89  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd (Pharmac) v The Commissioner of Patents 
[2000] 2 NZLR 529. 
90  Hon Christopher Finlayson, Attorney-General in first reading, above n 12, 2884; Patents 
Bill 2008 (Explanatory note), 52. 
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obviousness.91 Furthermore, such patents could also survive an opposition 
procedure because of the benefit-of-doubt approach. There have been 
several cases in New Zealand in which opposition procedures have failed 
even though the Assistant Commissioner concluded that the invention 
claimed appeared to be obvious, because section 21(1)(e) of the Patents Act 
1953 requires that the invention clearly does not involve an inventive step.92 
Following the benefit-of-doubt approach, the Assistant Commissioner 
allows applications to proceed unless in no reasonable view the 
requirements of the Patents Act 1953 can be met.93 Therefore, it seems that 
particularly the lack of examination for obviousness and the benefit-of-
doubt approach result in the IPONZ granting more patents with doubtful 
validity or a broader scope than would be possible in other countries.94  
Additionally, the local novelty standard allows the granting of patents 
for inventions that may already be known outside New Zealand, as long as 
prior art material is not accessible within its borders.95 This has the 
consequence that ―patents may be granted for inventions that already exist 
or where they are obvious variations on existing technology‖96 as Hon 
Christopher Finlayson, Attorney-General, stated. 
Consequently, the less strict examination standards and the benefit-of-
doubt approach create the potential that patent protection may be obtained 
for technology that is freely accessible elsewhere, and even more patents of 
                                               
91  See Anton Blijlevens ―What is obvious may not seem obvious: Obviousness in New 
Zealand and Australia‖ (2008) 5 NZIPJ 425. 
92  For example, see Delaval Holding AB v Waikato Milking Systems NZ Ltd (23 June 2008), 
Intellectual Property Office, P 2/2008; Fernando Vincente Ruiz Ocampo v New Zealand 
Racing Board (8 December 2008), Intellectual Property Office, P 7; Bernard Charles 
Sherman v Merck & Co, Inc. (13 August 2007) Intellectual Property Office P 21/2007; 
Ewan Malcolm Campbell v Agrissentials Ltd (9 May 2007) Intellectual Property Office P 
13. 
93  R v Patents Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Swift and Co [1962] RPC 37 cited in Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency Ltd (Pharmac) v The Commissioner of Patents, above n 89, para 15 
Gault J. 
94  See Hon David Parker, first reading, above n 12, 2886; Patents Bill 2008 (Explanatory 
note), 52. Due to this, Australia replaced the ―benefit of doubt‖ test at examination by the 
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invention is new and inventive, see Jill McKeough, Andrew Steward and Philip Griffith, 
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95  Patents Act 1953, ss 13(1) and 2(1). 
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  See Hon Christopher Finlayson, Attorney-General, first reading, above n 12, 2884. 
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doubtful validity may be granted at the expense of New Zealand‘s society.97 
Overall, the patent regime in New Zealand seems to be out of balance. 
 
F How Could the New Zealand Patent System Be Balanced? 
In order to restore the necessary balance, a patent system should avoid 
granting overly broad patents and should implement standards for obtaining 
a patent. As it is unrealistic to completely avoid the grant of undesirable 
patents, a good patent system should aim to minimise the amount of these 
so-called ―bad‖ patents to an acceptable level by increasing the required 
quality of patents.98  
Following such logic, New Zealand‘s patent system would be in 
balance if the level of ―bad‖ patents granted were as low as possible. By 
improving the quality of its patents, the market could revive its vitality by 
restoring confidence in the validity of its patents.99 The value of patents may 
thereby increase, and more financial resources may be available to promote 
further research and development. Moreover, a restored confidence in the 
validity of New Zealand‘s patents also has the potential to increase imports 
of new technologies from overseas, because importers would have strong 
rights to protect their inventions. In conclusion, enhancing the quality of its 
patents seems to be a good way to keep New Zealand‘s patent regime in 
balance. 
 
III  ENHANCING THE QUALITY OF PATENTS 
A What Is Meant by Patent Quality? 
The quality of patents has been a long-time subject for research 
worldwide. Economists who examine the outcome of the patent examination 
                                               
97  See Hon David Parker, first reading, above n 12, 2885, 2886; Patents Bill 2008 
(Explanatory note), 52-55. 
98 See Jensen and Webster, above n 73; Dietmar Harhoff ―The Demand for Patents and the 
Evolution of Patent Quality‖ (paper presented to Advancing Knowledge and the 
Knowledge Economy Conference, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 11 
January 2005). 
99 Mark D Janis ―Rethinking Reexamination: Towards a Viable Administrative Revocation 
System for U.S. Patent Law‖ (1997) 11 Harv J Law & Tech 1, 23. 
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process – the granted patent – have carried out most of this research.100 
According to their work, the validity of patents defines the quality of 
patents. Low quality patents, or so-called ―bad‖ patents, are improperly 
granted patents that should have been ―weeded out after a reasonable 
investment of effort, but [were] not.‖101 In contrast, high quality patents are 
valid patents that survive validity challenges and have improved chances of 
being reliably enforced in court.102 Ensuring high quality of patents increases 
the level of certainty and the value of the patents, to the satisfaction of both 
the patentee and society.103 Thus, the higher the quality of New Zealand 
patents, the greater the benefits for all concerned.  
 
B How Can the Quality of a Patent Be Enhanced? 
As it is clear that a patent system should only allow valid patents to 
survive in the market, the pertinent question is what needs to be done to 
enhance the quality of patents. This has been the subject of long debates.104 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to examine this debate in detail but to 
demonstrate which approaches to prevent the creation of invalid or overly 
broad patents could be appropriate for New Zealand.  
 
1 Patent Office or Courts – Who would be the best to eliminate “bad” 
patents? 
Generally speaking, there are two possible stages that could separate 
true inventions from those that should not obtain patent protection: the 
administrative stage and the judicial stage.  
First, as patents are the outcome of the Patent Office, one approach 
would involve changing the procedures of this office so that ―bad‖ patents 
                                               
100  Chris Dent ―Decision-Making and Quality in Patents: An Exploration‖ (2006) 28 EIPR 
381. 
101 Robert Merges, above n 74, fn. 6. 
102  John R Thomas ―The Responsibility of the Rule-Maker: Comparative Approaches to Patent 
Administration Reform‖ (2002) 17 Berkeley Techn LJ 727, 730.  
103  Dent, above n 100, 382. 
104 For further research, see Merges, above n 74, 590; Stephen Merill ―Improving Patent 
Quality: Connecting Economic Research and Policy‖ in Patents, Innovations and Economic 
Performance (OECD Conference Proceedings, Paris, 2004). 
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would not be so easily granted. This approach is based on the assumption 
that the quality of patents would automatically increase if the error rate of 
the Patent Office regarding the patentability of inventions decreased. 
Second, the courts have traditionally had the function of reviewing 
patents and removing invalid patents from the market. The final decisions of 
the courts on whether or not a granted patent meets the requirements of 
patent law could enhance the quality of patents,105 if as many invalid patents 
as possible could be brought before the courts – for example, in validity 
actions. This approach is based on the assumption that it would be more 
effective to examine only those inventions that are to be enforced than all 
inventions filed. 
Both approaches will be analysed with regard to their advantages and 
disadvantages for New Zealand.  
 
2  Patent Office 
(a) Increasing examination standards 
One way to enhance the quality of patents granted would be to 
increase the examination standards of the Patent Office. In most patent 
regimes, the Patent Office does not grant patents until it examines the 
invention with respect to its patentability. An ideal approach would be for 
the patent office to grant desirable patents only for novel and non-obvious 
inventions – that is, valid patents.106 Unfortunately, it is hard to identify such 
inventions. In addition, it is the goal of the examination procedure to 
differentiate those inventions that should be patented from those that should 
not, the standards of examination help the examiners to identify these. 
While most countries apply the same criteria for patentability, there are 
significant differences in the standards of examinations by the Patent 
Offices.107 That means that a patent may be granted for an invention by one 
                                               
105  See McKeough, Steward and Griffith, above n 94, 404. 
106 Merges, above n 74, 590. 
107  Paul H Jensen, Alfons Palangkaraya and Elizabeth Webster ―Patent Application Outcomes 
across the Trilateral Patent Offices‖ (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social 
Research, Melbourne, 2005) 2. 
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Patent Office, but the same invention would not obtain patent protection 
from another Patent Office.108 
One way to avoid the grant of invalid patents would therefore be a 
rigorous examination including particularly high standards.109 In fact, the 
higher the threshold for obtaining a patent (as defined by the examination 
standards), the more certain it is that the patent granted is a true invention.110 
 
(b) Practicability of a rigorous examination 
In addition to the threshold for patentability, the quality of 
examination procedures also strongly depends on the ability of the patent 
office to find prior art. As the examination of novelty and non-obviousness 
of a patent application is based on what was known before a specific date, 
the examination procedure includes the patent office‘s search for prior art. It 
is unrealistic for a patent office to be aware of all prior art, but a high quality 
examination means that the patent office must know as much prior art as 
possible. This means that the lowest error rate for patentability would be 
attained if the patent office performed an in-depth search for prior art for 
each patent application before granting a patent.111 However, such in-depth 
searches require extensive resources – manpower, time, and money.  
Furthermore, the diversity and complexity of patent applications have 
drastically changed in recent decades. New areas of patenting, such as 
patents for software or business methods, make it more difficult for an 
examiner to decide whether an application is patentable or not.112 As most 
examiners have expertise in traditional fields, such as engineering or 
biotechnology, they may lack the knowledge necessary to examine a 
                                               
108  This is the reason why one objective of the patent harmonisation agenda is to harmonise 
international examination procedures, see Patent Law Treaty (PLT) (1 June 2000) 39 ILM 
1047 [PLT]. 
109  Note, however, that even rigorous examination standards would not reduce the granting rate 
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business method application in a new technological field.113 Similarly, prior 
art information for new technologies may also lie outside of the traditional 
research areas of Patent Offices.114 It has thus become increasingly more 
difficult and time-consuming to conduct searches and to find relevant prior 
art.  
A rigorous examination by the patent office with high thresholds of 
patentability and an in-depth research for prior art might be an effective way 
to enhance the quality of patents, but it also has the potential to overburden 
the resources of the patent office. 
 
(c) A rigorous examination as solution for New Zealand? 
The administrative body in New Zealand to examine, grant, and 
register patents is the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand 
(IPONZ).115 Before a patent is granted, the examiners at IPONZ carry out an 
examination of the application. As discussed above, the standards of 
examination in New Zealand are currently lower than in other countries, 
allowing patents broader in scope.116 The introduction of a rigorous 
examination procedure for New Zealand could help prevent the grant of 
invalid or overly broad patents. Unfortunately, a rigorous examination 
procedure, based on an in-depth search for prior art, requires extensive 
resources of expertise and money.  
Currently, the IPONZ is capable of examining, to at least an 
acceptable extent, specifications in any field of art. However, due to its size, 
New Zealand‘s resources of experts in arts, sciences, and finances are 
limited.117 The Commissioner of Patents, Trade marks and Design stated in 
the 2007-2008 annual report of the IPONZ that it has been difficult to 
                                               
113 Jay P Kesan and Andres A Gallo ―Why ‗Bad‘ Patents Survive in the Market and How 
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provide a sufficient amount of experienced examiners because of the more 
complex and technically challenging applications in recent years.118  
As a consequence of the increasing number of patent applications, 
examiners worldwide have only a limited amount of time for conducting a 
prior art search and making a decision regarding an application‘s 
patentability.119 Accordingly, it has been said that ―the prior art search and 
evaluation during the original examination […] cannot be exhaustive‖120. In 
particular, it has been difficult to conduct in-depth searches in cases in 
which the prior art includes references other than printed publications.121  
A further issue is that, due to the size of the IPONZ, its examiners do 
not have the opportunity to specialise in a specific field of art or science, in 
contrast to the larger patent offices in the United States or the European 
Union.122 Consequently, the IPONZ may lack specialised knowledge of the 
prior art in some fields, particularly in areas of new technologies, such as 
telecommunications or computer science.  
Finally, it can be assumed that the IPONZ would not have the 
resources to conduct the in-depth search for prior art that would be required 
by a rigorous examination standard. As both financial resources and the 
number of experts are limited in New Zealand, it is perhaps unreasonable to 
establish such a rigorous examination standard. Under the current 
                                               
118  Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand ―Report of the Commissioner of Patents, Trade 
Marks and Designs to the Minister of Commerce for the Years Ended 30 June 2008‖ 
(IPONZ, Wellington, 2008) 3. 
119  For example, in New Zealand, the number of patent applications filed has more than 
doubled, from 3,828 in 1995/1996 to 8,653 in 2007/2008, see IPONZ ―Report of the 
Commissioner of Patents, Trade Marks and Designs to the Minister of Commerce for the 
year ended 30 June 2000‖ (IPONZ, Lower Hutt, 2001) 8; IPONZ ―Report of the 
Commissioner of Patents, Trade Marks and Designs to the Minister of Commerce for the 
year ended 30 June 2009‖ (IPONZ, Wellington, 2010) 7. 
120 Qin Shi ―Reexamination, Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative Efforts to Create a Post-
Grant Patent Quality System‖ (2003) 31 AIPLA Q J 433, 436. 
121  For example, this is true for software-related inventions, because in this field of technology, 
developments are commonly discussed in newsgroups or other online forums. Therefore, 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office has launched an alliance with the Open 
Source Community to get access to software codes, see USPTO ―USPTO partners with the 
Open Source Community to expand examiner access to software codes‖ (10 January 2006) 
Press Release. 
122  See the opinion of the Commission to Inquire into and Report upon the Law of Patents, 




circumstances, a rigorous examination procedure may make the patent-
granting process in New Zealand much more time-consuming, which could 
result in a huge backlog of patent applications.  
On the other hand, while the current, less strict examination standards 
in New Zealand may be cheaper to administer, they also introduce 
uncertainty with regard to the validity of a patent.123 Hence, it would be a 
first step in the right direction if New Zealand‘s examination standards were 
raised to an internationally appropriate level.124 However, as small as these 
changes in the examination standards would be, they would also have the 
potential to overburden the resources of the IPONZ. The establishment of a 
more rigorous examination procedure might therefore help increase the 
quality of patents in New Zealand, but the higher examination standards 
would also risk impacting the ability of the IPONZ to grant patents in a 
reasonable amount of time.  
To avoid the grant of ―bad‖ patents, increasing the standards of 
examination is a good solution for New Zealand. However, the 
implementation of stricter examination standards is only possible within the 
capacity of the IPONZ to carry out such examinations. 
 
3  Courts 
(a) A registration system without examination by the patent office125 
An additional way to improve the quality of patents in New Zealand 
would be to fully shift the burden of examination from the patent office to 
the courts. In this model, the government would register patents without 
examination. It would then be the sole task of the courts to make detailed 
                                               
123 Jensen and Webster, above n 73, 4. 
124  See speeches, first reading, above n 12. 
125  A modification of a registration system has been recently adopted in Australia with the 
―innovation patents‖. These types of patents have a maximum term of 8 years and only 
require an innovative step, not an inventive step. The Patent Office grants these patents 
without substantial examination for validity, after a formality check. However, an 
innovation patent cannot be enforced once a substantial examination has been carried out 
by the Patent Office in order to certify the patent.  
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validity determinations for those patents challenged by private parties and to 
decide whether they fulfil the requirements of patent law.126  
 
(b) Practicability of a registration system 
The intent underlying this approach is to avoid the high costs of a 
rigorous examination by the patent office. It is based on the assumption that 
these costs would generally be higher than the cost of court litigations in 
those few cases in which a patent is challenged and disputable.127 As Mark 
Lemley stated, ―[b]ecause so few patents are ever asserted against a 
competitor, it is much cheaper for the society to make detailed validity 
determinations in those few cases than to invest additional resources 
examining patents that will never be heard from again.‖128 By contrast, 
under a rigorous examination concept, the society must bear the 
examination costs for all patent applications, although most patents turn out 
to have little commercial value and may simply lapse because the patentee 
does not pay renewal fees.129 A rigorous examination process could help 
avoid the high social costs that arise from erroneous decisions of the patent 
office in granting invalid patents; however, the society must instead endure 
higher examination costs and more time-consuming procedures.130 The 
question is which alternative is better.  
One relatively unsuccessful attempt at such a registration system for 





Unfortunately, under this registration system, not all invalid patents were 
removed from the register, as challenging patents was too expensive for 
private citizens. As a result, the social costs arising from invalid patents 
remaining in the register were much higher than expected, since threats 
                                               
126 See F Scott Kief ―The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present 
Patent-Obtaining Rules‖ (2003) 45 BCLRev 55. 
127 Ibid, 70.  
128  Mark Lemley ―Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office‖ (2001) 95 Northwestern L Rev 
1495, 1497. 
129 Van Caenegem, above n 34, 68. 
130 Jensen and Webster, above n 73, 4. 
131 See Edward C Walterscheid ―The Winged Gudgeon – An Early Patent Controversy‖ (1997) 
79 JPTOS 533. 
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based on invalid patents were substantial enough to create distortions in the 
market.132  
Therefore, for a registration system to function successfully, it is 
imperative that all invalid patents are actually removed from the register; 
otherwise, even invalid patents can be used to harass competitors. For 
example, patentees could use invalid patents to approach competitors and 
demand that they are obligated to pay licenses fees. In many cases, they 
could target small companies without the financial resources to support the 
cost of litigation. Even if the small company believes that the patent is 
invalid, it may eventually opt for a settlement agreement rather than risking 
expensive patent litigation.133 
Unfortunately, under the registration model, chances are good that 
invalid patents will remain in the register, as they can only be eliminated by 
the courts. Because the process of patent litigation is expensive and time-
consuming, third parties may avoid the legal system to circumvent spending 
time and money. In particular for technology-based cases, because the 
courts are not necessarily well-trained in developing fields, the risk of 
erroneous decisions is high. This might necessitate an appeal of a 
preliminary decision, with the effect of increasing costs and time spent.134 
As the cost for seeking a review of a patent before a court might be higher 
than paying royalties, the third parties may try to reach private agreements 
or use arbitration procedures instead of going to court. As a result, an 
invalid patent can easily remain in the register, distorting competition.  
 
(c) A registration system as solution for New Zealand? 
In consideration of the limited resources of the IPONZ, a registration 
system for New Zealand is worth consideration. This would require first and 
foremost courts that are equipped to carry out in-depth patent examinations. 
As New Zealand does not have specialised courts for patent litigation and 
judges generally do not have the technological background to decide 
                                               
132 Merges, above n 74, 586. 
133  See Jeffe and Lerner, above n 55, 13-15. 
134
  Merges, above n 74, 595. 
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whether a patent is valid or not, the courts would need the help of experts. 
However, the same problems regarding limited resources of experts and 
money would simply be shifted from the IPONZ to the courts, without any 
real resolution. 
Even if only patents with economic value were examined by the 
courts, lowering the overall expenses for examinations, the social cost 
arising from invalid patents remaining in the register would still be higher. 
Therefore, under existing circumstances, using only patent litigation to 
eliminate invalid patents is not a feasible way for New Zealand to enhance 
the quality of its patents. 
 
4  Intermediate result 
As shown above, neither the approach based only in the Patent Office 
nor the solely judicial approach would be advantageous for New Zealand. 
The existing two-tier system with IPONZ and the courts acting together in 
order to eliminate ―bad‖ patents might therefore be the best solution.135 The 
IPONZ has the experts and the technological knowledge required to decide 
whether or not a patent should be granted. The courts can make detailed 
validity determinations in cases where patents are enforced.  
However, analysing both approaches also shows that the core problem 
in enhancing the New Zealand‘s patent quality is its limited resources in 
expertise and money. A rigorous examination process might be the best 
solution for quality enhancement, but it also has the potential to overburden 
the resources of the IPONZ. 
Therefore, it seems that the question is not at which stage it would be 
most effective to eliminate ―bad‖ patents, but rather how to revise the 
existing examination procedure and the review system without 
overburdening New Zealand‘s public authorities and resources.  
 
                                               
135
  The existing patent regime in New Zealand will be described in detail below in chapter VI.  
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IV  ENHANCING THE QUALITY OF PATENTS BY THIRD 
PARTIES 
A Involving the General Public In Order to Enhance the Quality of 
Patents  
1  Giving third parties influence 
One of the most common strategies used to enhance the quality of 
patents is to include the private sector in the examination procedure.136 
Obtaining a patent is normally a process between two parties: the applicant 
who applies for a patent and the government that grants it. In order to 
enhance the quality of patents, it could perhaps be advantageous to involve 
the general public or competitors as third parties in the examination 
procedure. This model is based on the assumption that a division of labour 
between the patent office and the private sector may improve the quality of 
the examination procedure, by utilising the knowledge and experience 
existing outside the patent office.137 
 
2  Practicability of third party influence 
As discussed above, the question whether a patent should be granted 
or not is primarily based on the analysis of the prior art.138 The quality of the 
examination procedure therefore strongly depends on the ability to find as 
much relevant prior art material as possible.  
The concept of involving third parties is based on the idea that the 
general public, and competitors in particular, may have better information 
about prior art than the patent office or the courts.139 For example, a firm 
operating in the same industry as the applicant will probably be better aware 
of whether an invention is truly novel and non-obvious.140 In order to 
improve the search for relevant prior art, third parties could provide the 
                                               
136  Most patent regimes worldwide allow third parties to exert an influence on the granting 
procedure, see above IV. B. 
137  Merges, above n 74, 596. 
138  In particular, the determination of whether an invention is novel or non-obvious requires 
knowledge of what was already known at the date of priority.  





Patent Office or the courts with relevant information concerning the prior art 
of the patent applications, information which otherwise might not have been 
considered. 
Involving third parties would permit the search of prior art to be more 
exhaustive, with the effect that fewer ―bad‖ patents would be granted or 
survive in the market. This model would also allow a more thorough 
analysis without increasing the examination costs. 
Unfortunately, such an approach involves the risk that these third 
parties would use their influence in the examination procedure in order to 
delay the granting of patents or infringement procedures. In such a scenario, 
the patentees would be kept from exploiting their patents, the value of the 
patents could decrease, because the patentees are withheld to exploit their 
patents and further innovation could therefore be stifled. Furthermore, this 
approach would only work if the third parties actually provided useful 
information to the patent office and courts.  
In the end, the influence of third parties may help prevent the grant of 
overly broad or invalid patents, but such a system needs to balance the 
interests of both sides – the applicant or patentee and the third parties. 
 
3  Third party influence as a solution for New Zealand 
Given the current circumstances in New Zealand with regard to the 
limited resources of the IPONZ and the courts, using the knowledge and 
experience of third parties in order to enhance the quality of New Zealand‘s 
patents may be the best solution.  
With the help of third parties, the quality of the examination procedure 
increases, as more prior art information will be available. This is particularly 
important for New Zealand, because if it increases its standards of 
examination by establishing an absolute novelty standard (as is planned), 
prior art information would need to be searched worldwide.141 Furthermore, 
for patents involving new technologies, expert knowledge that may be 
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  Patents Bill 2008, cl 8(1). 
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currently missing in the IPONZ could be incorporated by involving third 
parties in the examination procedure. 
With more and better prior art information, the rate of invalid patents 
granted may decrease without incurring the high social cost of a rigorous 
examination procedure by the patent office.142 The mixture of governmental 
and private expenditures to determine the validity of patents appears to be 
the ideal solution to enhance the quality of patents in New Zealand. 
 
B What Instruments Does a Third Party Have to Influence the Grant 
of a Patent? 
Although it seems clear that using the knowledge and experience of 
third parties would be a good way to improve patent quality, there is a 
controversy regarding how much influence a third party should have and at 
which stage of the process.143 
Most worldwide patent systems – including New Zealand‘s – allow 
third parties influence in the examination procedure and provide instruments 
for this in their patent laws.144 However, there are significant differences 
between these different instruments with regard to when third parties are 
allowed to join the process and how much influence they can have. 
In order to identify how third parties can help enhance the quality of 
patents in New Zealand, it is useful to know the types of third-party 
instruments that have already been developed and applied by patent regimes 
worldwide.  
                                               
142 Merges, above n 74, 590. 
143 See, for example, comparative studies such as Fiona Rotstein and Chris Dent ―Third Party 
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Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to show the diverse ways by 
which third parties can influence the granting procedure, by giving a general 
overview of the most common types of instruments used in various 
countries. In addition to a short description of when and how third parties 
can influence the granting procedure using a specific type of instrument, 
each type of instrument will be briefly analysed to reveal its strengths and 
weaknesses.  
However, as third party instruments are individually developed by 
each country and depend on the respective patent legislation, country-
specific instruments will only be mentioned as examples for a certain type 
of instrument. 
 
1 Submission of information by a third party before the patent is 
granted  
The earliest opportunity to influence the granting process as a third 
party is to submit information about potential prior art to the patent office 
before the patent is even granted. This type of third party instrument exists 
in different patent regimes in several varieties: for example, as ―Observation 
by a third party‖ in the European system145 or as ―Notice of matters affecting 
validity of standard patents‖ in the Australian system146. 
 
(a) Rationale and objectives 
If third parties have the possibility to get access to the specifications 
of a patent application at the stage when the patent office examines the 
patentability of the claimed invention, they may be able to assist the 
examiner with prior art information by submitting relevant material. The 
objective of this type of third party instrument is to enhance the quality of 
patents through third parties which could have more and better information 
about the prior art of the relevant technology. 
 
                                               
145 EPC, above n 3, art 115. 
146
  Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 27. 
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(b) How does the third party influence the granting procedure with this 
instrument? 
In this type of instrument, the influence of third parties on the granting 
procedure is generally limited to the submission of material. In addition to 
submitting material, some patent regimes allow third parties to file a 
statement explaining why they consider the material submitted to be 
relevant.147 In other regimes, explaining the prior art or submitting further 
information as a third party is expressly prohibited.148 However, all systems 
have in common that the third party does not become a party to the 
proceedings when using this type of third-party instrument.149 Furthermore, 
the third party does not have the right to insist that the examiner consider 
any of the material submitted. It is left to the discretion of the examiners to 
decide to raise an objection based on the material submitted or not.150 In 
other words, the third party using this type of instrument has only an 
indirect influence on the granting procedure.  
 
(c) Advantages and disadvantages of this type of instrument 
One advantage of this type of third-party instrument is that it gives a 
third party the right to provide the patent office with material regarding the 
patentability of a patent application, informally and typically without paying 
a fee.151 Furthermore, all questions of patentability can generally be 
addressed without limit on specific grounds (such as lack of novelty), in 
                                               
147 For the European system, see EPC, above n 3, art 115(1); for the Australian system, see 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 27(1). 
148  For the United States, see 37 CFR § 1.99 [R-5].  
149 See EPC, above n 3, art 115(1), Rule 114 stated: ―In proceedings before the European 
Patent Office, following the publication of the European patent application, any third party 
may, in accordance with the Implementing Regulations, present observations concerning 
the patentability of the invention to which the application or patent relates. That person 
shall not be a party to the proceedings.” or United Kingdom Patent Act 1977, sec 21(2), 
which provides ―It is hereby declared that a person does not become a party to any 
proceedings under this Act before the comptroller by reason only that he makes 
observations under this section.” (emphasis added). 
150  See, for example, United States Patent and Trademark Office Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (8th ed, 7th rev, Thomson/West, Washington, 2008) ch 1100, 1134.01 [MPEP]. 
151  In most patent systems that provide submission instruments, no fee is required for the 
submission of information (for example EPO, United Kingdom, and Japan). However, in 
the United States, a fee must be paid, see 37 CFR, § 1.99(b)(1).  
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contrast to the usual proceedings for other instruments, such as opposition 
or revocation.152 Another advantage of this instrument is that the third party 
does not become a party involved in the granting procedure.153 In some 
patent regimes, anonymously filing the information relevant to the patent 
applicant is permitted.154 This may help the patent office to obtain prior art 
information from third parties even if they have business contacts to the 
applicant. Additionally, this instrument does not in general restrict the 
possibility to submit relevant material to a specific time period, as 
instruments such as opposition do. Using this instrument, relevant material 
can typically be submitted throughout the entire lifetime of the patent.155 
On the other hand, submitting relevant material does not ensure that 
the examiner will carry out any further review of the patent application. It is 
possible that the examiner may simply include the new documents in the file 
without raising an objection based on the material. The submitting third 
party does not have the right to insist that the examiner take these 
documents into consideration.156 
Additionally, this type of third party instrument requires the patent 
office to publish the patent application after the applicant files it. Only when 
third parties have access to patent specifications are they able to provide the 
patent office with relevant information on prior art. Without publication of 
the specification before the grant of a patent, the prior art search could only 
be carried out by the examiner, and relevant material known only to third 
parties could not be taken into consideration. Therefore, most patent 
systems worldwide provide for an automatic publication of the specification 
of an application after a certain amount of time (for example, 18 months 
                                               
152 For example, in the European system it is possible to submit a third-party observation on 
the following grounds: alleged and proven invalidity of prior claims; inadmissible 
amendments of the claims within the scope of the original disclose (art 123(2)); non-
enabling teaching (art. 83); and lack of clarity in violation of article 84, see EPC, above n 3, 
art 115. 
153  See citation under n 149. 
154 For example, submission on an anonymous basis is permitted under the Japanese Patent 
Law, see Regulations under the Patent Act (Japan), art 13bis seq. 
155  See, for example, Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 27(1). 
156
  See, for example, MPEP, above n 150, ch 1134.01. 
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after filing).157 The main objection to automatic publication in the early 
stages is that this would allow competitors to infringe freely with no risk of 
injunction until the patent is granted.158 Patent systems with automatic 
publication thus need to provide regulations to protect applicants against 
infringing acts undertaken after publication but before the grant of the 
patent.159  
In some countries, moreover, the material filed in an observation 
procedure cannot be used by the same third party in a subsequent challenge 
of the patent such as an opposition procedure. It is still possible to file an 
opposition, but it must be based on new material.160  
 
(d) Result 
The submission instrument helps enhance the quality of patents 
because it is a simple and inexpensive way to challenge the grant of a patent 
on all criteria of patentability. Third parties will therefore be motivated to 
file relevant material, supporting the prior art search of the patent office.  
On the other hand, as this third-party action only supports the patent 
office, its influence is limited to the submission of relevant material. The 
examiner is still the one who decides whether or not to take these documents 
into consideration. That means that third parties submitting relevant material 
to the patent office face the risk of forfeiting the right to this material in 
more powerful third-party instruments if the examiner rejects its relevance. 
                                               
157  For example, international applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty are 
automatically published 18 months after the priority date of the application, see PCT, above 
n 5, art 21(2)(a). Furthermore, European patent applications as well as United States patent 
applications are automatically published 18 months after the date of filing or, if priority has 
been claimed, from the date of priority, see EPC, above n3, art 93(1)(a) and 35 USC 
122(b)(1)(A). For a general overview of the publication dates for patents, see MPEP, above 
n 150, ch 901.5. 
158  This was possible under the United States patent regime until it changed its patent law by 
implementing provisional rights (35 USC 154(d)(1)), see American Inventor‘s Protection 
Act 1999, Appendix L - Patents Law. 
159 For example, in the United States the applicant has the right to obtain reasonable royalties 
from any person who exploits the invention before the granting of a patent, 35 USC 
154(d)(1). In Australia, art 57(1) of the Patents Act (1990) enables the patentee to recover 
damages or an account profit. 
160  Jürgen Kaiser ―Up close – Finding an alternative to the European Opposition procedure‖ 
(2005) 176 Patent World 22, 24. 
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However, even if a third party does not want to have its own strong 
influence on the procedure, the material submitted to the patent office is 
made available to the public. This material can then be used by other third 
parties to file other types of third-party instruments, for example an 
opposition, based on these documents.  
Overall, the submission instrument is an inexpensive and informal 
way to support the patent office with additional prior art material if a third 
party prefers not to assume an active role in the granting procedure. 
 
2  Re-examination 
Another instrument that allows a third party to exert influence on the 
granting procedure is the request for re-examination. This type of instrument 
exists in different patent regimes but it is predominantly associated with the 
patent system of the United States.161 The United States patent regime 
provides two different types of re-examination instruments: ―ex parte re-
examination‖162 and ―inter partes re-examination‖.163 
 
(a) Objective and rationale 
The instrument of re-examination is an alternative to the opposition 
system. Its objective is to provide a forum to challenge the validity of 
patents outside the courts by re-examining granted patents on the basis of 
new prior art.164 It allows the correction of patents granted too broadly and 
the rejection of invalid patents. Using this instrument helps increase the 
overall quality of patents by correcting the errors of the patent office.165 
 
                                               
161  Re-examination also exists, for example, in the Australian patent regime, see Patents Act 
1990 (Cth), s 97, and in the Canadian patent regime, see Patents Act (RSC 1985, cP-4), s 
48.1. 
162  35 USC § 302 - § 307. 
163  Ibid, § 311 - § 318. 
164  See, for example, 35 USC § 302. 
165  See Bronwyn Hall, Stuart Graham, Dietmar Harhoff ―Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent 
quality via Postgrant Opposition‖ in Adam Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern Innovation 
Policy and the Economy Vol 4 (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004) 117, 123. 
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(b) How does the third party influence the granting procedure with this 
instrument? 
The instrument of re-examination provides third parties or the 
patentee with the right to request further examination by the patent office on 
certain questions of patentability.166 The grounds for re-examination are 
typically strictly limited: for example, the lack of novelty or 
inventiveness.167 
In general, re-examination can be requested at any time during the 
enforceability period of the patent, which means from the date of granting 
until the patent expires.168 Under some patent regimes, re-examination can 
also be carried out at the discretion of the examiner after the acceptance of a 
patent application. In this case, third parties have no right to request re-
examination.169  
In order to influence the outcome of the patent office‘s re-
examination, third parties may submit new prior art with their request. 
However, under most patent regimes, the basis of re-examination is limited 
to certain types of prior art.170  
In addition to prior art documents, third parties may also need to file 
an additional submission explaining the relevance of the documents.171 In 
some systems (for example, in the United States), third parties have the 
option to choose whether they want to submit a statement accompanying the 
prior art or not.172 If they do so, they become a party to the procedure with 
some extended opportunities for involvement (this is referred to as inter 
                                               
166  An ex parte re-examination can also be requested by the patentee, which is not possible for 
the inter partes re-examination.  
167  For example, Patent Act 1990 (Cth), s 98(1). 
168  35 USC § 302, § 311. 
169 See, for example, Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 97. 
170  See 35 USC § 302 or Australian Patent Office Patent Manual of Practise and Procedure - 
Vol 2, [22.4.3]. 
171  See, for example, Patent Regulation 1991 (Cth), reg 9.2(2A). 
172 However, the requester must furnish the Commissioner with documents supporting the 
grounds for re-examination and must state the relevance of these documents, ibid, reg 9.2. 
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partes re-examination in the United States).173 If not, the involvement of the 
third party in the proceedings is strictly limited (ex parte re-examination).174 
As with the submission instrument, in the re-examination procedure, 
the examiner typically remains the final arbiter of the process, and the 
influence of the requesting party is strictly limited. In the re-examination 
procedure of the United States, the third party has the opportunity to reply 
only if the patentee responds to the determination of the patent office.175 In 
the Australian system, the requester does not have the opportunity to file a 
statement until the Commissioner has issued his or her report.176 In this 
system, no other written statements are allowed.177  
By contrast, the inter partes re-examination procedure allows third 
parties to participate fully in the proceedings. They have the right to file 
statements on the issues raised by the patentee or the patent office.178 
 
(c) Advantages and disadvantages of this type of instrument 
The re-examination procedure has the advantage that for a requesting 
third party, the standard of proof necessary to invalidate a patent is 
substantially lower than the standard used at trial.179 Moreover, a re-
examination procedure is significantly cheaper than costly patent litigation 
in courts. 
However, the re-examination instruments have the disadvantage that, 
in order to prevent abusive tactics, a threshold requirement often exists that 
determines whether or not the patent office will carry out a re-examination. 
In the United States, for example, the patent statute only allows a re-
examination if there are substantial new questions of patentability.180 The 
                                               
173 35 USC § 311 - § 318. 
174  Ibid, § 305. 
175  Ibid. 
176  Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 99. 
177  However, under the Australian system, the Commissioner must give the patentee the 
opportunity to be heard before refusing the application or revoking the patent, Patent Act 
1990 (Cth), ss 100A(2), 101(a).  
178  35 USC § 314(b)(2). 
179 See John M Carson and William J Blonigan ―USA: Patents – Re-Examination‖ (2009) 31 
EIPR N15. 
180
 See 35 USC § 303, 312.  
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patent office will first determine whether the request for re-examination is 
based on this issue. If the patent office makes the determination that no 
substantial new questions of patentability have been raised, it will not carry 
out a re-examination.181 Moreover, this decision of whether or not the 
threshold has been reached is final. Both parties, the third party and the 
patentee, have no right to appeal. 
Third parties are further limited in their ability to raise certain 
objections, because the grounds for re-examination are typically more 
limited than those for opposition or revocation.182 In addition, as the basis of 
re-examination is limited to certain types of prior art, other relevant 
evidence for the lack of novelty or inventiveness cannot be used. Finally, 
the prior art filed by a third party in a re-examination process generally 
cannot be used in a later opposition or court procedure.183  
 
(d) Result 
The re-examination instrument, at least in the inter partes variant, 
gives third parties more influence on the procedures of the patent office than 
the submission instrument. On the other hand, the influence of third parties 
using re-examination as an instrument is limited in almost the same manner 
as submission is. In both procedures, the requester provides the patent office 
with new prior art and has the opportunity to comment on the statements of 
the patentee and the patent office.  
However, the odds of successfully challenging a patent in a re-
examination procedure greatly depend on the type of prior art available in 
the field of technology of the patent. Particularly in the case of new 
technologies, much of the prior art may be of the non-patent variety. For 
                                               
181  See MPEP, above n 150, 2242. 
182 The grounds for re-examination are mostly limited to lack of novelty and lack of inventive 
step; see, for example, Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 98(1). In contrast, the grounds for 
revocation in court proceedings under the Australian system include novelty, non-
obviousness, utility, and lack of entitlement; obtaining by fraud, false suggestion, or 
misrepresentation; and insufficiency, ambiguity, and lack of fair basis, see Patents Act 
1990(Cth), s 138 (3). 
183 For example, in the United States, an inter partes re-examination precludes the requester 
from raising in a court proceeding any objection on the validity of a patent already raised in 
the re-examination procedure, see 35 USC § 315(c). 
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example, for inventions in computer-based fields, most prior art may 
actually exist in running businesses or in non-published sources, such as 
internet news groups.184 As such evidence is inadmissible, and as expert 
statements cannot be used in the re-examination procedure, this instrument 
may not be the best solution to correct this type of patent. Unfortunately, 
patents based on new technology create the most difficulties for patent 
offices in the examination procedure.185  
As a result, the effectiveness of the re-examination instrument is 
highly debatable.186 Even the United States has been contemplating for years 
extending its existing third-party instruments with a post-grant review 
procedure similar to an opposition.187  
Re-examination is a third-party instrument that has the potential to 
enhance the quality of patents without resorting to legal procedures in the 
courts. On the other hand, re-examination also limits the ability of third 
parties to raise questions on patentability other than novelty and 
inventiveness, and it prohibits objections based on certain types of prior art. 
However, whether a limited prior art base has a significant influence on the 
effectiveness of the re-examination procedure is questionable, as the local 
novelty standard, for example, also limits the prior art base. The main 
problem of the re-examination procedure seems to be that the patent office 
exerts a dominant influence on the procedure and that the influence of third 
parties is limited.  
Re-examination is one possibility in challenging the validity of a 
patent at the administrative stage, as is opposition, but it cannot completely 
replace the judiciary in deciding questions of validity. At this stage of the 
process, the validity of a patent cannot be guaranteed, no matter how 
carefully the patent office examines the application. In all patent regimes 
providing administrative instruments to challenge the validity of a patent, it 
                                               
184  See Cohen, above n 114. 
185  See USPTO, above n 121. 
186  See, for example, Hall, Graham and Harhoff, above n 165, 117; Shi, above n 120. 
187
  United States Patent Reform Act 2009, HR 1260, 515, 610. 
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is still the function of the courts to finally determine whether or not a patent 
meets the requirements of the law.188 
 
3  Opposition 
Another inter partes administrative instrument to challenge the grant 
or the validity of a patent is the opposition procedure. Many patent regimes 
give third parties the opportunity to oppose a grant or the validity of a patent 
before the patent office, based on specific grounds and within a certain time 
period. 
Two types of opposition instruments exist in current patent regimes: 
―pre-grant opposition‖, which challenges a patent application soon before it 
will be granted, and ―post-grant opposition‖, which challenges an already 
granted patent. Some regimes, such as the European patent regime, provide 
only one type of opposition instrument, primarily the post-grant variant.189 
Other regimes, such as the current New Zealand and the Australian patent 
regimes, provide both variants: a pre-grant opposition and a post-grant 
revocation procedure ruled on by the Commissioner.190  
 
(a) Objective and rationale 
The main objective of opposition instruments is to provide an 
effective but simple and fast instrument to challenge patents within the 
patent office, outside of the courts. The aim of the opposition instrument is 
to enhance the quality of patents by allowing an early correction of overly 
broad or invalid patents.  
 
                                               
188  See, for example, for the United States, In re Lockwood (1995) 50 F 3d 966, 980 (Fed Cir); 
for Australia, see McKeough, Steward and Griffith, above n 94, 404. 
189  EPC, above n 3, art 99. 
190  Pre-grant opposition: Patents Act 1953, s 21, Patent Act 1990 (Cth), s 59, 101M; Post-grant 




(b) How does the third party influence the granting procedure with this 
instrument? 
(i) Pre-grant opposition 
Some patent systems (for example, the current New Zealand system) 
provide third parties with a pre-grant opposition instrument.191 After the 
examiner carries out the substantive examination of the patent application 
and proclaims a positive result, he or she publishes the intention to grant a 
patent. At this point, the third party has the opportunity to join the procedure 
in opposition of the granting.  
The right of opposition means that third parties are allowed to 
participate in the granting process in a fully integrated capacity. 
Consequently, they have the right to oppose the grant of the patent on 
certain grounds and to submit all evidence required.  
Such opposition systems are typically bound to a certain short 
deadline after the acceptance of the patent application (for example, three 
months).192 If no opposition is filed in this period, the patent will be granted. 
Filing an opposition means that the third party has the burden of proof 
to provide the evidence that the opposed patent application is not 
patentable.193 The third party must provide evidence – for example, prior art 
documents or statements of witnesses to demonstrate that an application 
lacks novelty. 
Pre-grant opposition is exceptionally due to the fact that the third 
party has such strong influence in the granting process at such an early 
stage, without bearing the risk that the patent will be enforced in a parallel 
infringing action. One criticism of this instrument is that pre-grant 
oppositions could be used to slow down the granting procedure. As a result, 
pre-grant opposition has been abolished in most patent systems in recent 
decades.194 However, some countries (including Australia) have deliberately 
                                               
191  Patents Act 1953, s 21. 
192  See, for example, Patents Act 1953, s 21(2). 
193  See McKeough, Steward and Griffith, above n 94, 322. 
194 For example, the United Kingdom shifted its pre-grant opposition to a post-grant opposition 
system in 1970, see Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office (1970) The British Patent System: 
Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law (the Banks Report); 
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decided in favour of pre-grant opposition and still provide third parties with 
the right to oppose a patent before it is granted based on the lack of novelty 
or inventiveness.195 
 
(ii) Post grant opposition/ revocation by Commissioner  
The more common version of opposition is post-grant opposition.196 
The post-grant opposition instrument gives third parties the right to 
challenge the validity of a patent within a certain period of time after the 
patent has been granted.197  
In some systems (for example, in New Zealand), the instrument 
―revocation by Commissioner‖ substitutes for post-grant opposition; it is 
generally similar to the post-grant opposition instrument found in the 
European Union, and is often referred to as ―delayed opposition‖ or ―post-
grant opposition‖.198 
In post-grant opposition, as in pre-grant opposition, the third party 
becomes a full party to the procedure, enjoying the opportunity to submit 
statements at any time. The main difference between pre-grant and post-
grant opposition is that the opponent in post-grant proceedings usually has 
more grounds available to oppose the patent. 
 
(c) Advantages and disadvantages of this type of instrument 
In order to avoid overly broad or invalid patents, it is useful to provide 
an additional layer of review correcting undesirable patents outside the 
                                                                                                                       
Japan changed it in the mid-1990s, see Keith E Markus and Christine McDaniel ―Impacts 
of the Japanese patent system on productivity growth‖ (1999) 11 Japan & World Econ 557.  
195 See Advisory Council on Industrial Property ―Review of Enforcement of Industrial 
Property Rights‖ (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999); Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Committee ―Review of intellectual property legislation under the 
Competition Principles Agreement‖ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000).  
196 For example, in the European system, see EPC, above n 3, art 99. The United States system 
has no opposition procedure but plans to provide such a review system, see Patent Reform 
Act 2009 HR 1260. On the other hand, Japan abolished its post-grant opposition in 2004 
and replaced it with an invalidation appeal procedure. 
197  For example, within nine months of the publication of the mention of the grant of the 
European patent, see EPC, above n 3, art 99(1); or within 12 months after the sealing of a 
patent, Patents Act 1953, s 42(1). 
198
  Patents Act 1953, s 42. 
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courts. The opposition instrument allows an early administrative review that 
is generally simpler, faster, and cheaper than proceedings by a judicial 
body.199 As an administrative procedure, an opposition can typically be filed 
by anybody, using a standard form. Furthermore, the standards of proof 
applicable in the patent office are generally lower than in the courts, helping 
to simplify the procedure and to save money. In addition, the examiners 
making the decision in an opposition procedure have technical expertise that 
judges may lack. Under some systems, the opposition procedure is held 
before independent hearing officers;200 in other systems, a former examiner 
can also be a member of the opposition division.201 
Opposition‘s principal advantage over the re-examination procedure is 
that in opposition procedures, being more adversarial proceedings, all kinds 
of evidence are allowed – for example, the testimony of inventors and 
experts.202 
On the other hand, the opposition procedure is not free and can be 
time-consuming. The patent office needs enough examiners to review the 
examination procedure and the arguments in the statements of the patentee 
and the opponent in an adequate amount of time. However, this 
disadvantage is not terribly serious, as only a small percentage of all patents 
are ever opposed.203 
The main criticism of opposition procedures lies in the fact that this 
additional review can substantially delay the entire patent-granting 
process.204 If more than one opponent opposes a patent on several grounds 
with different prior art documents, an opposition procedure can last for 
                                               
199 For the relationship between opposition and revocation by courts, see Jan Brinkhof ―The 
Revocation of European Patents‖ (1996) 27 IRIPCL, 225. 
200  For example, in the New Zealand system, see IPONZ www.iponz.govt.nz; in the United 
Kingdom system, see Intellectual Property Office www.ipo.gov.uk (both accessed 14 
March 2010). 
201  For example, in the European system, see European Patent Office Guidelines for 
Examination in the European Patent Office (EPO, Munich, 2009) part D, ch II, 2.1. 
202  Robert Merges, above n 74, 611. 
203  In 2007, the opposition rate at the European Patent Office was 6%; at the German Patent 
Office, 4.6%; and at the Korean Patent Office, 1.3%, see WIPO Statistics Database, 
www.wipo.int. The rate is calculated based on the number of oppositions filed and patents 
granted in 2007. 
204
  Patents Bill 2008 (Explanatory note), 54. 
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years.205 Moreover, as most countries that provide an opposition procedure 
also allow an appeal of the decision of the opposition body, the process to 
reach a final decision on the validity of a patent could last longer than patent 
litigation proceedings in the courts.206  
As a result, pre-grant oppositions have been rejected in most patent 
systems worldwide, as they were causing delays and financial burdens.207 
For example, the United States rejected its pre-grant opposition procedure 
because opponents could delay the grant of a patent by repeated citations of 
prior art.208  
 
(d) Result 
Opposition systems help increase confidence in patentability and 
validity because they allow challenges to patent applications or to granted 
patents. This additional review may have the effect that fewer overly broad 
or invalid patents remain in the market, thereby increasing the overall 
quality of patents. However, this additional process may also delay the grant 
of a patent, resulting in a negative effect on patent values and on innovation.  
Overall, opposition procedures are a good solution to review patents at 
an administrative stage, because they are generally simpler, less expensive, 
and less time consuming than court proceedings.209  
 
                                               
205  For example, seventeen oppositions have been filed from different groups in the opposition 
procedure against Harvard‘s OncoMouse patent. The complete opposition and appeal 
procedure lasted for 9 years, see file to EP 0169672 at European patent register, 
https://register.epoline.org.  
206  In opposition procedures before the European Patent Office, the average duration of both 
procedures combined is 3.6 years, longer than the average duration of 2.8 years for patent 
litigation proceedings by the national courts of the 27 EU states, see European Patent 
Office ―European Commission Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Preliminary Report 28 
November 2008 – Comments from EPO‖, www.ec.europa.eu (accessed 20 January 2010).  
207 See Janis, above n 99, 33. 
208 Senator Fong in United States Congress (1974) 120 Congressional Record 41, 145. 
209 A good overview of the advantages and disadvantages of an opposition procedure is 
presented in Jonathan Levin and Richard Levin ―Patent Oppositions‖ (2002) SIEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 01-29. 
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4  Challenging the validity of patents before the Courts 
All of the types of third-party instruments described above are 
administrative procedures of the patent office. Alongside these 
administrative procedures, most patent systems also provide possibilities to 
challenge the validity of a patent before a court. For example, New Zealand 
provides a revocation by the courts; other systems have nullity or invalidity 
actions.210  
Challenging the validity of patents before a court has the disadvantage 
that the standard of proof is generally higher than in an administrative 
procedure. The process is also more expensive and time-consuming.211 The 
high cost of patent litigation poses a heavy burden on patentees as well as 
on third parties.212  
Prolonged validity actions can be problematic in time-sensitive areas 
of technology: for example, for computer-related inventions. Moreover, 
unlike the judicial branch, the patent office has resources and technical 
knowledge, which make it a ―natural champion in assessing patent validity 
issues‖213; because validity questions often involve technical questions, the 
technically skilled examiners of the Patent Office may be better equipped to 
answer them than judges would be.214 On the other hand, Court-based 
proceedings are necessary because a judicial body and not an administrative 
                                               
210 See Patents Act 1953, s 41; in New Zealand, the applicant can choose whether he or she 
wants to challenge a patent before the Commissioner in an administrative procedure or 
before the courts. In Germany, a patent can be challenged in a nullity action without 
pending infringement procedures, see Patentgesetz 1980 (Germany), s 81(1). 
211 For the relationship between opposition and revocation, see Jan Brinkhof, above n 199, 
225. 
212 For the United States, the American Intellectual Property Law Association estimated a total 
litigation cost of an average of 2.5 to 4.9 million US dollars per party, see AIPLA Report of 
the Economic Survey (AIPLA, Washington, 2009). Unfortunately, such a survey of patent 
litigation costs in New Zealand is not available. However, the World Bank ranks New 
Zealand at 11th position in the world for efficiency of contract enforcement, with legal costs 
on average 22% of the claim value. In contrast, the United States is ranked at 6th position, 
with legal costs at 9.4 % of the claim value. See World Bank Doing Business Report 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For an overview of the civil litigation cost regimes in different 
jurisdictions, including New Zealand, see Judiciary of England and Wales Civil Litigation 
Cost Review: Preliminary Report Vol. 2 (2009, London). 
213 Shi, above n 120, 437. 
214
 Ibid., 457. 
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body should finally decide whether or not the requirements of the law have 
been met.215  
Consequently, the best solution for reviewing patents should be based 
on a two-tiered system in which the determination of patent validity is 
divided between the patent office and the courts. 
 
C What Types of Review Systems Are Available? 
As detailed above, all types of instruments a third party can use to 
exert influence in the patent-granting procedure have specific advantages 
and disadvantages. None of the analysed procedures (submission, re-
examination, and opposition) provides an all-in-one solution. As a result, the 
question of which types of third-party instruments and which procedures 
allowing third parties to take part in the patent-granting process would 
constitute the best solution for New Zealand cannot be answered simply. 
One point to keep in mind is that the design of a reviewing approach 
for patents or applications based on the knowledge and experience of third 
parties is not possible without an awareness of the overarching structure of 
the patent system. Each alteration in the system typically necessitates further 
adjustments in order to keep the system in balance. Most patent systems that 
allow third parties to influence the grant of a patent thus provide a reviewing 
system consisting of a combination of different types of third-party 
instruments at different stages of the granting procedure. 
As the next step on the way to finding the best reviewing system for 
New Zealand, it would therefore be helpful to define the combinations of 
third-party instruments already in existence. Each combination of third-
party instruments creates a specific type of patent-reviewing system with 
different weighting of the influence of third parties. These types of 
reviewing systems are not specified, but are instead classified freely 
according to the quantity and quality of influence that third parties can have 
in the granting procedure.  
                                               
215  Therefore, Article 62(5) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that administrative decisions 





1  Inquisitorial review systems 
In this type of reviewing system, the patent office has the primary 
responsibility to separate inventions that should obtain patent protection 
from applications that should not, based on extensive examination by 
qualified examiners. Inquisitorial reviewing means that third parties have no 
influence or only strictly limited influence in the granting procedure. Patent 
regimes belonging to this category of review system are, for example, Japan 
and the United States.  
 
(a) Characteristics of such a system 
The main characteristic of an inquisitorial reviewing system is the low 
level of influence of third parties on the granting procedure. The first 
possible time when third parties are able to exert a direct and unlimited 
influence is when they bring patents with doubtful validity before the court 
or when they challenge the validity of a patent in an infringement action. 
At the administrative stage, the role of third parties is mostly limited 
to supporting the patent office, for example, by submitting relevant prior art 
information.216 Even when third parties are allowed to file their own 
statements or responses, it is only permitted to a certain extent.217 
The patent office in such a system has the power to decide whether or 
not it will raise objections based on prior art material submitted by third 
parties. As third parties are in general not even parties to the procedure, they 
have no right to insist if the patent office decides to ignore submitted 
documents.218 
In addition, even though third parties may have the right to submit 
evidence that an application is not patentable, inquisitorial systems typically 
limit the types of evidence admissible in the procedure.  
 
                                               
216  See, for example 35 USC § 302. 
217  Ibid.  
218
  See, for example, MPEP, above n 150, ch 1134.01. 
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(b) Third-party instruments of such a system 
In the inquisitorial review system, the typical third-party instrument at 
the administrative stage is re-examination. In some cases, submission of 
information will also be allowed, but without extensive statements from the 
third party. However, the challenge of the validity of a patent before the 
court is also allowed, for example, as a defence in infringement actions. 
 
(c) Analysing such an approach 
The inquisitorial review system has the advantage that the review of a 
patent is based on the same standards as the examination procedure. This 
means that the patent office repeats the examination procedure using new 
information submitted by the third party. In such a system, third parties 
cannot use the reviewing instruments to extend the granting procedure as a 
way of harassing the patentee, because their influence is strictly limited. 
However, the inquisitorial review approach can only be effective if the 
patent office has enough resources to carry out an in-depth re-examination. 
If the re-examination procedure is carried out under the same time pressure 
as the regular examination – perhaps even by the same examiner – the errors 
of the patent office may not be corrected. In addition, as most evidence 
cannot be used in re-examination procedures and the grounds of re-
examination are limited, only a small amount of undesirable patents will be 
rejected. 
 
2  Adversarial review system  
In this type of review system, the third parties are largely responsible 
for separating patents that should be granted from those that should not. 
Although the patent office carries out the examination and is responsible for 
granting the patent, its decision on whether a patent should be revoked is 
based on evidence submitted by third parties and on the submissions of both 
parties representing their perspectives of the case. Therefore, the influence 
of third parties on this decision is quite strong. The European Union patent 




(a) Characteristics of such a system 
In the adversarial system, the third party can fully participate in the 
procedure. Both the patentee and the third party are allowed to submit 
statements in each stage of the proceedings and can discuss their points of 
view in an oral hearing. Typically, all kinds of evidence are allowed in 
challenging the validity of a patent. Before the grant of a patent, third parties 
are allowed to submit relevant information, as long as they state why the 
material is relevant to the hearing. However, in most adversarial review 
systems, this strong influence of third parties is allowed primarily after the 
grant of a patent.  
 
(b) Third-party instruments of such a system 
The typical third-party instrument of adversarial review systems is 
opposition. Submissions are also allowed, as well as statements explaining 
the filed material. 
 
(c) Analysing such an approach 
The adversarial review system has the advantage that the knowledge 
and experience of third parties can be promptly used, resolving erroneous 
decisions of the patent office at an early stage. Third parties not only 
provide the patent office with important information on relevant prior art, 
but also introduce new points of view regarding the patentability of 
inventions into the procedure. As more types of evidence become available, 
more patents in new technological fields can be reviewed. Additionally, 
studies show that even the patentees benefit from opposition procedures, 
because the system removes uncertainty and increases the value of 
patents.219 
                                               
219  Dietman Harhoff and Markus Reitzig ―Determinant of opposition against EPO patent 
grants – the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals‖ (2004) 22 IJIO 4, 443. 
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However, the strong influence of third parties also has the effect of 
delaying the granting procedure. In its worst form, third parties could use 
opposition to harass their competitors. 
 
3  Hybrid review system 
It is also possible to implement a review system that uses aspects of 
both approaches, combining the inquisitorial and the adversarial 
instruments. This means that third parties have the same influence on 
different stages of the procedure, pre-grant and post-grant, but also that the 
influence is limited in its depth and intensity. The patent regimes in New 
Zealand and Australia utilize hybrid reviewing systems.  
 
(a) Characteristics of such a system 
In a hybrid reviewing system, third parties have different procedures 
available at different stages of the granting procedure. For example, third-
party influence is limited before the patent is granted, but after the grant, the 
third party is allowed to fully participate in the proceedings. These systems 
typically provide pre-grant instruments that limit the influence of a third 
party by the time schedule and by the admissible reasons to challenge the 
grant of an application. However, the post-grant instruments give third 
parties the right to challenge the grant of patents on broader grounds.  
 
(b) Third-party instruments of such a system 
Hybrid systems normally provide combinations either of re-
examination and opposition instruments, or of limited pre-grant opposition 
and unlimited post-grant opposition instruments. 
 
(c) Analysing such an approach 
Hybrid review systems are based on the concept that both approaches, 
inquisitorial and adversarial, have their advantages and disadvantages. As 
the resources of the patent offices in small countries are more limited, it 
seems advantageous to give third parties an early and strong influence on 
57 
 
the granting procedure in order to support the patent office. However, using 
the knowledge and experience of third parties before the grant of a patent 
can be disadvantageous, as it can delay the grant procedure. On the basis of 
these arguments, a hybrid review system has been developed that attempts 
to find a balance between both positions.   
 
V SYSTEMS IN BALANCE – INTERMEDIATE RESULT 
As previously explained, a patent system is in balance if it is possible 
to avoid granting overly broad or invalid patents. New Zealand should 
therefore aim for a patent system that is able to keep the balance between 
the public interest and the interests of the monopoly holder. The higher the 
quality of New Zealand patents, the higher the benefits for all concerned. 
In order to reach this goal, it has been illustrated that, in addition to 
streamlining the examination procedure by implementing stricter standards, 
third parties should also be allowed to contribute their knowledge and 
experience to the procedure. The combination of stricter examination 
procedures and providing third-party instruments would appear to be a well-
balanced solution to enhance the overall quality of patents without 
overburdening the existing resources. Stricter examination standards help 
deny monopoly rights for inventions that should not be granted, and third-
party support helps the patent office review the patentability of inventions. 
Such a combination would result in fewer undesirable patents being granted 
or surviving in the market, increasing confidence in the patentability and the 
value of New Zealand patents. 
In order to maintain the balance, New Zealand should have stricter 
examination standards in combination with a review system for its patents 
that utilizes the knowledge and experience of third parties.  
The framework of this dissertation does not allow a complete and 
detailed review of the current patent system with regard to both aspects. 
However, it is impossible to review New Zealand‘s current third-party 
instruments and its patent review system without analysing its examination 
standards. Therefore, the focus will be on the development of a review 
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system for New Zealand based on third-party instruments, taking the 
examination standards into account as long it is useful in the context.  
In the review of third-party instruments, it has been shown above that 
the different national patent regimes provide different procedures for third 
parties to influence the granting procedure. Depending on the third-party 
instruments used, different levels of influence result. These procedures are 
parts of patent review systems favouring an inquisitorial, an adversarial, or a 
hybrid approach. Each instrument and each review system has its 
advantages and disadvantages: it cannot be said that one of those systems is 
definitely superior. These national reviewing systems have been developed 
under various circumstances in different countries. It is impossible for a 
country to simply adopt an existing review system of another patent regime 
without making adjustments to it with respect to the specific local 
circumstances and needs of the adopting country. 
New Zealand already has a review system including third-party 
instruments in place. Despite this, New Zealand faces the problem that the 
quality of its patents is not as high as it could be. As simply adopting 
another patent review system is not useful, it is necessary determine why the 
current New Zealand system is not effective at enhancing the quality of 
patents and how it can be revised to reach this goal. 
In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to show the 
framework in which New Zealand‘s current reviewing system was 
established. New Zealand‘s patent system is, in its way, unique in the world, 
with its outdated patent litigation and particular problematic issues. The next 
section of this dissertation begins with an examination of how the current 
New Zealand patent system works, identifying which particular issues need 
to be considered with an eye to a revision of the system.  
Next, this dissertation will examine in detail how the current New 
Zealand patent review system is designed, including its third party 
instruments. In addition, the reform efforts of the past few years will be 
explained. In this context, there will be an exploration of whether the 
Patents Bill 2008 would result in a better system for New Zealand. Finally, 
there will be possible suggestions of if and how the New Zealand review 
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system (including its third party instruments) should be revised to find an 
optimal solution for the specific needs of the country.  
 
VI  NEW ZEALAND’S PATENT SYSTEM AT WORK 
A Scope of the Patent System in New Zealand 
In order to find out which patent review system is the best for New 
Zealand, it is first necessary to define the particular issues concerning the 
current patent system in New Zealand. 
 
1  Patent policy in New Zealand 
Similar to the policy of most patent regimes worldwide, the patent 
policy of New Zealand has the fundamental purpose of promoting 
innovation for the benefit of society.220  
Although the current New Zealand Patents Act 1953 includes no 
preamble describing its purposes, it can be assumed that  one of its purposes 
is to ensure that New Zealand should profit as much as possible from its 
patent system. To this end, the explanatory note to the New Zealand Patent 
Bill 2008 states:221  
The provision of this exclusive right is intended to provide inventors 
with an opportunity to make a return on their investment in innovation 
by preventing others from copying the invention. This provides an 
incentive for innovation and its dissemination that might not otherwise 
occur. The grant of patent rights also provides an incentive for foreign 
innovators to transfer their innovations to New Zealand. It is the 
benefits to society of this incentive effect that provide the main 
justification for the patent system. 
According to the Bill, the New Zealand patent policy system also has 
the objective of stimulating the economy by providing protection against 
imitators and by offering an incentive to transfer technology to New 
Zealand.  
                                               
220 See, for example, the United States Constitution, art I, § 8, cl 8 which authorises the 
Congress ―[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts‖.  
221
 Patents Bill 2008 (Explanatory Note), 1. 
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The Ministry of Commerce has summarized the patent policy of New 
Zealand as follows: 222  
[It aims] … to ensure that New Zealand is: 
(1) no longer isolated from international developments; 
(2) internationally competitive; and 
(3) encouraging investment and innovation. 
As demonstrated above, the New Zealand patent regime should also 
be able to balance the interests of all concerned, and its patent law should 
comply with the international obligations of New Zealand. In accordance, 
the Explanatory Note of the Patents Bill 2008 states:223  
Statement of public policy objective(s)  
To provide an efficient and effective patent system that promotes 
innovation and economic growth while providing an appropriate 
balance between the interests of innovators and the interests of society 
as a whole and that complies with New Zealand‘s international 
obligations. 
 
2  Influences from the outside on New Zealand’s patent policy 
The New Zealand patent policy has been in part formed by influences 
from the outside. In order to understand some particularities of New 
Zealand patent law, these aspects need to be taken into account. 
 
(a) Adopting United Kingdom statutes 
The patent regime in New Zealand is derived from the system of the 
United Kingdom: namely, the current New Zealand Patent Act 1953 is 
based on the 1949 United Kingdom Patents Act. As with a number of other 
statutes, New Zealand adopted the United Kingdom Patent Act without 
taking into consideration whether it was appropriate to the particular needs 
of New Zealand.224 Specifically, the economic situation, which should be a 
                                               
222 Proposed Recommendations, above n 13, 3. 
223  Patents Bill 2008, (Explanatory Note), 58. 
224  Susy Frankel ―Towards a Sound New Zealand Intellectual Property Law‖ in Susy Frankel 
and Tim Smith Essays on Intellectual Property Law and Policy (VUWLR, Wellington, 
2001) 47, 48. 
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determining factor for the design of a country‘s patent law, is not at all the 
same in the two countries. Furthermore, although the United Kingdom 
fundamentally revised its Patent Act in 1977225, New Zealand has adhered to 
the old United Kingdom law. Therefore, as explained above, the patent law 
of New Zealand is outdated and is overdue for reform. 
 
(b) International obligations of New Zealand 
New Zealand is a member of a number of international agreements 
that set intellectual property standards. Several amendments to the existing 
Patents Act 1953 were based on New Zealand‘s obligation to implement 
international treaties such as the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs).226 In addition, in order to no longer be 
isolated from international development, policy makers worldwide have 
implemented harmonisation reforms in patent law. These are principally 
based on the treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO). In this regard, the Law Commission Intellectual Property of New 
Zealand states: 227  
The international context is particularly important in intellectual 
property. Ideas and their exploitation are not constrained by national 
boundaries but, in absence of international mechanisms, intellectual 
property rights can only be national. The need for international co-
operation and reciprocity to provide a workable system of intellectual 
property was recognised more than a century ago. 
Some of the relevant international developments and their influence 
on patent law in New Zealand will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
                                               
225  W R Cornish, above n 6, para 3-01. 
226  For example, the Patents Amendment Act (No 122) 1994 changed the patent law of New 
Zealand according to the obligations imposed by the TRIPs Agreement, first by restricting 
the grounds upon which an invention can be excluded from patentability; second, by 
increasing the term of a patent from 16 to 20 years; third, by limiting the circumstances in 
which a compulsory license may be granted; by also limiting the circumstances in which 
the Crown can utilise patented inventions; and by providing for the reversal of the burden 
of proof in cases of the alleged infringement of a process patent, see Kenneth B. Poplewell 
"The TRIPs Agreement: Implementation and Enforcement" (APEC Industrial Property 
Rights Symposium, Tokyo, August 2006).  
227
 The Context for Reform, above n 16, 3. 
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(c) Harmonisation with important trading partners 
As New Zealand‘s economy strongly depends on trade, the patent 
policy should attempt to coordinate New Zealand‘s patent law with the laws 
of its important trading partners. A discussion paper of the Ministry of 
Economic Development from 2006 states that any legislative change must 
not only be appropriate to New Zealand‘s circumstances but should also be 
―aligned with those of our leading trade partners [to help in] creating an 
environment conducive to foreign and domestic business investment‖.228 
Some of the bilateral agreements with important trading partners and their 
influence on New Zealand‘s patent law will discussed in more detail below.  
 
3  Particular issues for New Zealand 
In order to discuss policy issues it is necessary to acknowledge some 
specific features of New Zealand: its size, geographical position, 
topography, and inherited economic specialisation.229. It is useful to have 
these particularities and their influence on the design of patent law in mind, 
as they have an influence on the policy framework of New Zealand. 
 
(a) New Zealand as a small economy 
First, New Zealand, as a small economy, has only a small domestic 
market that limits the ability of businesses to grow to a size that would make 
them internationally competitive. Second, New Zealand‘s remoteness from 
major markets and knowledge centres can limit its international 
connectivity, which consequently slows down harmonisation processes. 
Moreover, New Zealand‘s economy is still shaped by agriculture, fishing, 
and foresting, and it has a strong dependence on overseas trading partners.230  
 
                                               
228 Paul Sumpter Intellectual Property Law – Principles in Practice (CCH New Zealand Ltd., 
Auckland, 2006) viii citing ―International Trade Treaties‖ March 2006, para 6. 
229 See Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development Reviews of Innovation Policy 
NEW ZEALAND (OECDPublishing, Paris, 2007) www.sourceoecd.org (accessed 5 
November 2009). 
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(b) New Zealand as net importer 
New Zealand is a net importer, and it should be noted that most of the 
patents granted in New Zealand originate overseas and belong to non-
residents.231 Therefore, the harmonisation of patent law with important 
trading partners is a very important issue. The Ministry of Economic 
Development states that New Zealand patent policy should encourage the 
transfer of technology to New Zealand in order to give New Zealand's 
businesses access to the technology and expertise they need to be 
competitive on the international market.232They further state that any 
legislative changes must not only be appropriate to New Zealand‘s 
circumstances but also be ―aligned with those of our leading trade partners 
[to help in] creating an environment conducive to foreign and domestic 
business investment‖233. In general, the patent law of New Zealand should 
not stray too far from international patent standards. 234  
 
(c) Māori issues 
Owning to its history, New Zealand places particular importance on 
its policy to involve Māori in matters that may be relevant to them. With 
respect to patent law, these issues are, in particular, the protection of 
traditional knowledge and of indigenous plants and animals.235 Under the 
Patents Act 1953, cultural issues can only be examined under the morality 
clause in section 17(1) of the Act, which gives the Commissioner the power 
to refuse a patent application if the use of the invention would be contrary to 
                                               
231 Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand ―Report of the Commissioner of Patents, Trade 
Marks and Designs to the Minister of Commerce for the years ended 30 June 2008‖ 
(IPONZ, Wellington, 2008).  
232 Boundaries to Patentability, above n 14. 
233 Sumpter, above n 228, viii citing ―International Trade Treaties‖ March 2006, para 6. 
234 Boundaries of Patentability above n 14, 6. 
235  The failure to protect the traditional knowledge of the Māori and indigenous plants and 
animals under intellectual property law is one issue of the Wai 262 claim before the 
Waitangi Tribunal. See Te Hunga Roia Maori o Aotearoa (Maori Law Society Inc.) 
―Submission on the Patents Bill before the Commerce Select Committee 2 July 2009‖ 
www.maorilawsociety.co.nz (accessed 15 March 2010). 
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morality. However, this morality exclusion presents difficulties, because the 
examiner must make morality judgements.236 
 
B Objections Against the Current New Zealand Examination 
Procedure by the IPONZ 
1  Resources of the IPONZ 
As previously described, the resources of the IPONZ are limited. It 
already has difficulty to provide a sufficient number of qualified and 
experienced examiners, as patent applications have become more complex 
in recent years.237 Furthermore, due to developments in the new technology 
market, more and more applications are being filed outside of traditional 
technological fields. This means that even more highly specialised 
examiners are needed in order to carry out high quality examinations. Due 
to its size, however, New Zealand has only a small number of experts 
available.238 
 
2  Automatic examination 
New Zealand‘s patent law provides for an automatic examination. 
Once the applicant has filed a complete application, the Commissioner will 
automatically refer it to one of the IPONZ examiners. The examiner will 
determine if the patent application complies with the formal and legal 
requirements of the Act and with any relevant regulations.239 An explicit 
request for examination by the applicant is only required if it is an advanced 
one (for example, because an infringement of the rights is likely to occur, 
rule 38).240  
                                               
236 Frankel and McLay, above n 10, 118. 
237  Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand ―Report of the Commissioner of Patents, Trade 
Marks and Designs to the Minister of Commerce for the years ended 30 June 2008‖, above 
n 231, 3. 
238 Hon Gault ―Recent Experience of Intellectual Property Law Reform‖ in The Context for 
Reform, above n 16, 21, 23. 
239 Patents Act 1953, s 12(1). 
240
 Patent Regulation 1954, r 38 
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Another particularity in the process is that the technical examination 
of a New Zealand application is performed without any further fees. For the 
examination procedure, this means that an examiner generally examines all 
patent applications in the order in which they are filed, without prioritisation 
or organisation of examination procedures according to the type of patent 
application.241 
 
3  Standard of examination 
Under current New Zealand patent law, the purpose of the 
examination is to decide whether an application meets all requirements for 
the grant of a patent: specifically, whether the subject matter is patentable 
and whether the invention is novel or not already claimed. As stated above, 
the standards of examination are lower in New Zealand than in other 
countries. The main sources of criticism are the following aspects: 
 
(a) Subject matter 
With respect to subject matter, the role of the examiner is to carry out 
a screening process in order to eliminate applications that cannot be 
considered inventions by a reasonable standard.  
In New Zealand, a patent can only be granted if the application 
includes a patentable ―invention‖ as defined in section 2(1) Patents Act 
1953.242 Patents can only be granted for inventions that are a ―manner of 
new manufacture‖. Unfortunately, the phrase ―manner of new manufacture‖ 
provides no clear definition of what is required for an invention to be 
patentable or which inventions are to be excluded from patentability. As a 
result, this definition has been the subject of a great deal of jurisdictional 
attention. The courts have decided to exclude some subject matters from 
                                               
241 Possible Options for Reform, above n 16, 37. 
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 Patents Act 1953, sec 2(1). 
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patentability, such as mere discoveries, mathematical algorithms, mere plans 
or schemes, and methods of medical treatment.243  
The landmark Australian decision National Research Development 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents244 clarifies what is meant by the 
term ―manner of new manufacture‖. Specifically, as this definition 
incorporates section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, the subject matter 
of a claim needs to meet the threshold requirements imposed by the 
principles of patent law.245 The test posed by the High Court of Australia has 
been adopted by New Zealand in the landmark decision Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents.246 Since Wellcome, several 
decisions on the issue of the patentability of specific subject matters have 
been written. For example, in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v 
Commissioner of Patents,247 the Court of Appeal held that new uses of 
known medical treatments are patentable as ―Swiss claims‖.248 However, in 
Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents,249 the Court of Appeal stated that 
methods of medical treatments are generally not patentable.  
In addition, the Patents Act 1953 provides a statutory exception to 
patentability in section 17, stating that the Commissioner may refuse an 
application if the use of the invention is contrary to morality.  
The Commissioner also has the right to refuse applications for patents 
that appear to be entirely lacking a patentable subject matter. However, as 
―the question of the subject matter is one of the most uncertain issues in 
patent cases‖,250 the New Zealand patent law allows refusal in the 
                                               
243 Generally, see Ian Finch (ed), above n 10, 20. The Court of Appeal of New Zealand 
confirmed general prohibition of patents on medical treatment in Pfizer Inc v Commissioner 
of Patents, above n 11 following Wellcome Foundation v Commissioner of Patents [1983] 
NZLR 385 (CA), Cooke, McMullin and Somers JJ [Wellcome]. 
244 NRDC, above n 80. 
245  Statute of Monopolies 1623, above n 38. 
246  Wellcome, above n 243. 
247  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529 
[Pharmac]. 
248  Ibid, Gault J.  
249  Pfizer, above n 11.   
250  Commission to Inquire into and Report upon the Law of Patents, Design and Trade-Marks, 
above n 122, 26. 
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examination stage on the ground of lack of a patentable subject matter only 
in the clearest cases.251 
Critics say that New Zealand‘s patent legislation should provide a 
clear definition of patentable inventions to ensure that the Patent Office and 
the courts have an appropriate tool to decide whether an invention is 
patentable or not.252 The advantage of a clear definition of invention is that 
uncertainties over whether a specific subject matter is patentable – 
potentially contrary to the goal of encouraging innovation – can thus be 
reduced.253 Furthermore, if the legislation provides clear exclusions from 
patentability, the examiner would be able to refuse an application in the 
examination stage without the need for interpretation of the Act by the 
courts. Otherwise, there is the potential that different Assistant 
Commissioners would come to different conclusions for similar cases. For 
example, in Abbott Laboratories, Assistant Commissioner Popplewell held 
that a dosage regime is a method of medical treatment and therefore not 
patentable.254 In Merck & Co Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals, however, 
Assistent Commissioner Hazlewood held that Swiss claims for dosage 
regimes are patentable.255 In Genetech Inc, Assistant Commissioner 
Popplewell contradicted his earlier opinion and held that such an application 
is patentable.256 Consequently, many feel that the IPONZ is not the place to 
decide whether or not a specific subject matter should be patentable.257 
 
                                               
251  The lack of a distinct definition of an invention in New Zealand patent law is the subject of 
long debates that can only be mentioned but not entered into. However, most judges and 
scholars argue that issues of patentability should be left to Parliament. See Wellcome , 
above n 243, 398 Cooke J. 
252  See Hammond J in Pfizer, above n 11, para 128; Susy Frankel ―A Patentable Invention: 
Will Current Proposed Law Reform Clarify Patentable Subject Matter?‖ (2005) 11 NZBLQ 
350.  
253  Susy Frankel ―Lord Cooke and Patents: The Scope of ‗Invention‘‖ (2008) 39 VUWLR 73, 
83. 
254  Patent Application No 510328, Abbott Laboratories (9 June 2003) Asst Commr 
Popplewell.   
255  Patent Application No 501807, Merck & Co Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals (NZ) Ltd (31 
January 2006) Asst Commr Hazlewood. 
256  Patent Application No 539505, Genetech Inc (15 December 2006) Asst Commr Popplewell   
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(b) Prior art base 
A monopoly such as a patent should only be granted if the invention is 
new or novel. New Zealand is one of only a few countries to follow patent 
law based on a local novelty standard instead of an absolute novelty 
standard. Under the current Patent Act, the prior art base used for the 
examination of the novelty of a patent application is limited to documents 
published in New Zealand.258 This means that the patent office usually only 
examines patent specifications published in New Zealand and easily 
accessible overseas specifications. Overseas publications that are not 
published in New Zealand cannot be used to challenge the validity of a New 
Zealand patent.259 This creates both advantages and disadvantages for New 
Zealand. 
The aim of a local novelty standard is to promote local products and 
industry. As publications of inventions outside New Zealand cannot be 
considered as anticipated claims, local novelty represents an advantage for 
local inventors.  
However, the local novelty standard also allows people to obtain 
patents in New Zealand without having any creative input. For example, it is 
possible for importers to obtain patents for inventions by simply importing 
them to New Zealand.260 In a time of international trade and communication, 
this standard may be outdated. For instance, the local novelty standard may 
also enable patents to be granted in New Zealand that would usually not be 
granted elsewhere, and patents may have a much wider scope than other 
countries would allow.261 A further particularity is that most patent 
applications in New Zealand are based on overseas patents and are owned 
by non-residents.262 Using the local novelty standard may therefore result in 
more weak patents instead of promoting New Zealand‘s economy and local 
inventors.  
 
                                               
258  Patents Act 1953, ss 13 and 2(1). 
259  Ibid, ss 21(1)(b), 41(1)(e) and 42(1). 
260  See Sherman v Merck & Co Inc (11 April 2001) HC WN, AP 184/00, McGechan J. 
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(c) Examination for obviousness 
Another peculiarity of the current New Zealand patent law regime is 
that the examiner has no right to examine the patent application on the 
ground of obviousness. Before the grant, obviousness can only be brought 
forth as an issue by a third party in a separate opposition procedure.263 As a 
result, New Zealand patents may protect inventions that would be ineligible 
for patent protection in other countries due to obviousness.264 
 
(d) Benefit of doubt 
If the patentability of an invention is in dispute, the New Zealand case 
law provides the applicant with the benefit of doubt.265 This means that the 
application should be allowed to proceed and will not be refused ―unless on 
no reasonable view can it be regarded as meeting the requirements of the 
Act‖266, as the Court of Appeal in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd 
(Pharmac) v The Commissioner of Patents stated. Accordingly, in Swift & 
Co, Lord Parker stated, regarding the function of the Commissioner under 
the equivalent United Kingdom law:267 
[T]he function … is not to decide finally whether an alleged manner 
of new manufacture is actually patentable. Rather their function is to 
refuse to allow applications to proceed which on no reasonable view 
could be said to be within the ambit of the Act. It is true that … there 
are no express words to this effect, but it seems to me that looking at 
the scheme of the legislation as a whole that must be the position.  
(Emphasis added) 
Many other patent regimes worldwide have in the meantime moved 
away from this ‗benefit of doubt‘ approach, adopting the more rigorous 
‗balance of probabilities‘ test as the standard of proof, including the United 
                                               
263  Patents Act 1953, s 21(1)(e). 
264  Blijlevens, above n .91. 
265 See Swift & Co v Commissioner of Patents [1960] NZLR 775; see also High Court of 
Australia Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959 1A IPR 52. 
266 See Pharmac, above n 247. 
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Kingdom with the Patents Act 1977 and Australia with the Patents 
Amendment Act 2001.268  
The rationale for the benefit-of-doubt approach is that in cases of 
doubtful validity, it is not the patent office who should challenge the 
doubtful validity of a patent during the examination stage, but rather a 
potential user.  Davison CJ stated in this regard:269  
The proceedings are not intended to finally determine questions of 
validity of a patent if granted. Their purpose is to avoid the 
registration of patents that are clearly defective. If a patent is granted 
the opponent will still be entitled to apply to the Court for revocation 
or to seek revocation by counterclaim in an infringement action. 
Consequently, examiners of the Commissioner of the IPONZ cannot 
refuse patent applications even in cases in which they are not sure that the 
patent granted is valid. The system therefore depends on third parties to 
challenge the validity of patents in order to remove such patents from the 
market. Without such a challenge, even invalid patents lacking an inventive 
step will survive. Consequently, most other countries have amended their 
standard of examination away from the benefit of doubt, shifting the burden 
of proof back to the patent offices.270  
 
4  No automatic publication  
Until the acceptance of the complete specification is advertised, its 
details are strictly confidential under the New Zealand patent law.271 Only 
some basic information is published in advance, such as the data of the 
applicant and the inventor, the title of the application, its number, its 
classification, and the filling date. This ensures that a third party cannot 
inspect the specification before its acceptance is published. The examination 
                                               
268 Ian Pascarl ―The Implications of the Changes Effected by the Patents Amendment Act 2001 
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report is not open for public inspection unless allowed by a court order, 
section 91(2) of the Act. 
A further issue is that the current Patents Act 1953 provides no time 
limit for the publication of an application. Under current law, an application 
is published at acceptance, which in New Zealand generally takes two to 
four years after the initial application is made.272  
As a result, at present, the specification is not available to the public 
until it has gone through the entire examination procedure. It may take years 
before a third party is aware of the complete scope of the patent. 
Consequently, the examiner may undertake unnecessary work: a third party 
may challenge the application with prior art that could have been used to 
refuse the application during the examination process. Another effect of 
New Zealand‘s system of publishing patents only after acceptance is that the 
public has no access to antecedent patent applications, such as parent or 
grandparent applications, which had not gone through the entire 
examination procedure itself. This could mean that a potential opponent 
could not verify whether an application was entitled to an earlier priority 
date based on an antecedent patent application.273 
Furthermore, as the term for giving a notice of opposition to the grant 
of a patent in New Zealand begins with the publication of an application, it 
is crucial for a third party to know when the publication of an application is 
expected.  
To avoid this complicated situation, most patent regimes have 
implemented an automatic publication of the patent application 18 months 
after the earliest priority date.274  
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C Objections to the Current New Zealand Patent Review System: 
Third Party Instruments According to the Patents Act 1953 
The New Zealand Patents Act 1953 approach is relatively unique with 
respect to its instruments for third parties to challenge the grant of a patent. 
In general, New Zealand‘s patent regime provides third parties with the 
following instruments: pre-grant opposition,275 revocation before the 
Commissioner276, and revocation by the High Court.277  
As discussed in Part III B, third-party instruments from different 
countries, even those of the same type, can differ in the details. In order to 
provide enough substantial information to analyse the current patent review 
system in New Zealand, the third-party instruments available will be 
examined in detail, including the corresponding case law.  
 
1  An hybrid approach 
The current patent review system in New Zealand applies a hybrid 
approach with an emphasis on adversarial instruments. New Zealand patent 
law offers third parties specific instruments that provide a strong influence 
with strict temporal limitations.  
 
2  Influence of third parties in terms of quantity 
Under the current patent law of New Zealand, third parties have the 
chance to influence the granting procedure at three points of the process: 
 
(a) First instance: Before grant of a patent – Patent opposition (section 
21) 
In the first case, third parties have the right to influence the granting 
procedure by filing an opposition after the IPONZ has carried out its 
examination and published the complete specification.278 Until the 
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publication of the complete specification, the application is treated as 
strictly confidential. Third parties may presume that a patent application 
could be relevant to their business, but have no right to inspect the files. 
New Zealand is one of only a few countries worldwide to give third parties 
the right to file an opposition before the patent is even granted. 
 
(i) When is a pre-grant opposition available? 
The earliest possible involvement for a third party in New Zealand‘s 
patent-granting process is the opportunity to give a notice of opposition to 
the grant of a patent. According to section 21 of the Patents Act 1953, a 
third party can contest the grant of an application within a timeframe of 
three months from the date of publication of the complete specification on 
the grounds set. The three-month opposition period can be extended to four 
months.279  
 
(ii) Who can file a pre-grant opposition? 
According to section 21(1) of the Act, ―any person interested‖ has the 
right to oppose the grant of a patent. The Act itself does not define who a 
―person interested‖ is, but anybody who wants to oppose a patent 
application must be directly affected by the grant itself.280 Several decisions 
of the New Zealand Patent Office and the ―British Patent Office Manual of 
Office Practice (Patents) (1949 Act)" provide grounds for standing. 
Examples include opponents with manufacturing or trading interests related 
to the same subject matter as the opposed application, or who possess 
related patents, or who have a clear financial interest in the case.281 
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(iii) Filing a notice of opposition and statement of case 
If a third party wishes to oppose the granting of a patent, it must file a 
notice of opposition (using the prescribed form)282 and a statement of case 
setting out the opponent‘s standing, the facts the opponent relies on, and 
which relief he or she seeks in detail.283 
Whether or not an opposition proceeding is valid when a third party 
only gives a notice of opposition without a statement of case was recently 
the subject of debate in New Zealand. Before the decision of the New 
Zealand High Court in Lacme v Gallagher Group284, a common tactic was to 
file a notice of opposition without a statement of case. This enabled the 
opponent to gain time in the negotiation process with the patent applicant 
without losing the possibility of dropping the pre-grant opposition and filing 
an application for revocation before the Commissioner. In Lacme v 
Gallagher Group, the High Court held that an opposition is deemed to be 
filed when the notice of opposition is given, even if no statement of case is 
filed. In such a case, the opponent could not apply to revoke under section 
42. 
 
(iv) Defending an opposition 
After the applicant receives a notice of opposition with the statement 
of case, he must file a counterstatement setting out the response to the 
opponent's allegations.285 The applicant thus has the opportunity to amend 
his patent application and to defend it against the arguments that the 
opponent has brought forward. The amendments are be examined by the 
IPONZ before acceptance. 
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(v) Outcome of the pre-grant opposition 
After the hearing, the Commissioner issues a decision. In the event 
that the patent application has been successfully opposed, he or she will 
either refuse the grant of the patent or request the applicant to amend the 
application. This decision is open to appeal to the High Court.286 
 
(b) Second instance: In-between – Refusal of a patent without opposition 
(section 22) 
The second opportunity for third parties to influence the granting 
procedure is after the three-month period for opposition but before the grant 
of the patent. At this stage, the third party can no longer oppose the grant of 
a patent, because the deadlines for opposition have expired. However, third 
parties who did not oppose the grant of the patent can file documents to the 
Commissioner in order to encourage him or her to examine the application 
using the submitted material, without taking an active part in the procedure. 
 
(i) In general 
If no notice of opposition is presented within a three-month period 
after the publication of the complete specification, the Commissioner has 
the power to refuse the grant of a patent if it comes to his or her notice that 
the invention has been previously published in New Zealand.287 
 
(ii) What can third parties do? 
The refusal procedure in section 22 of the Act differs from the 
instruments used by third parties to challenge the grant of a patent. It is a 
mere administrative procedure without any direct involvement of third 
parties. 
However, third parties may exert an indirect influence by submitting 
information of prior publication or use to the IPONZ without filing an 
opposition. If the Commissioner is satisfied with the anticipatory material, 
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he may refuse to grant the patent unless the applicant is able to amend the 
application to overcome the objections.  
 
(c) Third instance: After grant of a patent – Revocation proceedings 
(sections 41, 42) 
In this third instance, third parties may exert their influence in two 
ways. First, they can challenge the validity of a patent in a revocation 
procedure before the Commissioner.288 Second, they may exert their 
influence by becoming a party before the courts. For example, third parties 
have the right to file an application for revocation by the court in order to 
challenge the patent in a validity action.289 In addition, a third party may 
challenge the validity of a patent as a defence in an infringement action.290 
 
(i) In general 
Once the patent has been granted, it can be revoked in two ways: 
either by the Commissioner (section 42) or by the High Court (section 41). 
There are important distinctions between these two types of revocation 
procedures. The administrative revocation procedure by the Commissioner 
can be initiated by 'any person interested' who has not opposed the grant of 
the patent within 12 months after the sealing of the patent.291 The judicial 
revocation procedure by the Court can be filed by ‗any person interested‘ 
without restriction on whether or not this person has filed an opposition at 
any time during the term of the patent.292  
The most important distinction between the two types of revocation is 
that the grounds of an administrative revocation by the Commissioner are 
the same as the grounds of the opposition procedure; in contrast, revocation 
by the Courts has more extensive grounds.293 
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If revocation procedures or infringement actions are pending before 
any courts, a revocation by the Commissioner is only allowed with the leave 
of the High Court.294 Revocation procedures are thus issued more frequently 
before the Court than before the Commissioner. 
 
(ii) Revocation by Commissioner (section 42) 
Under the New Zealand patent regime, the revocation procedure by 
the Commissioner is the last opportunity for a third party to challenge a 
patent at the administrative level.295 This procedure is often referred to as a 
―belated‖ or ―post-grant opposition‖ because the procedure and the grounds 
are similar to the opposition procedure under section 21 of the Act.  
The third party must file an application for revocation at any time 
within 12 months after the sealing of the patent.  
Even if a revocation procedure cannot be issued while an infringement 
action is pending without the permission of the court, a prior revocation 
procedure can be used to justify an application for a stay in a later 
infringement process in exceptional circumstances.296  
 
(iii) Revocation before court (section 41) 
The final possibility for a third party to challenge the validity of a 
patent (apart from infringement actions) is the revocation before the High 
Court.297 These proceedings have no time limit: an application for revocation 
of a patent to the High Court can be filed any time during the term of a 
patent. Section 41 provides an extended list of grounds to challenge the 
patent. All of these grounds can also be used as a defence and counterclaim 
in an infringement action.298 
                                               
294  Ibid, s 42(1). 
295  After a patent has been granted, third parties have only the revocation procedures by the 
Commissioner to influence the granting if they do not want to go to court. All other 
opportunities to challenge the validity of a patent take place before courts: for example, 
revocation by Court or defences against an infringement action.  
296 Ferro Corp v Escol Products Ltd [1990] RPC 651. 
297  Patents Act 1953, 41. 
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3  Influence of third parties in terms of quality 
As the current New Zealand patent regime applies an adversarial 
approach, third parties have a strong influence on the granting process both 
before and after the grant of a patent. The influence of third parties before 
the grant is not limited to the grounds of novelty and obviousness. After the 
grant of a patent, third parties have several more grounds to challenge its 
patentability. 
 
(a) Influence of a third party with pre-grant opposition (section 21) 
Before the grant of a patent, the New Zealand opposition system 
allows third parties to oppose the patent application on a multitude of 
different grounds (see below (i)). Third parties can fully participate in the 
proceedings; they even have the burden of proof to show that a patent 
application should not be granted using all kinds of evidence available (see 
below (ii) and (iii)). An oral hearing is part of the opposition procedure, 
offering both parties a chance to convince the IPONZ that their perspective 
on the case is correct (see below (iv)). 
 
(i) Grounds for opposition 
Section 21(1) of the Act provides the statutory grounds for opposition 
in New Zealand. According to these, an opposition procedure challenging 
the grant of a patent in New Zealand can only be based on the following 
grounds: 
- Obtaining;299 
- Prior publication or prior use;300 
- Prior claiming;301 
- Obviousness by publication or by use;302 
                                               
299  Ibid, s 21(1)(a).  
300  Ibid, ss 21(1)(b) and 21 (1)(c). 
301  Ibid, s 21(1)(d). 
302
  Ibid, s 21(1)(e).  
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- Not an invention;303 
- Insufficiency of the description;304 
- That the convention application was not made within 12 months of the 
date of first filing overseas;305 
- When the applicant fails to comply with the terms given after the 
restoration of an application;306 
- Undue delay in applying for restoration;307 or 
- Where an extension of time has been granted by the Commissioner 




Section 21(1)(a) of the Act provides the option that the grant of a 
patent application can be opposed if the applicant for the patent obtained the 
invention. 
According to Assistant Commissioner Burton in Wade's 
Application309, obtaining an invention is 
… something more than 'finding out'. … mere 'knowledge' of the 
invention by a particular party cannot be the basis of an allegation of 
obtaining. Obtaining must surely involve the misuse of such 
knowledge by some party, i.e. an application for protection of an 
invention by a person not entitled to apply on contravention of the 
rights of the person truly entitled to apply … 
If the opponent meets the required high burden of proof to prove 
obtaining and files an application for the same application, section 62 of the 
Act gives the Commissioner the right to assign the priority date of the 
―obtained‖ application to the opponent's application. 
                                               
303  Ibid, s 21(1)(f). 
304  Ibid, s 21(1)(g). 
305  Ibid, s 21(1)(h). 
306  Ibid, s 21(1)(i). 
307  Ibid, s 21(1)(j). 
308  Ibid, s 21(1)(k). 




(2) Prior publication   
An application can be opposed on the ground that the invention, as it 
is claimed in any part of the complete specification, has been published in 
New Zealand before the claim‘s priority date.310 
In other words, an invention as it is claimed in the complete 
specification of the application lacks novelty if it has been published in New 
Zealand before the priority date of the application. Not included in the 
relevant prior art base are patent specifications which were published in 
New Zealand more than 50 years before the date of filing and documents 
which were not published in New Zealand. 
According to section 2(1) of the Act, a document is ―published‖ when 
it is made available to the public.  
Particularly noteworthy is that prior publication is only a ground for 
opposition if the information has been made available to the public within 
New Zealand. Thus, a prior publication available only in another country 
cannot be used to oppose a New Zealand patent application: this is what 
defines New Zealand as a local novelty country. However, if a foreign 
document has been available electronically via the Internet in New Zealand 
before the priority date of the application, the opponent may use this 
information as evidence to prove the lack of novelty. In Molecular Plant 
Breeding Nominees Ltd's Application, Assistant Commissioner Popplewell 
stated:311 
Any person who accesses a document on the Internet is free to 
download or print it; thus it seems to me that this would be analogous 
to a facsimile of a document being sent from overseas to a New 
Zealand resident — such a document would surely fall within the 
definition of s 2. 
The same test was used in Agriculture Victoria Service Pty Ltd's 
Application.312 
                                               
310  Patents Act 1953, s 21(1)(b). 
311 Molecular Plant Breeding Nominees Ltd's Application, Commissioner Decision No 
P25/2005, 12 September 2005, Asst Commr Popplewell, 27. 
312 Agriculture Victoria Service Pty Ltd's Application, Commissioner Decision No P26/2005, 
12 September 2005, Asst Commr Popplewell. 
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Additionally, prior art documents can only anticipate the invention as 
claimed if they pass the ―reverse infringement‖ test established in General 
Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co313 and applied by the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand in Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd 
(in liq) v Lucas.314 
The requirements of the ―reverse infringement‖ test were summarized 
in Sealed Air NZ Ltd v Machinery Development Ltd315 as follows: 
… the test is to consider the document relied upon as constituting 
prior publication, and to determine whether that clearly  
(a) describes something that would infringe the claim, or  
(b) instructs something to be done or made which would infringe the 
claim, or  
(c) gives directions, the carrying out of which would inevitably result 
in infringement of the patent applied for. 
The House of Lords reviewed the test of prior publication in Synthon 
BV v Smithkline Beecham Plc.316 Lord Hoffmann defined therein two 
distinct requirements for prior publication (or anticipation): prior disclosure 
and enablement. According to Lord Hoffmann, the disclosure condition is 
satisfied whenever the subject matter of the prior disclose can be performed 
and results in a patent that is infringed. Enablement means that an ordinarily 
skilled person would be able to create the invention.317 
The origin of the test, the landmark decision General Tire & Rubber 
Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co318 held: 
To anticipate the patentee‘s claim, a prior publication must contain 
clear and unmistakable directions to what the patentee claims to have 
invented …319 A signpost, however clear, upon the road to the 
patentee‘s invention will not suffice. The prior inventor must be 
                                               
313 General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co [1972] RPC 457 (CA) [General 
Tire]. 
314 Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) v Lucas [2006] 3 NZLR 721 (SC), para 3 
[Peterson]. 
315 Sealed Air NZ Ltd v Machinery Development Ltd [2004] BCL 917 (HC) MacKenzie J. 
316 Synthon BV v Smithkline Beecham Plc [2005] UKHL 59. 
317 Ibid, para 22 and 26. 
318 General Tire, above n 313. 
319 Citing Flour Oxidizing Co Ltd v Carr & Co Ltd (1908) 25 RPC 428, 457, approved in BTH 
Co Ltd v Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Co Ltd (1928) 45 RPC 1, 24. 
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clearly shown to have planted his flag at the precise destination before 
the patentee. 
 
(3) Prior claiming 
A patent application may be opposed on the ground that an invention 
has been claimed in another complete specification and was published on or 
after the priority date of the application but was filed in advance of this 
date.320  
The requirements for this ground are satisfied if another patent 
application with the same invention was filed before but published on or 
after the priority date of the opposed application.  
Particularly difficult to prove in an opposition procedure is that any 
claim of the opposed application has already been claimed.321 However, 
mere differences in the language of claims that do not substantially change 
the subject matter are irrelevant.322 On the other hand, an opposition 
procedure on the ground of prior claiming will fail if the prior claim lacks 
just one essential feature323 – even if the later claim falls within the scope of 
protection.324 As a result, opposition procedures based on prior claiming are 
quite uncommon. 
 
(4) Prior use 
The grant of a patent application can also be opposed on the basis that 
the invention was used in New Zealand before the priority date of the 
application.325 
According to a practise note of the IPONZ326 based on the decision of 
the House of Lords in Bristol-Myers (Johnson's) Application,327 in order for 
an opposition to succeed on this ground, the opponent must first, 
                                               
320  Patents Act 1953, s 21(1)(c). 
321  General Tire, above n 313, 486, per Sachs LJ, stating that: ―[t]he prior inventor must be 
clearly shown to have planted his flag at the precise destination before the patentee.‖ 
322 See Commercial Solvents Corp's Application (1954) 71 RPC 143. 
323  Re Viskase Corporation's Application (New Zealand Patent Office, IP No 215759, 10 July 
1998, Asst Commr Popplewell). 
324 See Traver Corp’s Application (1964) 81 RPC 26. 
325
  Patents Act 1953, s 21(1)(d). 
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… establish that the alleged instance(s) of prior use was (were) not 
secret use(s) of the invention, as claimed. … 
and second, 
The opponent must also establish, by evidence, 
(a) what was used 
(b) where it was used 
(c) by whom it was used 
(d) the dates it was used 
(e) where apparatus still extant may be inspected. 
This means that a challenge on the basis of prior use will fail if the prior use 
of the invention was secret. The House of Lords in Bristol-Myers 
(Johnson's) Application held that an invention is secretly used if the user 
intentionally conceals it.328  
Furthermore, the prior use must be ―in a public manner‖. 329 Thus, the 
private use of an electric blanket manufactured overseas has been held to be 
insufficient to support an opposition based on prior use.330 In addition, to 
oppose a patent application on the ground of prior use, it is sufficient to 
prove only a single instance of prior use,331 but the lack of a specific 
example of prior use will result in failure for the opposition.332 In Georgeson 
v Urwin and Co,333 it was held that a certain amount of experimental use 
does not result in the loss of novelty. 
Section 60 of the Act provides statutory exceptions to prior use: for 
example, an invention disclosed at a ―gazetted exhibition‖, disclosed to a 
Government department, or used for the purposes of reasonable trial and 
experiment. 
                                                                                                                       
326 IPONZ New Zealand Intellectual Property Practice Notes 1974 – 1998 (IPONZ, 
Wellington, 2003) Issue No 1287. 
327 Bristol-Myers Co (Johnson’s) Application (1975) 92 RPC 127, 157. 
328  Ibid. 
329 Ralta Ltd's Application Commissioner Decision No P05/1985, 16 April 1985, Asst Commr 
Burton, 6. 
330 Ibid. 
331 For example, Craig & Connelly's Application Commissioner Decision No P03/1982, 17 
March 1982, Asst Commr Burton.  
332  See Re Application of Eighth Milieu Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] NZIPOPAT 8 (10 June 
1992), Asst Commr Burton. 
333





Unlike most other national Patent Offices, the examination by the 
IPONZ does not include the question of whether or not the invention is 
obvious. The examiner can only refuse the application if the invention does 
not meet the requirements of an ―invention‖ as defined in section 2(1) of the 
Act. By that standard, an invention only needs to be a manner of new 
manufacture. However, it is possible to oppose a patent application if the 
invention is obvious and clearly does not involve an inventive step.334  
This ground involves two separate and distinct areas: obviousness or 
lack of inventive step with regard to prior publication and with regard to 
prior use.335  
In opposition proceedings, the opponent must show that the invention 
is clearly obvious; otherwise, the applicant will be given the benefit of 
doubt.  
In Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Myers Company (No 2),336 it was 
decided that the insertion of the word ―clearly‖ in section 21(1)(e) of the Act 
shows that the opponent has an higher onus of proof using the ground of 
obviousness in opposition procedures than in revocation procedures.337 
Furthermore, Barker J held in the same decision that obviousness is to be 
judged from the viewpoint of a ―notional‖ addressee who is a skilled 
technician, knowledgeable in the relevant literature, but incapable of a 
―scintilla of invention‖.338  
As summarised in Bernard Charles Sherman v Merck & Co Inc,339 the 
two leading New Zealand appellate authorities on obviousness are Ancare v 
Cyanamid340 and Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd v Lucas.341 These 
                                               
334  Patents Act 1953, s 21(1)(e). 
335 IPONZ New Zealand Intellectual Property Practice Notes 1974 – 1998, above n 329.  
336 Beecham, above n 269, 230, Barker J. 
337  Section 41(1)(f) of the Act lacks the word ―clearly‖. 
338 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Myers Company (No 2) [1980] 1 NZLR 192. 
339  Bernard Charles Sherman v Merck & Co Inc [2007] NZIPOPAT 21 (13 August 2007). 
340  Ancare NZ Ltd v Cyanamid of NZ Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 299 (CA) (upheld in a judgment of 
the Privy Council [2003] RPC8) [Ancare]. 
341
  Peterson, above n 314. 
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cases held that under New Zealand law, the principals of obviousness ―are 
the same as those adopted in England and applicable under the Patents Act 
1977 (UK)‖.342 Therefore, the four-stage analysis as a test for obviousness 
set out in the landmark decision Windsurfing Inc v Tabur Marine (GB) Ltd343 
is still applicable in New Zealand.344 Accordingly, the ground of 
obviousness is  not justifiable if the difference between the prior art and the 
alleged invention is obvious to a ―normally skilled but unimaginative 
addressee‖.345 
In New Zealand, two different approaches exist when the court is 
asked to filter out prior art which could not be found by such a skilled 
person. In Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Myers Company (No 2),346 the 
diligent searcher approach used in Australia was applied. However, in 
Ancare NZ Ltd v Cyanamid of NZ Ltd,347 the court held that it is not 
necessary to decide whether a diligent searcher would have found the prior 
art or whether all documents should be taken into consideration. The ‗all 
document‘ approach has been confirmed by the High Court in Cool 123 Ltd 
v Vodafone NZ Ltd.348 As a result, prior art cannot be excluded from 
consideration in New Zealand. 
In some cases, although the prior art documents lack one or more 
features of the invention, they form in their entirety a mosaic supplying all 
necessary features. Thus, while it is not permissible to combine instances of 
                                               
342  Ibid, para 54. 
343 Windsurfing Inc v Tabur Marine (GB) Ltd (1985) 102 RPC 59, 73-74 (CA) [Windsurfing]. 
Followed by the New Zealand High Court in Smale v North Sails Limited [1991] 3 NZLR 
19, followed in the New Zealand Court of Appeal by Gault J in Ancare, above n 340, 309, 
and confirmed by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Peterson, above n 314, para 54.  
344  The test includes following steps: (1) considering the inventive concept of the alleged 
invention, (2) considering the prior art or prior use, (3) identifying differences between 
prior art and the alleged invention, and (4) asking whether the differences would have been 
clearly obvious to a ―normally skilled but unimaginative addressee‖ at the priority date, see 
Crusader Engingeering Limited v Mattersmiths Holdings Limited and Juken New Zealand 
Limited [2009] NZIPOPAT 22 (23 November 2009) Asst Comm Hazlewood. However, in 
the United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal recently reformulated the steps of the 
Windsurfing approach, see Pozzoli SPA v BDMO SA [2007] EWCA Civ 588. 
345  See Seda SPA v Huhtamaki Australia Pty Ltd and Michael Horauf Maschinenfabrik GmbH 
[2010] NZIPOPAT 1 (22 February 2010) Asst Comm Popplewell. 
346 Beecham, above n 338, 230, Barker J. 
347 Ancare, above n 340, para 43. 




prior use and prior publication for obviousness, it is allowable to piece 
together a number of prior art documents if the ―notional addressee‖ would 
normally combine them.349 
The last step of the Windsurfing test is the determination of whether 
the differences between the prior art and the alleged invention would have 
been clearly obvious to a ―normally skilled but unimaginative addressee‖ at 
the priority date. Different countries utilise a variety of approaches in 
addressing this issue.350 In New Zealand, the ‗worthwhile to try‘ approach 
has been used.351 
In addition, in Lucas v Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd,352 the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand decided that a mere combination of already 
known features without new functions does not involve an inventive step.353 
With regard to this decision and the ‗all documents‘ approach, it 
seems that the threshold for an inventive step is higher in New Zealand in 
comparison to other patent regimes – Australia, for example.354 
Consequently, it might seem that New Zealand‘s approach to obviousness 
would make it easier to invalid a patent there than in other countries.355 
However, even though the obviousness approach is the same for opposition 
procedures and revocation, ―it is unlikely that an opponent can succeed on 
this ground‖,356 as Assistant Commissioner Burton stated. The reason is that 
the burden of proof is higher in opposition proceedings than for revocation, 
                                               
349 Ancare, above n 340, para 43. 
350  For example, in Europe, the problem-solution approach is preferred, while in the United 
States and Australia, the ‗obvious to try‘ approach is preferred, see Aktiebolaget Hassle v 
Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 59, Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric 
Products Pty Ltd 235 ALR 81; 81 ALJR 1070. 
351 Ancare, above n 340 , para 43. 
352  Peterson, above n 314. 
353  Unlike Australia, see Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (No 2) 
[2007] HCA 21, para 132. 
354  Anton Blijlevens, above n 91, 434. 
355  See discussion in Novartis New Zealand Ltd v Aktiebolaget Hassle [2004] 2 NZLR 721, 
para 32. 
356 George Oscar Kohler and Emanuel M. Bickoff v Licencia Talalmanyokat Ertekesito 
Vallalat [1981] NZIPOPAT 9 (10 June 1981). 
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because in opposition procedures, the applicant needs to show that the 
invention clearly does not involve an inventive step.357 
 
(6) Not an invention 
Under section 21(1)(f), the opponent may challenge the grant of a 
patent on the ground that it is not an invention within the meaning of the 
Act.358  
According to New Zealand case law, this ground can be used if the 
patent application is based on an invention that is not a manner of new 
manufacture or if it consists of a mere discovery,359 a mere scheme or plan,360 
a mere collocation of integers,361 or a method of medical treatment.362  
 
(7) Insufficient description 
According to section 21(1)(g) of the Act, a patent application can be 
opposed on the ground of insufficient description of the invention or of the 
method by which the invention is to be performed. The ground of 
insufficiency is based on the assumption that it is the duty of the applicant to 
provide full and sufficient information for the public by describing first, the 
nature of the invention and second, the manner by which the invention is to 
be performed.363  
An allegation of insufficiency of the complete specification involves 
two factors:  
                                               
357  Beecham Group v Bristol-Myers Company (No 2), above n 269, 230, per Barker J. 
358  The term ―invention‖ is defined in section 2(1) of the Act as follows:  
‗Invention‘ means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of 
privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or process of 
testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture; and includes an alleged 
invention. 
359 See Reynolds v Herbert Smith and Co Ltd (1903) 20 RPC 123; Maunder v Wanganui Sash 
& Door Factory & Timber Co Ltd [1928] NZLR 566. 
360 See Rolls-Royce Ltd's Application [1963] RPC 251; IBM Corps Application [1980] FSR 
564. 
361 See Peterson, above n 314. 
362 See Wellcome, above n 243. 
363 American Cynamid Co (Damn's) Patent (1971)54 RPC 425 (HL), Valensi and Another v 
British Radio Corporation [1973] RPC 337, 377. 
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(1) that the complete specification does not sufficiently and fairly 
describe the invention; and 
(2) that the complete specification does not sufficiently and fairly 
describe the method by which the invention is performed. 
An opposition procedure based on the ground of insufficiency of the 
description will fail if the applicant meets the standard applied in Edison 
and Swan United Electronic Co v Holland.364 According to this decision, a 
description is sufficient if a person with reasonable skill is able to perform 
the invention. If the user is unfamiliar in the use of this method or invention, 
then the applicant needs to guarantee that a competent person would be able 
to understand how to proceed by reading the specification.365 
Thus, due to an insufficient description or an error in the specification, 
a specification may be invalid, as the invention claimed would not work as 
described.366  
It should be noted that the ground of insufficiency ought not to be 
confused with the ground of inutility.367 A patent application can only be 
challenged based on inutility in a revocation process.  
 
(8) Other grounds 
There are four other possible grounds for opposition provided by 
sections 21(1)(h) to 21(1)(k) of the Act, including more formal reasons for 
an patent application to be opposed by a third party. 
 
(ii) Burden of proof 
The onus of proof to prevent an application from being granted lies 
with the opponent. This means that the third party filing an opposition needs 
                                               
364 Edison and Swan United Electric Co v Holland (1889) 6 RPC 243, 280. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v Fisher & Paykel Limited [2005] NZIPOPAT 8 (11 April 
2005); Valensi and Another v British Radio Corporation [1973] RPC 337, 377. 
367 The distinction between the two grounds is described in Tetra Molectric Ltd's Application 
[1977] RPC 290, 297. 
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first to submit the grounds for opposition and must then prove that the 
application is not suitable for grant.  
It is not the function of the opposition procedure to determine 
definitively the validity of a patent application.368 According to New 
Zealand High Court case law, the opposition procedure only deals with the 
question of whether or not a patent application is ―manifestly untenable‖.369 
If this question cannot clearly be answered in an opposition procedure, then 
the High Court must take up the claim for invalidity in a revocation 
process.370 As Berker J said in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Meyers Co (No 
2),371 
I shall ask myself the questions in respect of each ground of 
opposition; is the claim to the patent in suit 'manifestly untenable'? Is 
there a prima facie case for the grant of the patent? Does the justice of 
the case require the applicant to be permitted to resist the claim for 
invalidity in properly constituted revocation proceedings? All these 
tests, although differently stated, really amount to the same thing. 
With regard to the onus of evidence, according to section 96(1) of the 
Act, evidence admitted in the proceedings before the Commissioner may be 
given by affidavit or statutory declaration. Furthermore, the Commissioner 
may ―if he thinks fit in any particular case take oral evidence instead of or in 
addition to such evidence.‖372 He also has the right to allow the cross-
examination of witnesses on their affidavits or declarations. Concerning the 
evaluation of evidence filed in opposition procedures, Diplock LJ states:373  
...look at the evidence filed on behalf of the applicants and the 
opponents in order to see (1) whether the opponents‘ evidence read by 
itself clearly establishes the opponents‘ case, and, if so, (2) whether 
                                               
368  See R v Patents Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Swift and Co [1962] RPC 37, 46 Lord Parker. 
369 See Sealed Air NZ Ltd v Machinery Developments Ltd, above n 315; Beecham, above n 
338; Saxpack Foods Ltd v J Watties (11 July 1988) HC WN M454/85 Ongley J 
370  In Swift & Co’s Application [1962] RPC 37, the principle was stated that an opposed 
application should only be refused in the clearest possible cases. 
371 Beecham, above n 338, 213. 
372 Patents Act 1953, s 96(1). In Malik M Hasan v Ministry of Health, Accident Compensation 
Corporation, Telecom New Zealand Limited [2009] NZIPOPAT 6 (5 May 2009), Asst 
Commr Hazlewood decided that all grounds of opposition are to be heard at one single 
hearing. Therefore, evidence need to be delivered completely to the applicant in advance, 
see Patent Regulations 1953, reg 50.  
373
  General Electric Company’s Application [1964] RPC 413, 455-456. 
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the applicants‘ evidence in reply raises any bona fide conflict of fact 
or expert opinion on a question on the answer to which the opponents‘ 
case depends. 
 
(iii) Filing evidence 
Under Regulations 50 and 51 of the Act, both parties have two months 
to file evidence in support of their cases. The evidence is to be given to the 
Commissioner in the form of a statutory declaration or affidavit, or as oral 
evidence if he sees fit.374 
 
(iv) Hearing 
Section 21(3) of the Act provides for a hearing before the 
Commissioner. After the applicant files its counterstatement and all 
evidence is compiled, the Commissioner appoints a hearing at least 14 days 
in advance, if all parties have not elected to be heard in a written 
procedure.375 
 
(b) Influence of a third party without filing an opposition (section 22) 
If a third party does not want to file an opposition, but has material 
relevant to the application, he or she can make the Commissioner aware of 
the evidence by simply filing these documents with the IPONZ. As the third 
party has no direct influence, it depends entirely on the Commissioner 
whether or not he or she uses the information provided by a third party. 
Third parties bringing anticipatory material to the Commissioner's attention 
have no right to file further submissions in support, but it is generally 
accepted that the applicant may file a submission in response to the findings 
of the Commissioner.376  
                                               
374  Patents Act 1953, s 96(1). 
375 Patents Regulations 1953, reg 54.  
376  As the applicant has the right to file a submission in response to the objections under 
section 13 of the Act, and the documents cited by the Commissioner have the same subject 
matter under section 13 as under section 22, the circumstances are analogous. 
91 
 
However, it is possible to submit documents under section 22 and to 
file an opposition under section 21 simultaneously. As the hearing officer 
must consider all information brought to his attention, even after the hearing 
but before the grant of the patent, anticipatory material submitted under 
section 22 can also be used in an opposition procedure under section 21 of 
the Act.377 
 
(c) Influence of a third party in revocation procedures and before the 
court (section 41 and 42) 
After grant of the patent, third parties have two opportunities to exert 
their influence. The third party can either apply to the Commissioner for an 
order revoking the patent on the same grounds upon which the application 
could be opposed, or they can file an application for revocation to the 
courts, challenging the grant of a patent on even more possible grounds. In 
both procedures, the third party fully participates as a party to the 
proceedings and must prove that the patent is invalid. An oral hearing is also 
included in the revocation proceedings. 
 
(i) Burden of proof and evidence 
As Tomlin J in In the Matter of Lowndes' Patent stated, the burden of 
proof lies on the person who applies for the revocation of the patent:378 
I think that, where an application is being made for the revocation of a 
patent which bas been granted, there is no doubt that the applicant is 
under the duty or burden of making out his case in the clearest way. It 
seems to me that that must follow from the very nature of the 
proceeding. 
As in the opposition procedure, evidence in revocation proceedings 
before the Commissioner can be given either by affidavit or by statutory 
declaration.379  
                                               
377 See Hughes and Kennaugh's Application (1910) 27 RPC 281. 
378 In the Matter of Lowndes' Patent 45 RPC 48, 57. 
379
  Patents Act 1953, s 96(1). 
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For a revocation proceeding before the High Court, evidence must be 
given according to the High Court Rules.380 
 
(ii) Grounds for revocation 
The grounds for revocation before the Commissioner are similar to the 
grounds in section 21 of the Act. Therefore, the aforementioned grounds for 
opposition are applicable for the revocation procedure before the 
Commissioner. 
The revocation process under section 41 of the Act has essentially the 
same grounds as the opposition procedure, although the grounds are 
generally wider in scope. In the following section, only the differences 
between these grounds will be discussed; for the most part, the explanations 
above for the grounds for opposition apply. The grounds for revocation 
include: 
- Prior granting381 
- Applicant not entitled to apply382 
- Obtaining383 
- Not an invention384 
- Lack of novelty385 
- Obviousness386 
- Inutility387 
- Insufficient description388 
- Ambiguity389 
- False suggestion / representation390 
                                               
380  Judicature Act 1908 No 89, sch 2, High Court Rules, rr 9.1-9-9.89. 
381  Patents Act 1953, s 41(1)(a). 
382  Ibid, s 41(1)(b). 
383  Ibid, s 41(1)(c).  
384  Ibid, s 41(1)(d).  
385  Ibid, s 41(1)(e).  
386  Ibid, s 41(1)(f).  
387  Ibid, s 41(1)(g). 
388  Ibid, s 41(1)(h).  
389
  Ibid, s 41(1)(i).  
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- Secret use391 
- Contrary to the law392 
 
(1) Obtaining 
Unlike in opposition procedures, the ground of obtaining in revocation 
proceedings is not limited to obtaining the invention from the true and first 
inventor or its personal representative.393  
 
(2) Lack of novelty 
The challenge of a patent in a revocation process based on the lack of 
novelty will be successful if the applicant can prove that the invention was 
either known or used in New Zealand before the priority date of the 
patent.394 In contrast to the ground of prior publishing for opposition,395 the 
broader term ―known‖ instead of ―published‖ is utilised for this ground. 
Therefore, in a revocation process, it is also possible to anticipate an 
invention with oral disclosure. 
 
(3) Obviousness 
In general, it is easier to succeed with this ground in revocation 
proceedings than in opposition procedures. Firstly, in revocation 
proceedings, it is necessary to show that the claimed invention is ―obvious 
and does not involve any inventive step having regard to what was known or 
used before the priority date of the claim in New Zealand,‖396 whereas in 
opposition procedures, the invention needs to be ―clearly‖ obvious.397 This 
means that the burden of proof for obviousness is markedly higher in an 
                                                                                                                       
390  Ibid, s 41(1)(j).  
391  Ibid, s 41(1)(l).  
392  Ibid, s 41(1)(m).  
393  Ibid, ss 21(1)(a), 41(1)(c). 
394  Ibid, s 41(1)(e). 
395  Ibid, s 21(1)(b). 
396  Ibid, s 41(1)(f). 
397
  Ibid, s 21(1) 
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opposition procedure.398 Secondly, regarding prior disclosure, the scope of 
the ground of obviousness in revocation proceedings is broader because it is 
not limited to ―published‖ disclosure. 
 
(4) Inutility 
An additional objection to the validity of a patent in revocation 
proceedings is inutility.399 In Fawcett v Hoffmann,400 the English Court of 
Appeal defined utility as follows: 
If an invention does what it is intended by the Patentee to do, and the 
end attained is itself useful, the invention is a useful invention.  
In Smale v North Sails Ltd,401 the High Court of New Zealand held that 
the test of utility is satisfied ―if the result is that the object sought to be 
obtained can be attained and is practically useful …‖402 Consequently, this 
ground is rarely successful, because the invention needs only to fulfil one of 
its objectives to be useful.  
 
(5) Insufficient description 
A patent may be revoked if the ―complete specification does not 
sufficiently and fairly describe the invention and the method by which it is 
to be performed, or does not disclose the best method of performing it‖.403 In 
contrast to opposition procedures, this ground requires that the specification 
disclose ―the best method of performing‖. This second part has been 
interpreted in E/I du Pont Nemours & Co v Enka BV404 as imposing three 
requirements. Hon Falconer J stated:405 
                                               
398 See Beecham, above n 338. 
399 Patents Act 1953, s 41(1)(g). See, for example, Maeder v "Ronda" Ladies' Hairdressing 
Salon [1943] NZLR 122 (SC and CA), a case in which a hairdresser performed the method 
described in the patent before the court in order to show that it did not work. 
400 Fawcett v Hoffmann (1896) 13 RPC 398, 405 (CA). 
401 Smale v North Sails Ltd - [1991] 3 NZLR 19, 52 (HC). 
402 Ibid. 
403  Patents Act 1953, s 41(1)(d). 
404 E/I du Pont Nemours & Co v Enka BV [1988] FSR 69. 
405
  Ibid, 87-88, (referring to Patents Act 1949 (UK), s 32(1)(h)). 
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… to succeed on this ground a defendant has to establish three 
requirements in respect of that matter not disclosed in the specification 
and which is relied upon (the "omitted matter"), namely:  
(i) the omitted matter must disclose a method of performing the 
invention better than any disclosed in the complete 
specification of the patent;  
(ii) the method disclosed in the omitted matter must have been 
known to the applicant for the patent as better than any 
disclosed in the complete specification, and,  




A patent can be revoked if the scope of a claim is insufficient and 
unclearly defined, or if it is not fairly based on the disclosed matter.406 
This ground consists of two quite different bases:  
- that the definition is not sufficiently and clearly defined, and/or 
- that the claims are not fairly based on the disclosure in the 
specification.  
As Dennison J stated in Daily v Lightband,407 in order to sufficiently 
and clearly define the specification, a definition ―… is to be such that a 
person of ordinary intelligence, conversant with the subject matter, will 
understand it, and will be able to act upon it.‖ 408  
With regard to the second base, there are three rules held by Lloyd 
Jacob J in Mond Nickel Co Ltd’s Application409 to determine whether or not 
a complete specification is fairly based: 410 
Firstly, one has to enquire whether the alleged invention as claimed 
can be said to have been broadly described in the provisional 
specification …  
                                               
406  Patents Act 1953, s 41(1)(i). 
407 Daily v Lightband (1903) 6 GLP 135. 
408 Ibid, 136. 
409 Mond Nickel Co Ltd’s Application (1956) 73 RPC 189; applied in Allied Chemical 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents [1970] NZLR 166. 
410
 Mond Nickel Co Ltd’s Application, above n 409, 194. 
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Is there anything in the provisional specification which is consistent 
with the alleged invention as claimed? … 
Does the claim include as the characteristics of the invention a feature 
as to which the provisional specification is wholly silent? 
 
(7) False suggestion 
There is a ground for revocation if a ―patent was obtained on a false 
suggestion or representation.‖411 This ground is not available in an 
opposition procedure. 
As the Court of Appeal in Valensi v British Radio Corporation Ltd412 
ruled, a revocation proceeding based on this ground may be successful if the 
applicant shows that the misinterpretation made by the patentee was of such 
materiality that the Crown was misled into granting the patent. It is not 
possible to challenge the grant of a patent because it was obtained in the 
absence of good faith, unless the challenge can be brought under the ground 
of false suggestion.413 
 
(8) Secret use 
A patent may revoked if the invention was secretly used in New 
Zealand.414 In determining whether a secret use has taken place, no 
importance is given to: (1) use of the invention for reasonable trials or 
experiments,415 (2) use by the government or any person authorised by a 
Government Department,416 or (3) use by a person without the consent or 
acquiescence of the applicant or of any person from whom he derives title.417 
 
                                               
411  Patents Act 1953, s 41(1)(j). 
412 Valensi v British Radio Corporation Ltd [1973] RPC 337, 381. 
413  Dow Chemical Company v Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd (No 2) (1985) 5 IPR 415. 
414  Patents Act 1953, s 41(1)(l). 
415  Ibid, s 41(2)(a). 
416  Ibid, s 41(2)(b). 
417
  Ibid, s 41(2)(c). 
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(9) Contrary to the law 
A patent may be revoked if it ―has been granted contrary to law.‖418 
This ground gives a third party the right to apply for revocation of a patent 
on any other ground on which the patent could have been refused apart from 
the grounds in subparagraphs (a) to (l) of section 41(1) of the Act.419 
However, in Dow Chemical Co v Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd,420 Eichbaum 
J considered and limited this provision as follows: 
The legislature having carefully codified the law in 12 preceding 
subparagraphs, I do not believe that be means of the broader 
provisions of the 13th it should have intended to throw open an 
examination of the entire pre-existing common law,… 
 
4  Advantages and disadvantages of this system 
As shown above, the current patent review system of New Zealand 
shifts the burden of reviewing patents completely to third parties. If they 
have relevant information as to why an application should not be granted or 
concerning the doubtful validity of a patent, third parties can initiate 
adversarial proceedings to challenge a patent. This system is advantageous 
because the third party has several instruments to effectively challenge a 
risky application or patent. As the procedure does not limit the kind of 
evidence that can be used, the possibilities of challenging are manifold. 
Even inventions based on new technology having predominantly non-patent 
prior art may be effectively challenged .  
Pre-grant opposition even gives third parties the right to challenge an 
application before the applicant has obtained a monopoly to block 
competitors from the market. This means that the challenger does not face 
the risk of provoking an infringement action based on the matter in dispute. 
In patent regimes that provide only a post-grant opposition procedure, it is 
not uncommon that challenging the validity of a patent will demonstrate to 
                                               
418  Ibid, s 41(1)(m). 
419  This ground was inserted by the Evans Commission in order to provide an equivalent of the 
writ of scire facias, see Evans Commission H-10A 29 June 1950, paras 200 and 201. 
420
 Dow Chemical Co v Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd (19 December 1983) HC WN M653/83. 
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the patentee that a patent has relevance to the products of a competitor. As a 
result, the patentee might sue the opponent in a parallel infringement action.  
The current New Zealand patent review system also has many 
disadvantages. In particular, the third party can only oppose the application 
within the brief time period of three months. As the complete specification 
is first available only after publication, third parties actually have only 
weeks to find relevant prior art. The search for relevant prior art (including 
material that is not in patent databases) may take too long to allow a realistic 
chance of opposing an application. As a result, the opposition procedure can 
have a low chance of success.  
Furthermore, the current patent review system provides no instrument 
for a third party to submit relevant information at an early stage of the 
procedure. As the publication of the complete specification happens after 
the IPONZ has already carried out the complete examination of the 
application, third parties have no chance to support the IPONZ with relevant 
prior art without opposing the application. As a result, relevant prior art may 
not be considered, because a third party might not invest the money to 
oppose an application in cases in which the risk a patent represents for their 
products is not so high. 
 
D Intermediate Result 
In principle, New Zealand‘s current review system as a hybrid 
approach has the potential to effectively enhance the quality of patents when 
third parties make use of the available instruments. The current patent 
review system provides several third-party instruments giving third parties a 
strong and early influence in order to challenge overly broad or invalid 
patents. However, the current system does not allow third parties to support 
the IPONZ before the grant of a patent with relevant prior art without 
opposing the application. Furthermore, the influence of third parties before 
the grant of a patent is temporally limited in a way that makes it difficult to 
search for prior art in depth. Moreover, the cost-efficient administrative 
procedures of the IPONZ are more limited with respect to the grounds 
available than the proceedings in the courts. 
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It may be beneficial to adapt the current patent review system of New 
Zealand to support the IPONZ with more relevant prior art, preserving and 
improving its ability to function. A revise would also promote third-party 
actions to challenge applications or patents of doubtful validity by providing 
a more effective and less costly way to do so.  
 
VII REFORM PROCESS IN NEW ZEALAND 
The reform process for New Zealand patent law has been ongoing for 
decades, but without significant changes to the Patents Act 1953. The reason 
for the lack of progress is that revisions of the entire patent system have 
been attempted. However, in recent years, important steps toward a modern 
patent system have been made. For instance, the patent review system of 
New Zealand has been revised with regard to its third-party instruments. 
The following section of this dissertation provides an overlook of the reform 
process of New Zealand‘s reviewing system. In particular, the Patents Bill 
2008, as an outcome of the reform process that proposes significant changes 
in the patent review system, will be analysed in detail. In order to 
understand how the new patent law proposed by the Patents Bill 2008 has 
been developed, it is also necessary to briefly illustrate the history of the 
reform process, developments in patent policy, and the discussions related 
to the review of the Patents Act 1953 from its beginning up to the present 
day. 
 
A History of Reform 
The New Zealand Patents Act 1953 has been in force for more than 
half a century without any significant changes to the law. By contrast, 
corresponding legislations in the United Kingdom and Australia have been 
continuously altered, reacting with flexibility to technological 
developments.421 The release of the draft Patents Bill in 2004 and the 
introduction of the Patents Bill 2008 to the Parliament are the first steps in 
updating New Zealand‘s patent law; they have initiated substantial debate 
                                               
421
  See Patents Act 1977 (UK) and Patents Act 1990 (Cth) including amendments. 
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over what sort of patent law would be most appropriate to the needs of the 
country.  
 
1  Government reports with respect to patent law 
There have been previous attempts to review New Zealand‘s patent 
laws, but none of these has led to a comprehensive revision of the system as 
a whole.422 Official reports at the beginning of the 1990s, responding to the 
law reforms in Australia, recommended modernization of the legislation, 
which did not finally take place until more than 14 years later. In its report 
from 1990, the Law Commission recommended:423  
- If possible, major legislative changes to copyright, patent, 
trade mark or trade secret law should be introduced 
contemporaneously. 
- In the meantime, amendments to existing statutes should be 
permitted to proceed, in particular where this would advance 
or retain harmonisation with Australian developments in this 
area. 
(emphasis added) 
In the same report, the Law Commission also pointed out public 
policy issues of intellectual property that provided a framework for the later 
reform process. The questions that the report posed were:424 
- Does intellectual property law strike the right balance 
between the interests of right holders, consumers and 
competitors? 
- Does intellectual property law strike the right social balance 
between short-term price increases and long-term 
innovation? 
                                               
422  In 1985 , the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) reported on the extension of 
the patent term from 16 to 20 years, see IPAC Report The Patent Monopoly Term and 
Extensions Thereof” (Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Wellington, 1985). In 1987, 
the IPAC discussed the review of New Zealand‘s patent law with respect to micro-
organism inventions, see IPAC Report The Adequacy of Definition and Disclosure in 
Patent Specifications Relating to Micro-Organism Inventions (Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee, Wellington, 1987). 
423 The Context for Reform, above n 16, 15. 
424
 Ibid, 13. 
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- Should profit maximisation or cost recovery be the State‘s 
aim when assessing fees for intellectual property?    
- Should term of grant and social benefit be more evenly 
matched? 
- Does resolution of the foregoing issues require a more 
unified intellectual property law or should we dissect and 
reassemble that law so that it reflects more closely the 
personal and business interests sought to be protected rather 
than the often fortuitous and largely historical patent-
copyright-trade mark division?  
In addition, the Minister of Commerce announced in July 1989 a 
review of the Patents, Trade Marks and Design Acts. The first stage of this 
review was the publication in 1990of a discussion paper identifying possible 
options for reform with respect to the intellectual property regime in New 
Zealand.425 The topics discussed in this paper were the implementation of 
international treaties, such as the TRIPs Agreement and the proposed World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) treaties on harmonisation of the 
law, as well as other patent law issues (concerning compulsory licensing, 
the patent term, and the protection of micro-organisms and biotechnological 
inventions). In 1992, an additional discussion paper was issued.426 In 
accordance with New Zealand‘s policy for issues concerning the Māori and 
biotechnology, in 1999 the Ministry of Commerce published a discussion 
paper on the patenting of life forms and the Māori.427  
In 2000, the Government agreed to a three-stage review of the Patents 
Act 1953 to account for the social and technological changes in the world 
since the Act came into force. In Stages 1 and 2 of the review, the Cabinet 
dealt with technical and operational changes to the Act, with a focus on 
updating New Zealand‘s patent legislation. Proposed amendments were, for 
example, the implementation of an absolute (rather than local) novelty 
standard and the examiner‘s determination of an inventive step as a 
                                               
425 Possible Options for Reform, above n 16. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ministry of Commerce Maori and the Patenting of Lifeform Inventions An Information 
Paper Produced by the Patenting Lifeforms Focus Group for the Ministry of Commerce 
(Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1999). 
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requirement for the grant of a patent. Stage 3 of the review considered more 
complex issues; a discussion paper on this stage was released in March 
2002.428 These issues included the definition of the term ―invention‖, the 
stringency test for patents in New Zealand, and the patentability of 
biotechnology, business methods, software, and methods of medical 
treatment of humans. 
 
2  Draft Patents Bill 2004 
The first substantial outcome of the review process was the release of 
the Draft Patents Bill in 2004 by the Ministry of Economic Development, 
for the purpose of giving professionals the opportunity for consultation.429 
This step is normally not required in the legislative process, but it was 
useful at this time, as it opened up a broader forum to discuss highly 
controversial topics.430 As the Ministry stated: ―This consultation exercise is 
intended to help ensure that the legislation gives proper effect to the policy 
decisions that have been made and to minimise the risk of unintended 
consequences of change.‖431  
In its report on the submissions from 2005,432 the Ministry of 
Economic Development noted that it was aware of the implications of some 
policy issues, such as the abolition of pre-grant opposition, but indicated 
that it was not intending to reopen the debate. The Ministry stated that 
―none of the submissions identified any new issues that would warrant re-
considering the policy decision at this stage‖433 but also that it would 
nevertheless continue to draw attention to critical policy issues. 
Furthermore, the Ministry considered assigning the clarification of these 
matters to a Select Committee.434  
                                               
428 Boundaries to Patentability, above n 14. 
429 Draft Bill, above n 17. 
430 Frankel, above n 252, 351. 
431 Boundaries to Patentability, above n 14.  
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The intended purposes of the draft bill were, according to clause 3 of 
the Bill, to:435  
(a) ensure that a patent is granted for an invention only in appropriate 
circumstances by— 
(i) establishing appropriate criteria for the granting of a patent; 
and 
(ii) providing for procedures that allow the validity of a patent 
to be tested; and 
(b) provide greater certainty for patent owners and the users of 
patented inventions that patents will be valid after they are granted; 
and 
(c) address Maori concerns relating to the granting of patents for 
inventions derived from indigenous plants and animals or from Maori 
traditional knowledge; and 
(d) promote quality, expertise, and integrity in the profession of patent 
attorneys; and 
(e) ensure that New Zealand‘s patent regime takes account of 
international developments. 
In order to achieve these purposes, the Draft Patent Bill proposed 
fundamental changes for New Zealand‘s patent legislation. Concerning the 
grant of a patent, the regulations provided major developments, such as the 
introduction of absolute novelty,436 the revised definition of a patentable 
innovation437 including explicit exclusions from patentability,438 and the 
examinations for obviousness and usefulness.439 Another notable element 
was the establishment of a Maori Advisory Committee to provide advice to 
the Commissioner of Patents on patent applications for inventions involving 
indigenous plants and animals.440 In addition, the Draft Patents Bill proposed 
significant changes regarding third-party challenges, such as the abolition of 
pre-grant opposition and its replacement by re-examination.441  
                                               
435 Draft Bill, above n17, cl 3.  
436  Ibid, cls 6 and 8. 
437  Ibid, cl 13. 
438  Ibid, cls 14 and 15. 
439  Ibid, cl 58. 
440  Ibid, cls 283-286. 
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3  Patents Bill 2008 
In 2008, the Patents Bill was introduced to Parliament. This Bill is still 
in the legislative process, and it is not known when and in what version it 
will come into force.442  
Most of the changes proposed in the Draft Bill have been adopted into 
the Patents Bill, among them the introduction of stricter examination 
standards, such as absolute novelty instead of local novelty as the base for 
prior art,443 and the examination for an inventive step.444 Also included were 
the definition of invention445 and specific exclusions from patentability,446 
the required publication of patent applications 18 months from the earliest 
priority date,447 the establishment of a Maori Advisory Committee to provide 
advice to the Commissioner of Patents on patents applications for inventions 
involving indigenous plants and animals,448 and the reform of the patent 
attorney profession.449 The proposed amendments in the Patents Bill 2008 
will be examined in more detail below, specifically with regard to the 
examination procedure and the changes in the third-party instruments. 
 
B Proposed Amendments of the Patents Bill 2008 
1  Higher standard of examination 
One of the principle intentions of the Patents Bill 2008 is to streamline 
the granting procedure, providing stricter standards of examination in order 
to reduce the number of patents granted to non-inventions.450 The changes to 
the examination standards that follow are the most important factors aimed 
                                               
442  A current estimate suggests that the Bill will come into force in early 2011, see Liz Nock 
―Time for an Upgrade? New Bill to Overhaul Patents Regime‖ 
www.internationallawoffice.com (accessed 22 March 2010). 
443  Patents Bill 2008, cls 6 and 8. 
444  Ibid, cl 60. 
445  Ibid, cl 13. 
446  Ibid, cls 14-15. 
447  Ibid, cl 72(1)(b). 
448  Ibid, cls 275-278. 
449  Ibid, cls 184-240. 
450
  Ibid (Explanatory note), 51. 
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at strengthening the quality of New Zealand‘s patents and promoting the 
agenda of harmonisation. 
 
(a) Definition of invention and specific exclusions from patentability 
Under the current Patents Act 1953, patentable invention is defined 
as:451 
Any matter of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant 
of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and any 
method or process of testing applicable to the improvement or control 
of manufacture; and includes an alleged invention 
As aforementioned, the IPONZ is required to give the applicant the 
benefit of doubt when determining whether an invention is patentable or 
not.452 Additional exclusions from patentability have been developed by the 
courts and are subject to re-interpretation.453 As a result, a frequent criticism 
of the current patent regime is that uncertainties exist regarding the 
requirements for a patentable invention and possibly patentable subject 
matters, especially for new technologies.454 These uncertainties and the cost 
to challenge a patent can result in fewer invalidation procedures and the 
related negative effects that invalid patents have on the market, such as 
restraint on competition.455 Furthermore, as no other patent regime uses New 
Zealand‘s current definition for invention, the case law of other countries 
can no be longer used as a guide.456  
Consequently, the Patents Bill 2008 proposes a definition for a 
patentable invention457 and the exclusion of specific subject matters from 
patentability.458 In line with goals of harmonisation, this new definition of 
                                               
451  Patents Act 1953, s 2(1). 
452  See R v Patents Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Swift and Co, above n 93.  
453  See citation under n 359-362. 
454  Patents Bill 2008 (Explanatory note), 57. 
455  Ibid, 58. 
456  Ibid, 57. 
457  Patents Bill 2008, cl 13 
458
  Ibid, cl 14-15. 
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patentable inventions is similar to the definition under the Australian Patent 
Act.459 
The exclusion of specific subject matters has been particularly 
controversial. As the topic of this dissertation is the changes to New 
Zealand‘s patent review system and not the entire Patents Bill, this debate 
cannot be explained in detail. Most heavily criticised, however, were the 
facts that patents for creative works such as software were not excluded460 
and that the proposed exclusions regarding methods of medical treatment of 
humans were not clear enough.461  
 
(b) Examination of obviousness and usefulness 
Under the current patent system, applications are only examined for 
novelty; obviousness can only be a ground for an opposition or revocation 
procedure.462 As a result, New Zealand may grant much broader patents for 
an invention than countries that examine patent applications for obviousness 
(as most countries do).463 Therefore, with regard to the negative effects of 
overly broad patents and to the harmonisation agenda,464 the Patents Bill 
2008 proposes that patent applications be examined to determine whether or 
not they involve an inventive step.465  
This change is critical. First, the examination of novelty is 
straightforward: all features must already exist in the prior art for a patent to 
be denied. In contrast, the examination of obviousness is much more 
subjective: the examiner needs to consider whether hindsight is enough to 
decide that the invention was obvious at the priority date. For this reason, 
                                               
459  Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 18(1). 
460  See, for example, Information Science Department University of Otago ―Submission on the 
Patents Bill 235-1‖ www.waitaki.otago.ac.nz (accessed 22 March 2010); New Zealand 
Open Source Society ―Submission on Patents Bill – Government Bill 235-1‖ 
www.nzoss.org.nz (accessed 20 March 2010), InternetNZ ―Submission to the Commerce 
Committee on the Patents Bill (235-1)‖ www.isocnz.org.nz (accessed 20 March 2010). 
461  See, for example, Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand 
Incorporated ―Submission on Patents Bill to the Commerce Select Committee‖ 
www.ramianz.org.nz (accessed 20 March 2010). 
462  Patents Act 1953, ss 13, 21(1)(e), 41(1)(f) and 42(1). 
463  Patents Bill 2008 (Explanatory note), 52. 
464  Ibid, 54. 
465
  Patents Bill 2008, cl 13. 
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different tests (such as the Windsurfing test466) have been developed to help 
the examiner decide whether an invention is obvious or not. However, the 
examination for obviousness may increase the time and effort needed and 
therefore has the potential to overburden the resources of the IPONZ. 
Secondly, as discussed in detail above, New Zealand case law currently tests 
obviousness in a different manner than other jurisdictions.467 Thus, it is 
questionable whether the examination of obviousness by the examiner 
would actually harmonise New Zealand‘s laws with the laws of its 
important trading partners, when the outcome of such an examination might 
be not the same. 
In addition, patent applications will also be examined for usefulness 
by the examiner.468 This is particularly relevant for patents with subject 
matters in new technological fields. For example, under the current system, 
some patents have been granted involving large numbers of gene sequences, 
even though it is not clear what the use of these sequences might be.469 
Researchers nevertheless have to pay royalties if they want to use these gene 
sequences in their projects, a possible restraint on further innovations. 
Usefulness is a requirement for a patentable invention in most other patent 
regimes,470 and therefore the examination for usefulness is a step toward 
harmonisation with important trading partners such as Australia.471 
 
(c) Absolute novelty standard 
Additionally, according to clause 8 of the Patents Bill 2008, the 
relevant prior art base includes all material available to the public (whether 
in New Zealand or elsewhere) by description (written or oral) in use before 
the priority date. With this clause, the Patents Bill 2008 proposes an 
absolute novelty standard to replace the local novelty standard. This means 
that New Zealand would adopt an internationally recognised standard of 
                                               
466  Windsurfing above n 343. 
467  See Peterson, above n 314. 
468  Patents Bill 2008, cl 13. 
469  Ibid (Explanatory note), 62. 
470  See TRIPS, above n 5, art 27. 
471
  Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 18(1)(c). 
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novelty, a further step in harmonising its law with important partners in 
trade.472 As more prior art will be available to challenge the grant of a patent 
than under the current system, it seems likely that fewer undesirable patents 
will be granted or will survive in the market. 
 
(d) Balance of probabilities 
In determining whether or not an application should be granted, the 
IPONZ must currently give the benefit of doubt to the applicant. As 
explained above, this approach means that the examiner can only refuse an 
application if he or she is certain that the court would find this patent 
invalid.473 As a result, patents of uncertain validity may be granted.474 This 
uncertainty in the quality of patents lowers their value, and invalid patents 
may remain in the market if no third party challenges them,475 possibly 
leading to higher prices and restricted competition at the expense of 
society.476  
According to the Patents Bill 2008, instead of the former benefit-of-
doubt requirement, the Commissioner must now accept the complete 
specification on the more lenient standard of ―balance of probabilities‖.477 
The Commissioner will thus have a broader justification for refusing the 
grant of patents of doubtful validity, allowing the overall quality of New 
Zealand‘s patents to increase. If patents are only granted if they meet all 
requirements of the law at the balance of probabilities standard, it will be 
more likely that the patents will be valid.478 It is also in the interest of the 
patentee to have strong patents that would survive a challenge. 
 
                                               
472  See, for example, Patents Act 1990 (Cth), sch 1. 
473  See R v Patents Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Swift and Co, above n 93. 
474  Patents Bill 2008, (Explanatory note), 58. 
475  See Chris Dent, above n 100, 382. 
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2  Third-party instruments according to the Patents Bill 2008 
The second key objective of the Patents Bill 2008 is to provide 
instruments that will make it easier and cheaper to challenge the grant of a 
patent.479 The following third-party instruments are proposed: 
 
(a) Third-party assertion 
(i) Background 
The current Patents Act 1953 provides no time limit for the 
publication of an application. An application will be published after 
acceptance, which in New Zealand generally takes two to four years after 
the initial application is filed.480  With the Patents Bill 2008, New Zealand 
adopts the automatic publication of the specification after 18 months.481 
Furthermore, the Bill provides that all examiner reports and communication 
will be open for public inspection once the application has been accepted.482 
This allows third parties to make assertions; these are similar to existing 
submitting instruments, such as the European Union‘s third-party 
observation.483  
 
(ii)  How does the instrument work? 
The Patents Bill 2008 introduces a new third-party instrument called 
‗assertion‘. This instrument allows any person to assert to the Commissioner 
that the invention claimed in the patent application is not patentable due to 
its lack of novelty or its obviousness.484 
The person asserting to the Commissioner must state his or her 
reasons for the assertion by filing a notice.485 Additionally, it is apparently 
permissible to submit documents accompanying the notice, as clause 86(3) 
of the Patents Bill 2008 states that the notice and ―any documents 
                                               
479  Ibid, 50. 
480 Ibid, 9. 
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482 Ibid, cl 74. 
483 Ibid, cl 86, 87. 
484  Ibid. 
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accompanying‖ shall be open to the public.486 In response, the 
Commissioner must inform the applicant that a notice has been filed.487 
 
(iii)  Analysis 
This new informal instrument of assertion allows third parties to 
notify the Commissioner before acceptance of the application in matters 
affecting novelty and obviousness. As third parties will be allowed to file 
relevant prior art documents at an early stage of the examination process of 
the application, the IPONZ may thereby become aware of more substantial 
prior art before the examination procedure has been completed. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether or not third parties will be allowed to 
respond to the applicant‘s statements. It is additionally unclear whether the 
Commissioner will have the right to ignore the submitted prior art 
information. Currently, it seems that the assertion procedure only allows for 
the submission of documents and a notice explaining why the person is 
asserting a claim. It is my opinion that the assertion instrument is a first step 
in the right direction, but it needs to be described in greater detail. 
 
(b) Re-examination 
(i)  Background 
The Patents Bill 2008 repeals pre-grant opposition under section 21 of 
the Patents Act 1953 and replaces it with a re-examination instrument.488 
 
(ii)  How does the instrument work? 
This new procedure allows any person to request a re-examination, 
after publication of the application but before a patent is granted.489 The 
                                               
486  It is unclear from the wording of this clause whether or not the submission of documents 
will be allowed. 
487  Patents Bill 2008, cl 87. 
488  Ibid, cl 88-92. 
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 Ibid, cl 88-90. 
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grounds for re-examination are limited to novelty and obviousness.490 All 
other grounds of the current opposition procedure are no longer available. 
―Any person‖ means that anybody, including the applicant him- or 
herself, can request re-examination and ―standing‖, as in the current 
opposition procedure, is no longer required.  
If somebody requests re-examination, the Commissioner must re-
examine the application.491 It is also possible for the Commissioner to re-
examine an application without a request of a third party at any date after 
publication but before the grant of a patent.492 
After the grant of a patent, a request for re-examination is possible for 
any person, as long as no relevant proceeding is pending and no application 
for revocation by the Commissioner has been made.493 Additionally, the 
Commissioner must re-examine the patent if its validity is in dispute and a 
re-examination has been ordered by the court.494 
A request for re-examination obliges the Commissioner to consider 
and to report to the best of his or her knowledge whether or not the complete 
specification is novel and involves an inventive step.495 
If the Commissioner decides that the complete specification is not 
novel or does not involve an inventive step, and that the applicant/patentee 
has not properly amended the specification, the Commissioner may refuse 
the grant of a patent by re-examination before the grant of a patent.496 He or 
she may also revoke the patent by re-examination after granting.497 
 
(iii)  Analysis 
By replacing pre-grant opposition with pre-grant re-examination, the 
Patents Bill 2008 shifts the burden to prove the patentability of an 
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application in the first stage of examination back to the IPONZ. As a result, 
third parties are no longer allowed to directly influence the pre-grant patent 
procedure.  
The main argument for repealing the pre-grant opposition procedure is 
that it has the potential to delay the grant of a patent for years.498 It is true 
that pre-grant opposition, as currently implemented in New Zealand, has the 
potential to delay the patent-granting procedure. However, the efficiency of 
re-examination procedures can also be questionable, because it strongly 
depends on the instrument‘s design and utilisation.499  
The clauses in the Patents Bill 2008 regulating the re-examination 
procedure are not very specific concerning the influence that third parties 
are allowed. For example, it is unclear whether third parties have the right to 
submit prior art or statements.  
Furthermore, the Patents Bill does not currently provide for a hearing 
after the Commissioner‘s determination and report on whether the invention 
is novel and involves an inventive step. 
Overall, the current pre-grant opposition provides third parties with 
much more influence on the procedure than they will have after the Patents 
Bill 2008 passes. 
In addition, the Patents Bill is also vague as to how the proposed re-
examination procedure will work in conjunction with revocation by the 
Commissioner. It seems that the Patents Bill 2008 will allow two 
administrative post-grant procedures at the same time.  
However, an argument in favour of the re-examination procedure is 
that it provides a more inexpensive and easier way to challenge the validity 
of a patent.500 However, even if the re-examination procedure is cheaper, it 
will not accelerate the removal of undesirable patents from the register if it 
turns out to be less effective for third-party challengers.  
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(i)  Background 
As compensation for the abolition of pre-grant opposition, the Patents 
Bill 2008 provides third parties with an expanded revocation procedure 
before the Commissioner.501 The provisions for revocation by the 
Commissioner and for revocation by the courts are now combined in clause 
104. The revocation instrument by the courts is principally the same as 
before, very much similar to the revocation procedure according to section 
42 of the Patents Act 1953. In the following section, foremost the changes 
with respect to revocation by the Commissioner will be analysed. 
 
(ii)  How does this instrument works? 
The revocation instrument allows third parties to apply for revocation 
by the Commissioner at any time during the term of a patent on any of the 
grounds on which a grant can be refused.502 In contrast to the re-examination 
procedure, the revocation procedure includes a hearing of the parties before 
the Commissioner issues his or her decision.503 
 
(iii)  Analysis 
The more comprehensive revocation procedure by the Commissioner, 
the new alternative offered by the Patents Bill, is expected to be an 
inexpensive and quick procedure in comparison to the more tedious and 
time-consuming revocation by the High Court under the current system.504 
However, under the new Patents Bill, third parties still have the right to 
apply directly to the High Court if they wish to do so.505 
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(e) Māori Advisory Committee 
With the Māori Advisory Committee, the Patents Bill 2008 provides a 
new instrument for a specific third party.506 It requires the Commissioner to 
consider advice from the Māori Advisory Committee concerning patent 
applications involving Māori traditional knowledge and indigenous plants 
and animals. Although the advice of the Māori Advisory Committee is not 
binding, it should help limit the inappropriate grant of patents for inventions 
that are based on traditional knowledge.507 
 
C Are the Amendments of the Patents Bill 2008 an Appropriate 
Solution for New Zealand? 
After examining in detail the amendments proposed by the Patents 
Bill 2008, the question is now whether these amendments are the best 
solution for New Zealand. By adopting these changes, will New Zealand 
achieve the goals of its patent policy and enhance the quality of its patents?  
  
1  Changes in the standards of examination  
As critically discussed above, New Zealand‘s standards of 
examination are currently lower than those of other countries. In order to 
align New Zealand‘s standards of examination with international standards, 
the Patents Bill 2008 provides and implements new instruments and 
procedures to harmonise the national examination standards with those of 
important trade partners, Australia in particular.508  
While this development is advantageous for New Zealand, it also 
should be noted that these new examination standards have the potential to 
delay the grant of a patent and may impose extra costs.509 For instance, 
examiners will now be forced to examine applications for obviousness and 
usefulness on an absolute novelty standard. This means that the prior art 
                                               
506 Patents Bill 2008, cl 276. 
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509
  Patents Bill 2008, (Explanatory note), 60. 
115 
 
search will take more time and the examination, although thorough, will be 
more challenging for the examiner.510 However, the delays and costs will 
decrease over time, as IPONZ and the applicants become more familiar with 
the new examination standards.511  
In the end, using the new stricter examination standards will enhance 
the overall quality of patents, and this is therefore a good solution for New 
Zealand. However, it would be preferable and more effective to combine the 
stricter examination standards with new instruments for third parties, 
allowing them greater influence on the procedure as a whole. The support of 
third parties (for example, in the submission of information on relevant prior 
art) might help prevent the IPONZ from overburdening its resources, which 
could result in delayed examinations. 
 
2  New third-party instruments 
(a) Assertion 
As analysed above, the assertion instrument is the cheapest and best 
solution to support the IPONZ‘s examinations. By allowing third parties to 
submit relevant prior art at the examination stage, more relevant documents 
are available to decide whether an invention is patentable or not.512 The third 
parties will be allowed to file statements explaining the relevance of these 
documents.513 Furthermore, this instrument causes no significant delays, as 
the Commissioner considers the filed notice but is not impeded by direct 
influence of the third parties.514 
Consequently, the assertion instrument is a good solution to increase 
the prior art information available for the IPONZ without increasing the 
costs to the third party and without causing delays in the procedure.  
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The shifting of the Patents Bill 2008 to a more inquisitorial approach 
with respect to pre-grant instruments can be criticised on several points. 
Specifically, the reasoning behind replacing the pre-grant opposition system 
with a re-examination procedure can be disproved.  
The main argument in favour of a re-examination procedure is that 
third parties will have the chance to encourage the IPONZ to re-examine an 
application that may lack patentability, without risking the costs of an 
opposition procedure.515 It is likely that an opposition procedure would be 
more expensive than a re-examination procedure.516 The main reason for this 
is that the third party in an opposition procedure has the burden to prove that 
the application is not patentable. This means that an in-depth search for 
prior art must be carried out before an opposition can be filed. Furthermore, 
the third party must file several written statements and prepare for an oral 
hearing to demonstrate why the submitted prior art is relevant to the 
patentability of the application. However, by implementing the additional 
instrument of assertion, a third party that would prefer to avoid the cost of 
an opposition procedure now also has the option to submit documents to the 
examiner without any extra costs. 
It has been further argued that ―the abolition of the existing pre-grant 
opposition procedure will remove a potential source of costs and delay in 
obtaining a patent.‖517 It is generally true that pre-grant opposition has the 
potential to delay the grant of a patent. However, if the challenge of the 
application is reasonable, the delay caused by pre-grant opposition is 
acceptable, as the grant of an invalid patent may cause significant problems. 
Furthermore, if the application survives an opposition procedure, its worth 
may increase, to the applicant‘s advantage. The delays that may be caused 
by opposition aimed at putting off the grant of a patent as long as possible 
can be reduced if the pre-grant opposition system is designed in a way that 
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limits delaying effects. Examples for limitations could be, for instance, strict 
deadlines and limited grounds for opposition.  
An additional issue is that the re-examination procedure is only based 
on two grounds: novelty and obviousness. The Commissioner cannot 
consider, for example, the prior use of an invention in this procedure. 
Therefore, a patent may be granted which will later be ruled as invalid in the 
courts.518 Re-examination also shifts the burden to find and analyse prior art 
lies to the IPONZ, since third parties are not allowed to submit statements.519 
Third parties may thus be forced to challenge a patent after the grant, risking 
infringement actions.520 In this permutation, with a validity procedure and an 
infringement action pending simultaneously, a fair number of parties may 
decide to resolve the conflict outside the courts in a settlement agreement, 
with the result that an invalid patent might remain in the register.  
Moreover, as more than 90 percent of New Zealand‘s patents are 
granted to overseas applicants and most of the benefits of invalid patents 
flow overseas, it may be desirable to provide a review system that allows 
third parties an early and strong influence in the granting procedure, as the 
re-examination procedure provides. As the New Zealand Law Society said  
―a pre-grant opposition procedure for third parties (as under the 1953 Act) 
would result in a cleaner and more reliable register.‖521  
The IPONZ has only limited resources of time, money, and 
specialized personnel. Consequently, particularly in new technological 
fields, the prior art brought to them within an opposition procedure may 
support the examiners better than the art for a re-examination procedure, 
because only in the context of an opposition procedure is it permissible to 
submit prior art that is not in published form.522 
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These critical issues and partial disadvantages of the re-examination 
system present a picture that implies that the re-examination procedure may 
not be the best solution for New Zealand.  
 
(c) Revocation  
The new extended revocation procedure before the Commissioner is a 
good way to allow third parties to challenge the validity of a patent on all 
grounds available in a less expensive administrative procedure. The IPONZ 
has the experience and technological knowledge to comprehensively review 
an invention‘s patentability. Revocation is possible as an administrative 
procedure, which would be less expensive and time-consuming than a 
revocation before the High Court.523 However, if third parties want to go 
directly to the High Court, they have the right to do so.524 Therefore, the 
extension of grounds available through revocation by the Commissioner is a 
good solution to enhance the quality of New Zealand‘s patents. 
 
VIII SUGGESTED ROUTE FORWARD FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A Developing a New Approach for the New Zealand Review System 
Should New Zealand implement the Patents Bill 2008, the outlined 
changes will set New Zealand‘s patent system on the right path, in line with 
international standards. However, shifting from a pre-grant opposition 
procedure to a pre-grant re-examination procedure will have enormous 
impact on the entire patent system, which may not be the best solution for 
New Zealand. In consideration of the particular needs of the country, this 
dissertation aims to develop a new approach that may be more advantageous 
for New Zealand. 
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B Framework of a New Approach 
In order to develop a new approach for New Zealand‘s review system, 
it is first necessary to define the framework. It is particularly important to 
keep the country‘s needs in mind.  
The most important issues that require consideration in developing a 
new approach for New Zealand are the following:  
 
1  International framework for a patent reviewing system 
In general, intellectual property rights are local or territorial rights. 
This means that a patent sealed and registered in New Zealand only grants 
protection within the territory of New Zealand and can only be enforced 
within this jurisdiction.525 In this respect, the patent law of New Zealand is a 
domestic law. However, ongoing globalisation and international trade have 
led to new considerations for the territorial nature of intellectual property 
law. Therefore, in developing a new approach in its patent law, New 
Zealand also needs to consider the international developments with regard 
to patent law harmonisation, in order to minimize differences that may 
impede its international trade. Furthermore, the new patent law needs to be 
consistent with New Zealand‘s obligations to international agreements. The 
following international agreements require consideration: 
 
(a) Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 
1883 
New Zealand has been a member of the International Union for the 
Protection of Industrial Property since 1931. The purpose of the Convention 
is to enable the transfer of knowledge and to increase international trade by 
harmonising industrial property law between its member states.526 The 
Convention enumerates details such as national treatment, the right of 
priority, and rules related to local manufacture; it includes the concept of the 
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national independence of patent systems.527 However, the Convention makes 
no reference to patent review systems.  
 
(b) Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 19 June 1970 
The Patent Cooperation Treaty simplifies the procedure of filing a 
patent application internationally and reduces its cost. It enables the filing of 
a single patent application (―international application‖) with one Patent 
Office (―receiving office‖) to have effect in each member state nominated 
by the applicant. This one application is examined by the receiving office 
for formal requirements and researched with respect to available 
international prior art. The applicant then has the opportunity to convert the 
international application into a national application (―the national phase‖). 
The PCT has been in force in New Zealand since December 1992.528  
The Patent Cooperation Treaty only governs the system of 
international patent applications; no provisions with respect to patent review 
systems are included. 
 
(c) Patent Law Treaty (PLT), June 2000 
The Patent Law Treaty, enacted by the WIPO in 2000, is one of the 
more recent treaties regarding the harmonisation of patent law.529 Its purpose 
is to streamline the application procedure and to reduce the cost of obtaining 
parallel patents in several countries.530 New Zealand is not yet a member 
nation, but Australia signed the treaty on 16 December 2008. Therefore, 
New Zealand might also consider becoming a member of the Patent Law 
Treaty.  
The PLT includes some details regarding patent review systems. For 
example, the PLT states that non-compliance with certain formal 
requirements concerning the application may not be a ground for the 
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revocation or invalidity of a patent.531 However, some non-compliance can 
be used as a ground to challenge a patent, if it is the result of a fraudulent 
intention. Furthermore, the PLT also prohibits the revocation or invalidation 
of a patent without giving the patentee the opportunity to attend the 
revocation and to amend or correct the patent.532 
Thus, the PLT needs to be considered if grounds for revocation or 
invalidity procedures are developed that are based on the formal 
requirements for the application of a patent.  
 
(d) TRIPS Agreement  
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) was signed in 1994 as an addition to the Agreement establishing 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO).533 It aims to develop an international 
framework of principles and rules dealing with the global trade of pirated 
and counterfeit goods. 534 Its provisions afford member states with a 
minimum standard of protection, the principle of national treatment, the 
principle of most-favoured-nation treatment, and the World Trade 
Organisation Dispute Settlement Mechanisms. New Zealand is a member of 
TRIPS. 
The TRIPS Agreements must be considered when implementing a 
review system, because if member nations implement administrative 
revocation and inter partes procedures (such as opposition, revocation, or 
cancellation), these procedures have to follow the general principles set out 
in Articles 41.2 and 3.535 These include the precepts that the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should be fair and equitable, should not be 
complicated or expensive, and should not entail unreasonable time limits or 
delays.536 Furthermore, the decision of the Patent Office (preferably in 
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written form) must be reasonable, without delay, and based only on 
evidence on which the parties have the opportunity to be heard.537 Finally, 
the ultimate decision in an administrative procedure shall be subject to an 
appeal to the court or to other judicial authorities.538  
 
(e) Result 
As shown above, the worldwide harmonisation agenda does not 
provide explicit provisions concerning the type of third-party instruments a 
patent regime should have. Only the TRIPS Agreement regulates that if a 
member state provides third-party instruments, their work and interaction 
should be governed by general principles such as fairness, equality, 
simplicity, low costs, and limited delays. Explicit specifications of how the 
third-party instruments should be designed are not provided. 
 
2  Harmonisation with important trade partners 
(a) Australia  
Australia is one of the most important trading partners of New 
Zealand.539 The two countries are close partners territorially and benefit 
from several agreements meant to stimulate and to simplify their cross-
national trading activity. Most of these agreements include general 
regulations concerning harmonisation; only those agreements that refer to 
the harmonisation of intellectual property law will be considered below. 
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(i) Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANCERTA) 
ANCERTA, more popularly known as the CER Agreement, is a series 
of agreements and arrangements that provides a free trade area, eliminating 
most of the barriers to trade between Australia and New Zealand.  540  
One of the key aspects of the CER Agreement is the mutual 
recognition of goods and services between Australia and New Zealand. 
Under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA), the 
countries agreed that goods legally sold in one country can also be sold in 
the other country without any further restrictions; additionally, people 
registered to practise an occupation in one country are allowed to practise in 
the other country as well.  
Unfortunately, the sale of goods protected by intellectual property 
rights is not included under TTMRA.541 However, this agreement is 
important for patent law because registered patent attorneys from one 
country are permitted to apply for registration in the other country.542 
 
(ii) Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of New 
Zealand and the Government of Australia on Coordination of Business 
Law 2006 
In 2006, the Minister of Commerce of New Zealand and the Treasurer 
of the Commonwealth of Australia signed the current Trans-Tasman 
Memorandum of Understanding for Coordination of Business Law. This 
Memorandum includes the proposed work program for the harmonisation of 
the business laws of the two countries by 2011. Its Annex (Work 
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Programme for Coordination of Business Law) includes the following 
purpose: 543 
j) Development of a seamless processing regime for the granting of 
patents and the registration of trade marks, plant variety (or breeders‘) 
rights and patent attorneys … 
(Emphasis added) 
 
(iii) ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) 
The latest development in the harmonisation process of intellectual 
property law between New Zealand and Australia is the establishment of the 
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (ASEAN). The aim of the ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Bill is to implement the Agreement 
establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area 
(AANZFTA) on 27 February 2009.544 The AANZFTA deals with 
intellectual property law in chapter 13 of the Agreement.545 The parties 
agreed under article 9(7) of chapter 13 of the Agreement that they would 
accede to several international treaties dealing with patent law. New 
Zealand is a member of most of these treaties; however, under this 
agreement, New Zealand is obligated to join the Patent Law Treaty 2000. 
 
(b) Europe  
The European Union is New Zealand‘s second most important market 
after Australia, accounting for approximately 12.8 percent of the total 
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exports of New Zealand.546 In 2007, New Zealand and the European Union 
signed the Joint Declaration on Relations and Cooperation between the 
European Union and New Zealand 2007.547 More specific bilateral 
agreements concerning patent law do not exist between New Zealand and 
the European Union.  
 
(c) Result 
The harmonisation effort with important trading partners is one aspect 
of patent policy in New Zealand. In particular, Australia and New Zealand 
are attempting to harmonise their patent laws, but at present all of these 
approaches are limited to questions regarding the grant of patents, not the 
review system.  
However, the design of the review system should also be harmonised 
in order to allow the same conditions in the two countries. Even though the 
amendments proposed by the Patents Bill 2008 are primarily based on the 
existing patent law of Australia, some significant differences still exist. For 
example, Australia still has pre-grant opposition as a third-party instrument, 
which is slated to be abolished in New Zealand. Accordingly, the issue 
arises of how New Zealand and Australia will be able to share examination 
of patents when the two countries do not provide the same kinds of 
influence for third parties in the patent-reviewing procedure. The design of a 
new review system could be based on the review system under the 
Australian patent regime. 
Even if most research relating to third-party instruments is based on 
the European patent system and the patent system of the United States, and 
although both systems provide well-established instruments, the needs of 
New Zealand are more comparable those of Australia. Both countries are 
small economies and strongly dependant on international trade; in addition, 
the patent system of both countries is based on the laws of the United 
Kingdom, and the two countries have similar domestic issues, including the 
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rights of their indigenous peoples. It may therefore be desirable to utilise the 
already existing knowledge of specific types of third-party instruments and 
the review system of Australia, adjusting it to fit the particular needs of New 
Zealand in order to design a new review system for the country.  
 
C The New Approach – Third-Party Instruments for New Zealand 
According to the analysis of the Patents Bill 2008, the new approach 
will adjust the proposed amendments so that the former, more adversarial 
approach of the current Patents Act 1953 will be retained. The proposed 
adversarial approach would also conform with the harmonisation agenda, at 
least with respect to Australia. 
The new approach highlights the fact that an optimal system for New 
Zealand requires adjustments to the influence of third parties at the stage 
before a patent is granted. Therefore, the following instruments could be 
appropriate for a patent review system in New Zealand: 
 
1 Assertion by any third party after publication of the specification on 
all questions of patentability 
As analysed above, the assertion instrument provides an effective and 
inexpensive way for a third party to support the IPONZ at the examination 
stage without becoming a party of the procedure.  
The instrument of assertion should also allow third parties to submit 
relevant material to the IPONZ. A statement providing the reason why the 
submitted material is relevant should accompany the submission. As in the 
European system, it should be possible to make a submission anonymously. 
Furthermore, the third party should have the right to respond to the 
applicant‘s replies. 
To effectively support the examiner in the examination process, the 




2 Pre-grant opposition on the grounds of novelty and obviousness 
If third parties wish to participate more actively in the examination 
procedure, they should also have the right to oppose the application. Such 
pre-grant opposition would also allow third parties to carry out an in-depth 
argumentation on relevant documents in submission and in hearings before 
the examiner. As the right to opposition gives third parties a strong 
influence, which they could use to delay the granting procedure, the grounds 
should be limited to novelty and obviousness.  
Allowing pre-grant opposition of applications offers several 
advantages for New Zealand. As invalid patents create social costs and New 
Zealand mainly grants patent to non-residents, it would be better to be able 
to challenge a patent before it is granted. Otherwise, a patent may remain in 
the register without being challenged, because of the risk of lawsuits.  
The possible delaying effects of pre-grant opposition can be reduced 
by implementing strict deadlines. In addition, as third parties would have to 
bear the costs of an opposition procedure, they would use substantial prior 
art during opposition that may also reduce the time of such a procedure. 
 
3 Revocation before the Commissioner and the Court without limited 
grounds 
The final instrument would be the revocation on all grounds of 
patentability before the Commissioner and the courts after grant of the 
patent. The post-grant revocation instrument should be retained, as more 
grounds are available than in pre-grant opposition. Furthermore, after a 
grant, new documents may be found to challenge an application. Since a 
procedure before the Commissioner is financially easier to bear than a 
procedure in the courts, the revocation should also be possible in an 
administrative procedure without limited grounds.  
 
IX  CONCLUSION 
A patent is a temporarily limited monopoly on an invention giving the 
patentee the right to exploit this invention and to prohibit its use by others. 
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In return, the patentee provides a description of the invention, which allows 
anybody to use it after the expiration of the patent term. Even though 
patents limit competition and may result in higher prices, they may also help 
to encourage research and development and to promote innovation. This 
societal benefit is the main reason for countries to provide patent protection. 
However, the balance between advantages and disadvantages of patents for 
society is at risk if too many inventions that are not patentable obtain patent 
protection, or if overly broad patents are granted. Such ―bad‖ patents impose 
costs on society without a beneficial effect on research and development. 
Providing for strong patent rights is the best solution to maintain this 
balance.  
As the quality of patents greatly depends on the quality of the 
examination procedure, it would be ideal for a country to have an effective 
and inexhaustible pool of experts and resources for each kind of industry to 
examine its patent applications. Unfortunately, no country in the world has 
such an ideal patent office. In practise, patent examiners have only a limited 
amount of time to conduct prior art searches and make decisions about the 
patentability of applications.  
This means that the quality of patents must be improved by another 
factor: third parties, whose influence can help to prevent the grant of patents 
that should not be granted and to eliminate ―bad‖ patents, should they be in 
the market. Third parties should therefore have a key role in the granting 
procedure. As a result, the quality of patents would improve, innovation 
would be encouraged, and society would receive benefits from its patent 
system. As a fair patent system needs to balance the interests of all 
concerned, it should also provide third parties with instruments to influence 
the granting procedure to protect them against the unfair use of patents. 
Third parties need to know whether and when something happens that could 
affect their business. Although the patent system is not designed to give 
patentees weapons to harass their business competitors, it still gives the 
patentee a competitive advantage. In order to keep the balance, a good 




Patent systems worldwide provide several instruments for third parties 
to participate in the granting procedure with different levels of influence and 
at different stages of the administrative procedure. How much influence a 
third party has depends strongly on the quality of the examination 
procedure.  
The most effective way to review patents is before the courts, as it is 
the function of the courts to make a final determination of whether a patent 
is valid or not. Unfortunately, patent litigation is expensive and time-
consuming. Although patents are supposed to protect small firms, these 
firms can in fact be crushed by the cost of patent litigation. Therefore, most 
patent regimes also provide reviewing procedures before the patent office. 
As analysed above, the most effective review instruments, such as 
opposition, are adversarial proceedings. Comparable to court proceedings, 
the burden of proof lies on the opponent, who must file substantial evidence 
to be successful. Such a review procedure imposes costs and delays into the 
proceedings. Additionally, if a comprehensive review of a patent is only 
allowed after the patent is granted, the third party faces the risk of being 
sued in a parallel infringement action. As a result, it is quite likely that 
invalid patents survive in the market because it is too expensive and too 
risky to challenge them. 
Another issue is the quality of the patents granted by the patent office. 
If the standards of examination are high and the patent office refuses all 
undesirable applications, it may not be necessary for third parties to have 
numerous possibilities to challenge the grant of a patent. Thus, the better the 
examination procedure of the patent office, the lower the influence of third 
parties needs to be. In other words, if the examination procedure already 
creates strong patents, it will not be necessary to give third parties much 
influence in the granting procedure. 
Under current New Zealand patent law, due to its less than strict 
examination standards, it is relatively easy to obtain patents with an overly 
broad scope. The existing law accordingly provides third parties with pre-
grant opposition, giving them a strong influence before the patent is even 
granted. In order to clear ―bad‖ patents out of the register, third parties are 
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allowed to challenge applications on several grounds without risking 
lawsuits. This approach seems beneficial for third parties, but is 
disadvantageous for patentees, who must bear the risk that the grant of a 
patent may be delayed for years. On the other hand, the influence of third 
parties on the examination itself is not as strong it might first appear. Firstly, 
third parties can only have full access to the information of an application 
after the examination has already been carried out. This means that the 
patent office reaches the point of granting a patent without any influence by 
third parties. Furthermore, a third party who may have relevant material on 
the patentability of an application has to bear the costs of an opposition 
procedure because no other instrument (such as assertion) currently exists. 
Thus, material relevant to the patentability might not be submitted and the 
application might not be challenged at all. Moreover, the timeframe for 
opposing an application is strictly limited to three months after the third 
party had its first access to the complete specification. Therefore, an 
opposition may be unsuccessful because the time for in-depth research for 
prior art was too short.  
Overall, it may be easy to obtain a patent in New Zealand with a broad 
scope, but at the same time, the law also provides third parties with strong 
instruments to challenge these patents in order to maintain a balance. 
Under the Patents Bill 2008, the examination procedure will be much 
stricter. The instruments for third parties to challenge the grant of a patent 
will significantly change. With the establishment of an automatic 
publication of the specification, as well as the instruments of assertion and 
re-examination, third parties will be given the opportunity to exert influence 
much earlier than before. Particularly, the right to give notice to the 
Commissioner and to submit relevant material gives third parties new 
possibilities to exert influence without filing an opposition. However, 
neither instrument allows direct participation in the proceedings, which has 
advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, the revocation procedure 
before the Commissioner, which currently gives the third party more 
influence, would only be allowed after the grant of a patent and would 
involve the risk of being sued. Under the Patents Bill 2008, the Patent 
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Office must apply stricter standards for examination, but third parties would 
have less direct influence before the grant of a patent. 
Neither the approach of the Patents Act 1953 nor that of the Patents 
Bill 2008 is the ideal solution for New Zealand‘s review system. However, a 
mixture combining both approaches may be more appropriate in order to 
achieve the goal of avoiding as many ―bad‖ patents as possible in the 
register. The revised patent law will increase the standard of examination, 
but it would still be better for New Zealand‘s system to offer third parties 
more involvement in the examination procedure than the Patents Bill 
proposes. As it is currently formatted, the extended prior art base of absolute 
novelty, the examination for obviousness, and the changed standard of proof 
have the potential to overload the resources of the New Zealand patent 
office. In addition, the fact that third parties may have a better perspective 
on prior art and could help prevent invalid patents during the examination 
procedure has thus far been overlooked. An earlier influence of third parties 
could speed up the examination process in more ways than one, if relevant 
prior art were brought to light or submitted to the Commissioner before he 
or she carries out the examination.  
A new approach, as suggested above, incorporating elements of both 
schemes should also be considered as a way to enhance the quality of New 
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